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ABSTRACT 
Since nearly every water resources management choice has two 
or more sides, differences must be resolved in decision making. 
Equitable resolution requires an understanding of the reasons for the 
differences. These reasons originate in that implemented plans have 
physical-environmental, economic, social, cultural, and political 
impacts at levels ranging from local to national or international in 
scope. Decisions are made by individuals and groups impacted in all 
of these dimensions and at all of these levels; the decisions generate 
additional impacts; and the entire interactive process changes water 
management practice in ways outside the control of anyone decision 
point or even decision dimension. The objective of this study is to 
conceptualize this process in a way that will help in establishing 
institutional mechanisms for reconciling differences among levels of 
analysis. 
The conceptualization used viewed differences in choices being 
made at the various levels of analysis as associated with perspective 
differences having value, jurisdication, action, and temporal ele-
ments. The possible combinations of differences within and between 
these elements were used to identify ten categories of institutional 
obstacles to efficient water planning (differences in values, con-
flicts between value and jurisdiction, etc.). The history of water 
resources planning in the Colorado River basin was then examined to 
identify 17 specific institutional obstacles, and a computerized 
policy simulation was applied to levels of analysis in the Uintah 
basin of Utah to identify three more. These 20 obstacles were 
shown to be broadly distributed over the ten categories, and the 
nature of the obstacles defined provides valuable insight into the 
common characteristics of the major institutional obstacles to water 
management. 
The principles of logic as applicable to rationality in decision 
making were then used to identify two root causes of levels I con-
flicts. If alternatives are evaluated from a single perspective, the 
ostensible causal relationships commonly used lead to estimates of the 
sum of the consequences from the parts of a water management program 
being far more than the total consequences of the entire program. 
Looked at another way, since available water resources planning tools 
do not properly allocate consequences from interact ive processes to 
individual causal sources, decisions made to achieve a desired impact 
are not based on reliable information. In fact, different decisions 
made over time from a single perspective have conflicting impacts. 
When multiple perspectives are considered, one finds that individual 
values do not aggregate linearly in forming social values, many 
actions are not efficient in achieving preferred values, and decision 
makers are not able to implement their plans as desired. Real world 
situations combine interacting perspectives and partial contribu-
tions. Nine recommendations are made on what to do next in improving 
water resources planning in an interactive, nonlinear world. 
iii 
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LEVELS OF WATER RESOURCES PLANNING 
Introduction 
As economic growth and technological 
advances have added to the complexity of 
interactions of water availability and 
use with the economy, env ironment, and 
society, systems analysis techniques have 
become increasingly important in water 
resources planning. The systems approach has 
led to considerable improvement in under-
standing these interactions so that quantita-
t ive models could be developed to represent 
the interactions in design optimization. 
Analysis leading to a reasonable decision 
in the presence of interactive relationships 
amounts to solving a relational problem. 
Problems caused by economic, envi ronmental, 
and social impacts are all relational. 
While much more research is needed 
to understand and solve the relational 
problems in project and other water manage-
ment opt imizat ion, the top ic of th is report 
is much narrower. The subject here is the 
subset of relational problems that must be 
solved in opt imizing the planning process. 
The issues of this subset are called the 
problems of levels of analysis. Why do 
pl&nners for different jurisdictions come 
to different conclusions on a given manage-
ment issue? Why do water resources groups 
pursue different courses of act ion than do 
land management groups? Why do planners so 
often encounter major resistance from the 
putlic when they try to proceed to imple-
mentation? What can be done to bring diverse 
viewpoints together, improve the efficiency 
of the planning process, and thereby improve 
resource management? These are some of the 
issues in solving problems in levels of 
analysis. 
Problem Setting in the Colorado 
River Basin 
Individuals make countless water use 
decisions daily. These individual decisions 
aggregate into the use society makes of 
its water and related land resources. 
Water resources planners review current 
and potential water use for opportunities to 
make more beneficial use of water and for 
problems that can be ameliorated. They 
define action alternatives, collect informa-
tion on their consequences, and present their 
resulting evaluations for discussion and 
decision making. 
When water is abundant, each user 
can pursue his own interest with little 
effect on others. As the demand for water 
becomes almost as large as the average annual 
runoff, conflicts among users and opportuni-
ties for cooperation for mutual benefit 
multiply. The planning must be more thorough 
to lay the foundation for objective develop-
ment and management decisions. 
Three principal factors make the need 
for careful planning increase with demand. 
First, the increasing marginal cost, in 
both economic and environmental terms, of 
developing additional water justifies greater 
planning effort to get the most for more 
money spent and to avoid unnecessary environ-
mental and social costs from the greater 
impact of larger projects. Second, when 
nearly all the available water is being used, 
the system loses its resilience in coping 
with external events that reduce supply or 
increase demand. This loss necessitates 
greater and more effective interaction 
between land and water planning. Third, the 
greater marginal benefit from the last units 
of water used just if ies greater management 
effort to prevent the waste of a more valu-
able commodity. 
New demands that develop after all 
the water nature supplies has been put to use 
can only be supplied by taking water pre-
viously used by others. In discussions 
of such shifts, former users and those 
with the new demands, including people who 
identify with both groups, are likely to have 
quite different views of the exchange, and 
tbe negotiation is complicated because 
changes that occur often have significant 
effects on still other groups. Water 
exchanges among individuals in water short 
areas consequently become quite sensitive in 
the community and are closely regulated by 
water rights officials. Proposals to change 
government water management policy become 
very sensitive in the political arena. 
Such a situation exists in the South-
western United States, where the Colorado 
River and its tributarieR supply I') million 
people in seven states. The water from the 
Colorado supports 8.0 percent of the nat ion's 
population with less than 1.5 percent of the 
annual runoff in a region where high tem-
peratures and long growing seasons add 
greatly to water requirements. Perennial 
water shortages result in continual con 
flicts and discussion of trade offs in 
water allocations among users. These dia-
logues make the Colorado River Basin an ideal 
area to study the economic, political, and 
cultural linkages that connect people's lives 
in their efforts LO obtain water and use it 
benef ic ially. 
the Sel of Relational Problems 
The set of relat ionsh ips important 
to water resources planning can be divided 
between impact relationships and decision 
relationships. Impact relationships cause 
impacts from decisions made, and decision 
relationships influence decisions contem-
plated. The impact relat ional problems 
include forecasting impacts that will occur 
and avoiding undesirable impacts. The 
decision relational problems include bringing 
the best information into the decision 
making and compromising conflicting decisions 
being made at various levels. 
Impact Relationships 
As diagramed on Figure 1, a decision 
on a new water project or policy as depicted 
by a black dOL in the center of the figure 
scatters impacts in many direct Ions shown 
as economic, governmental, social, cultural, 
and physical-natural dimensions. Impacts 
in each dimension vary from very local to 
very broad concerns. For example, impacts 
in the social dimension range from those 
on individuals to lhose on society as a 
whole. 
The linkages causing these impacts 
generally radiate outward from the center. A 
decision may affect an individual and then 
affect others indirectly as they perceive 
what happens. A decision affects individ-
uals, directly and indirectly, and because 
it does so, it also affects families. When 
these more localized effects are more numer-
ous they aggregate to affect groups. Effects 
Figure 1. Partial representation of interconnected dimensions and elements in a planning 
system. 
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on many groups change communities, and 
effects on communities aggregate to change 
society. As the effects radiate outward, 
they also cross from one dimension to an-
other. As examples, economic effects 
on consumers can affect families as well as 
can social effects on individuals. Experi-
mental effects on water quality or on in-
dustrial employment can alter cultural 
va lues. 
Each po int along a d imens ion may be 
defined as a level of impact. Each level 
of impact includes many elements, specifi-
cally many "consumers, neighborhoods, indi-
viduals, behaviors, or small drainage basins. 
The elements at a level vary from many small 
units near the center to fewer but much 
larger units further out. For example, there 
may be millions of consumers, thousands of 
firms, scores of industr ies, and one or two 
national economies affected by a given 
decision. 
The impacts radiating outward from a new 
project or policy tend to l be damped at the 
higher impact levels. An effect that com-
pletely changes a neighborhood may not even 
be noticed at the national level, or major 
alterations in behavior may occur within 
fixed cultural norms. 
Decision Relationships 
Each element at each level is also a 
locus of decision making. An impacted 
consumer may respond in a variety of ways. 
One consumer is likely to respond quite 
differently than another. 
The top level decision makers in the 
nat ional economy may also respond, but two 
important trends can be observed as one goes 
to higher decision making levels. First, the 
dec is ion mak ing process involves more part i-
c ipants and occurs through more complex 
interactive processes. Second, the decisions 
made become more powerful in the impact they 
exert. Decisions to alter the course 
of the nat ional economy have a much greater 
impact than do those of an individual con-
sumer changing his buying habits. 
The decision making within a given 
element responds to some combination of 
the original stimulus and perceived effects 
on or responses by other elements, either 
on the same or on other dimens ions. Deci-
sions by elements will often be different 
from one another and may be either com-
plementary or competitive in nature. 
From the viewpoint of the general 
welfare of society, information on impacts 
along all five dimensions is relevant to 
making water USE decisions as well as many 
other decisions that indirectly affect water 
ava ilability or use, for example, by changing 
the runoff characteristics of the land 
surface, the need for water by mUnicipal or 
industrial users, etc. No one decision 
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maker considers, wants to consider, or even 
is capable of considering all the information 
on all impacts along all five dimensions. 
Instead, each reviews data on what, from his 
perspect ive, appear to be key variables or 
indicators of harm or merit. l Perspective 
thus serves as a filter that reduces the 
total set of relevant information to a lesser 
set that its user can assimiiate, but the 
reduction process is very biased. Methods 
for reducing this bias are the key to solving 
the "level of analysis" problem. 
Decision making in water resources 
management is a collect ive process. Each 
actor decides according to his perception of 
h is best interest. Each acts on the bas is of 
perceived information and reacts to perceived 
actions or statements of others. It is these 
relational interactions among decision 
makers that are the primary focus of this 
study. Specifically, what methods and 
procedures exist or can be developed to 
define interest and coordinate act ions for 
the mutual benefit of the diverse individ-
uals, groups, organizations, and levels of 
decision making in the total water planning 
process? The importance of this question has 
been recognized for sometime, but no one has 
made much progress in ofganizing a theory 
that can be used to achieve effective 
methods and testing it against empirical 
information. 
Received View as a Theoretical Basis 
Conceptually, the linkages within and 
among the various levels of analysis are not 
well understood, although certain ones have 
received much attention in various social 
sc iences. "Examples include the problem of 
exernalit ies in economics and polit ical 
science; the problem of sub-optimization 
in business; that of conflict resolution in 
political science; and that of interest 
aggregation in economics, political science, 
and sociology. The results of these var ious 
stud ies can best be appl ied by find ing a 
common thread of applicable theory. One 
common ground exists iri the ph ilosoph ical, 
logical, and semantic issues that these 
ef forts employed In def In Ing "perspect Ive," 
"point of view," and "level of analYSIS." 
Common issues include: 
How can a planning perspective be 
identified and/or defined? 
What is involved in the definition of 
a planning system? 
lIn the TechCom study hundreds of 
indicators and variables were identified 
for nine primary goals related to water 
resources planning (Technical Committee 
of the Water Resources Centers of the Th ir-
teen Western States, 1974). 
What are the conceptual categories 
that best describe interactions among 
planninp, perspectives and levels? 
Whether purposefully or incidentally, 
assumptions used in answering the above 
questions underlie any attempt to coordinate 
and/or integrate planning for a complex 
system. A proper understanding of the 
conceptual issues related to levels of 
analysis must be coupled with a technical 
understanding of such varied areas as hy-
drology, economic analysis, environmental 
impact, institutional setting, and social 
well-being. It is within the contexts of 
both the conceptual prerequis ites and plan-
ning aClualities that the aims and objectives 
of this study should be understood. 
Because of the diversity of interrelated 
actors, an operational theory needs to begin 
with a shared language or understanding of 
such key terms as "relat ional problems," 
It leve Is of analys is," "perspect ives," and 
"points of view." The kind of shared lan-
guage needed is one like that characterized 
as "received view" among philosophers on 
the nature of scientific theory. These 
philosophers have been able to develop a 
profound understanding of how to structure 
sc ient if ic theory because a "received view" 
was consensually understood to identify a 
specified set of conditions for a theory 
to be accepted as a theory (Suppe, 1977). 
Planners need consensual understanding of 
conditions for a plan to be accepted as a 
plan. In order to lay a foundat ion for the 
needed consensus, the present study will 
begin with a review of the observed rela-
t ional problems, issues, and parameters that 
characterize the study region and sub-regions 
(Colorado River Basin, State of Utah, and 
U intah Bas in), and that have been discussed 
in the context of nat ional water resources 
planning. 
Decision Points in Land and Water Use 
In focusing on levels of analysis 
problems, it is useful to examine the al-
ternatIves for land and water use and the 
decision points choosing amon~ them. The use 
alternat ives can be characterized in several 
ways. Patterns of land use, for instance, 
are of ten ca tegor ized in terms of woods, 
pasture, farms, homes, factories, etc., and 
can be displayed as a spat fal conf i!!urat ion 
at a given point in time. This pattern 
chanp,es as parcels shift from one use to 
another. Patterns of water use may be 
def ined in terms of power generat ion, waste 
dilution, fish habitat, etc., or water 
diverted. from the stream for agricultural, 
induslrial, or municipal supply. The deci-
sion poinls occur at the individual, com-
munity, slate, regional, and national 
levels in lhe governmental dimens ion, and 
over a correspondinp, range of levels along 
the olher dimensions shown on Figure 1. 
The patterns of land and water use 
at a given point in time are the product of 
4 
many decisions made by indivIdual "property 
managers." They include persons who own 
land, lease from a landlord, or work for a 
corporation; they include farmers with water 
rights and home owners who water their 
lawns. Each person bases his decision on 
some kind of analysis (informed, uninformed, 
or misinformed; superficial or profound) from 
which he concludes that certain land or 
water use is beneficial from his point of 
view. Each dec is ion is to var ious degrees 
influenced by the characteristics and 
availability of the resources and by the 
way others use or do not use adjacent lands 
or waters. 
As a property manager IS benef it from 
land or water use is affected by the activi-
ties of his neighbors, he is motivated to 
influence them to adopt certain uses and 
avoid others. He may exercise personal and 
social pressures to advance h is private 
interest. If individual efforts to control 
these external effects fail in matters which 
many people th ink important, the not ion of 
general or public interest creates a role for 
government in guiding individual land and 
water use decision making toward some accept-
able public standards. Laws, regulations, 
financial incentives, and other means are 
employed to confine individual choices within 
the bounds of acceptability as defined by 
some higher level of analysis. These in 
struments can be used at public interest 
levels varying from the local community to 
the nat ion as a whole. Communit ies monitor 
the act ions of individuals, states monitor 
the actions of communities, etc. 
The public interest as seen at a given 
level is def ined by actors in the pol i tical 
and gove rnme n tal a rena wh ich impact sand 
is impacted by the decisions that emerge. 
For example, actors work through local 
government leaders to establish a community 
viewpoint (more accurately a dynamically 
changing viewpoint responding to a wide 
variety of influences). The governmental 
actors then use instruments available to them 
to build projects or to confine individual, 
private choices within the bounds of com-
munity acceptabililY. Ideally, all community 
decisions should originate from some kind of 
analysis that has concluded that a given 
action would promote the public interest and 
that a certain action plan is the most suited 
to achieve the desired results. 
As the quantilY and quality of available 
water is affected by upstream land and waler 
use and in turn affects the quantity and 
quality of water available for those down-
stream, communities need to be motivaled 
towa;:-d land and water use policy in confor-
mance with state or regional public inleresl. 
Some level of governmenl high enouV,h lo 
inlernalize bOlh beneficial and adverse 
external effects may well find i l necessary 
to influence community policy to in lurn 
influence individual property manager deci-
sions (the flood plain management program for 
example) or to implement direct construction 
of necessary facilit ies (a water supply 
reservoir for example). Implementable 
incentives are needed to ach ieve a combined 
pattern of land and water use to achieve the 
general good. 
In an hierarchial system of jurisdic-
t ional governments, a number of arenas 
are available for establishing consensus and 
implement ing programs. Decision systems are 
found at the property manager, town, county, 
regional council of governments, state, 
inters t ate compact, and nat ional levels. 
Each level possesses its own viewpoint with 
respect to all five impact dimensions (Figure 
1), and each has its own limitations on what 
it can and cannot do. Each jurisdiction has 
its own access to informat ion (correct or 
incorrect), its own capability for evaluation 
of alternat ives, its own resources to imple-
ment the selected courses of action, and its 
own legal and institutional restrictions on 
its activities. The total decision making 
and "planning" system for land and water use 
combines all these levels deciding, inter 
acting, adjusting, and continually changing 
in both perception and viewpoint. 
At each level, the decision process is 
affected by what participants observe or know 
of the problems and selected solutions at 
hi er or at lower levels, or at the same 
level in other jurisdictions. The water and 
related land use management practices within 
the Colorado River Basin thus result from a 
decision making system functioning at many 
levels and at many locat ions at each lower 
level. The success or failure of any effort 
to influence these practices cannot be 
adequately evaluated at anyone level alone 
because the interactions among the levels of 
analysis must be taken into account. 
Illustrative Relational Problems 
in the Colorado River Basin 
In order to illustrate the wide scope 
of relational issues faced by water resources 
planners, it is helpful to describe some of 
the link s in decision making in the 
Colorado R r Bas in. The current linkages 
among the various levels of analYSis are in 
turn strongly influenced by historical 
1 inkages that produced the ex ist ing context 
of the legal agreements, court decisions, and 
water rights that govern water allocation. 
For example, Colorado River water is al-
located among seven states through the 
Colorado River Compact of 1922, a u.s. 
Supreme Court decree in Arizona vs. Cali-
fornia (376 U.S. 340, 1964) and the Colorado 
River Basin Project Act--PL 90-537 (USDI, 
Bureau of Reclamation, 1975).2 In addi-
2The water rights of many Indian tribes 
in the region have not been finally settled, 
so that some signlficant uncertainties about 
water allocations remain at the state levels. 
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tion, the basin states are responsible 
to Insure that 1.5 million acre-feet water of 
specified quality is delivered to Mexico 
annually. 
One could begin a discussion of the 
myriad interconnections among decision levels 
in the region with just about any issue or 
geograph ical area. One interes t ing account 
(Lich tens tein, 1977) follows the course of 
the Colorado River, beginning at its head-
waters. Alternatively one might start with 
the Denver metropolitan area which lies 
outside the drainage area but draws more than 
70 percent of its water from the Colorado 
(Hundley, 1970). For our purpose, it is 
useful to develop the relational questions 
and issues by beginning with the Imperial 
Valley in California, near the downstream end 
of the rive!:. 
The Imperial Valley was a desert before 
irrigation began with Colorado water. 
Now the valley produces an estimated one-half 
bi llion dollars worth of agr icul t ural com-
modit ies annually and supplies vef,etable 
markets in all parts of the country. The 
Imperial Irrigation District, the largest 
single user of Colorado water, imports close 
to 3 million acre feet of water from the 
Lower Colorado River, or about two-thirds of 
California's allocated 4.4 million acre feet. 
The rema inder of California's share as well 
as additional Colorado water, bringing 
California's total annual use to about 5.1 
million acre feet, is transported to the 
Southern California coastal plain where it 
provides about 50 percent of the water for 
the San Diego and Los Angeles areas. 
A number of water use issues within 
California emerge from this situation. 
California is presently using about 0.7 
million acre feet of water officially allo-
cated to Arizona and Nevada. When these 
other Lower Basin states claim their water, 
which California users will have to give up 
what they now have? Will they be able to 
obtain replacement water from Northern 
California or from saline water converllion? 
Who should pay the cost for the imported 
water or for ocean water conversion? Whilt is 
the optimum allocatlOn of water within the 
State of California and what values should be 
used or are affected by such an optimum? 
What pr iori ties should govern water alloca-
t ion among the different areas in Southern 
California and the state as a whole, and how 
should various interests be weighted? For 
instance, should municipal use drive out 
agr icultural use? How should the water 
rights of California Indian tribes affect the 
allocation of water? What planning process 
should California implement to insure that 
the distribution of water among different 
users will be equitable and efficient? 
These kinds of questions can be repeilted 
for every state in the bas in, for the ref' ion 
IH: a whole, and for the e n t ire co u n t r v • 
Tbey can be answered in some sor t of ob jec-
tive sense by specialists evaluating -the 
trade offs scientifically, but actual choicei 
are more often made through the collective 
decision making of many actors at diverse 
levels. Furthermore, many of these choices 
do nOl make a great deal of sense from a 
purely objective viewpoint. 
The difficulties in rationally planning 
an timum water allocation at the state 
leve are compounded at the basin level where 
the constraints of political feasibility are 
greater. The significance of politics can 
be demonstrated by speculating how plann 
might proceed if only economic efficiency 
were cons idered. One poss ible outcome could 
be that water diversions to most of Arizona 
and Southern California would not be justi 
fied on the basis of opportunity cost cal-
culations. Water used in the Imperial Valley 
might be more efficiently used in other parts 
of the basin. Long-run economic efficiency 
might favor resettlement of populations from 
Arizona, Nevada and California to other 
areas in the bas in or the country. Another 
poss ible outcome would be that such con-
siderations as milder climate and greater 
availability of other factors of production 
in the Lower Basin would make it economically 
efficient to reallocate water from the Upper 
to the Lower Basin. 
As one more possibility, it may be 
economically feasible for both Upper and 
Lower Basins to import water from the Colum-
bia River, although just the study of this 
possibility has already created conflicts 
with the Northwest states (Idaho Water 
Resources Research Institute, 1976). The 
point is that none of these reallocations 
is possible because political factors far 
out-weigh economic efficiency when one is 
dealing with complel<, -scale planning 
systems. 
In addition to these water quantity 
problems, salinity has become a major problem 
in the Lower Basin. Further Increases 
in salinity may cripple agriculture in some 
areas. Wh ile damage est imat ion presents 
difficult technical problems (Utah Water 
Research Laboratory, 1975: p. 232-244), a 
Bureau of Reclamation (1974) approximation 
estimates a possible reduction of $16 per 
acre in net farm income for the Imperial 
Valley if salinity increases by 320 mg/l 
by the year 2000. Costs to other Lower 
Basin areas are similar or higher. Since the 
salts that reach the valley originate in all 
areas of the basin, an effect ive program to 
reduce salinity needs to involve almost 
everyone upstream. Furthermore, the entire 
country is affected as the federal government 
bears the cos t of the desalt plant at the 
Cali[0rnia-Mexico border to ensure that water 
of appropr late guaU ty enters Mex ico. 
I t is compt [caled to determine what 
sal inity control measures are most efficient, 
e qui tab 1 e , and e f f e c t i v e, and how s u c h 
measures can be best implemented. One 
writer describes the basic difficulty as 
follows: 
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The problem of salinity control 
cannot be narrowly construed. 
Decisions concerning salinity 
control have implications for water 
resource development in t he bas in. 
Water resource development deci-
sions have environmental and 
social implications of the most 
far-reaching kind. Decisions 
affecting the basin as a whole need 
to be examined systematically and 
comprehensively, but no eXIsting 
institution has a basin-wide 
interest and perspect ive as lts 
primary focus (Utah Water Research 
Laboratory, 1975). 
Thus salinity control measures cause numerous 
conflict situations. One major conflict IS 
illustrated by the ins istence of the states 
in the Upper Basin that they will not toler-
ate interference with their deve to 
reduce salinity for farmers, munic pal, and 
other users in the Lower Basin (Utah Water 
Research Laboratory, 1975: p. 99). 
The water quantity and quality inter-
relationships described in this section are 
only suggestive of the many relational 
problems that pertain to water supply and 
quality issues. Other relational issues 
related to energy, economic development, 
recreation, environmental quality, and social 
welfare are just as important. 
Wit h res p e c t top rob 1 ems i n 1 eve 1 s 
of analysis, all the important interact ions 
among decision makers acting at various 
levels along the various dimensions of Figure 
1 influence water policy. All need to be 
considered in an effective forma"l planni 
framework. How can this be done? Can it 
done at all? Progress in this direction can 
only be made by int ating the conceptual, 
procedural, and inst tional components of 
the planning system in an organizing frame-
work that guides the planning process. 
Research Objectives 
General Objectives 
The two previous sections have tried 
Lo convey the complex context faced by 
water resources planners because of the 
ny and varied impact relationships af-
ecting elements over a range of levels 
along several dimensions. The complexity 
increases as the impacts generate feedback 
linkages to multiple decision points. 
The planner rightly seeks optimality as 
he weighs tradeoffs among alternat lves but 
he must also rec nize the constraints 
the options being se ed at other declsion 
points create for the decisions that he 
would like to implement. The processes 
of impact, cholce at other decislon points, 
and formal planning decisions interact 
dynamically in response to mull iple external 
stimuli as resource availability, technologi-
cal ca~ability, environmental health, and 
many other conditions change. The general 
object ive of th is study is to help planners 
who must work in th is context by 1) develop-
i ng a conceptual representat ion of thei r 
levels of analysis problems and 2) suggesting 
institutional mechanisms to help integrate 
different planning perspectives in achieving 
common goals. 
General Procedure 
The general approach to accomplish 
these planning objectives will begin by 
ident Hying important levels of analysis 
problems as seen in 1) the history of 
planning decisions within a portion of 
the Colorado River Basin (Chapter II) and 
2) the current state of the water resources 
planning art (Chapter Ill). A simulation 
mode 1 (PROPDEMM) for express ing preferences 
from three levels of analysis (basin, state, 
and local) will then be used in trying 
to understand these problems in greater 
depth (Chapter IV). Out of efforts, 
specific problems will be defined and used as 
a bas is for the conceptual deve lopment and 
suggestion of institutional mechanisms in the 
second part of this report. 
Research Frameworka Activities, and Metbo s
The research procedure combined 1) 
conceptualization and theory, 2) application, 
and 3) analysis. The methods included 
a mail survey and personal interviews, 
content analys is of newspapers, and the 
appl icat ion of a computer s imulat ion 
(PROPDEMM I I, a programmed policy decis ion 
making model). The results of the con-
ceptual/theoretical analysis and the fol-
low simulation were synthesized in recom-
mendations for dealing with institutional 
issues and concerns. 
From the start of the project, levels 
of analysis problems were found to be very 
important in numerous contexts, but previous 
in-depth analyses with practical relevance 
were lacking. It was therefore decided to 
begin with development of a conceptual 
framework that could provide a foundation for 
dealing with levels of analys is problems in 
water resource planning pract ice. To th is 
end, a large scale literature review was 
undertaken to identify the theoretical as 
well as applied work that has been ac-
complished with respect to levels of anal-
YS]s. Considerable theoretical work relating 
to social choice, levels, and relational 
problems has been done in economics, systems 
theory and cybernetics, philosophy, sociol-
ogy, and political science. 
The applicat ion was based on the lhree 
"planning syslems" defined by the Colorado 
River Basin, the State of Utah, and the 
Uintah Basin in Northwestern Utah. These 
three levels provide an excellent example 
of the complexities that characterize the 
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interactions, conflicts, and planning activi-
t ies in a large river basin. The region has 
been studied extensively, so that large 
amounts of data are available, facilitating 
the identification and invest ation of 
levels of analysis problems. In addit lon, 
each area has major water planning challenges 
due to water scarcity and quality control 
problems. Some of the problems were outlined 
earlier in this chapter for the Colorado 
Basin. Additionally, in Utah and the Uintah 
Basin, special problems are posed by energy 
development and by emerging population 
pressures. 
The conceptual foundation was comple-
mented by simulation of decision making 
at the various levels. The model needed to 
portray several levels of analys is in isola-
tion and also interrelate them. PROPDEMM II 
was chosen because it could do th is as It 
evaluates large amounts of planning informa-
tion in concise formats. 
PROPDEMM II simulates planning decisions 
from three cross-impact matrices that repre-
sent the socio-political, socio-economic-en-
vironmental, and course-of-action components. 
The model links the three matr ices through 
the concept of "value impact" postulated to 
be the fundament al element of any policy or 
planning situation. In addition, PROPDEMM II 
is among the politically most realistic 
simulations in that it gives explicit expres-
sion to political factors such as the power 
of interest groups, their commitment to 
certain values, the rigidity of their posi-
tions, their interactions historically, and 
their concern with costs of public programs. 
Simulation of the major plann -related 
interactions within each of the three systems 
provided compar isons that could be used to 
identify levels issues and problems that need 
to be addressed. Because the three systems 
are hierarchically ordered (the Uintah Basin 
is part of the State of Utah, which is 
turn de nds for most of its water on the 
Colorado iver), the interrelationships among 
them can be more easily traced and examined. 
The results could be used to analyze how 
interrelationships among interest groups, 
socio-economic-environmental factors, and 
courses-of-action for different levels of 
planning affect or are affected by each 
other. 
Summary 
The interdependence of dec is ion mak ing 
at various levels along the five dImensions 
shown in Figure I with water use and manage-
ment effort necessitates comprehensIve, 
integrative planning practices. Unfortun-
ately, relatively little practical knowledge 
and understanding exists about the nature and 
funct ioning of complex, inlerrelated impact 
and decis ion systems. What is worse, a large 
number of decis ion makers and planners are 
only vaguely aware that limitations to their 
understanding of how impacts interact with 
decisions may well be resulting in very poor 
decisions. Planners need a conceptual 
understanding that is descr ipt ive of the 
complexity of activities that impact upon one 
another, rooted in experience, and able to 
improve practice. 
One way to begin is to identify and 
examine the kinds of water and land use 
dec is ions. I t is apparent that patterns of 
water and land use are the combined result of 
decisions made by a number of individuals 
with different degrees of influence. The 
various social, economic, and political 
interests lead to specific viewpoints and 
perspectives that affect the planning system 
as a whole. They must somehow be taken into 
account in the overall planning process. 
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The Colorado River Basin provides 
numerous ex of the kinds of analytical 
and synthet c problems that need to be 
resolved in regional plann These prob-
lems, as a class, may be termed relational 
problems. Wh He relat ional problems encom-
pass all of interactions, levels of 
refer to interrelationships 
mak ing, part icularly character-
ized by some hierarchical ordering, as 
exemplified, for instance, by various layers 
of government. Levels of analys is problems 
present perh the most difficult conceptual 
and pract obs tacles to improved compre-
hensive river basin planning. To develop the 
necessary understanding for dealing with 
relat ional and levels of analys is problems, 
this study will examine both the context of 
plann inquiry and that of planning prac-
t ice, respect ively through philosoph ical and 
simulation ana 
CHAPTER I I 
THE "LEVELS OF ANALYSIS" PROBLEM IN CURRENT 
WATER RESOURCES PLANNING 
Introduction 
Water resources planning may be broadly 
defined to encompass the design, implementa-
tion, and operation of schemes to reduce 
flood damage, supply water, protect water 
quality, generate hydroelectric power, 
provide navigable waterways, provide opportu-
nity for water-oriented recreation, or 
otherwise increase the benefits people derive 
from water resources. The purposes of plan-
ning are to select worthy schemes, to 
develop functional designs, and to provide 
cost-effective implementation. The work that 
planners do, however, is often under used or 
ignored in actual selection, design, and 
implementation processes. To return to the 
decision framework presented with Figure 
1, decisions are made on these points at many 
levels using many degrees of analysis. Some 
use the results of the planning, and others 
do not. Thus, whether the plan is ever 
implemented as planned or not, the planning 
does have a benef icial impact to those who 
can use the information disseminated. 
Nevertheless, many plans are never imple-
mented because of obstacles of the "levels of 
analysis" sort. The purpose here is to 
identify some of these principal obstacles 
and explore ways to reduce them. 
The strategy will begin from an examina-
t ion of the purposes of water resources 
planning and the conventional procedure 
for achieving those purposes. It will 
review how the i~creased complexity of modern 
society has expanded the scope of planning 
considerations and changed planning pro-
cesses. A comparison between needs for 
ch ange tha t h ave been me t and those tha t have 
not will provide insight into institutional 
qbstacles. Four components of each level of 
analysis will then be used to classify 
institutional relationships in planning, 
identify conflict situations, and select 
examples for use in developini!, a better 
understanding of institutional obstacles or 
levels of analysiS problems. 
Purposes of Water Resources Planning 
The threefold purpose of water resources 
planning is 1) to select water development 
or management schemes that are worthy invest-
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ments for limited capital resources con-
sidering the consequent economic, environ-
mental, and social effects, 2) to develop 
a design (whether for a multipurpose reser-
voir or a flood-plain zon regulation) that 
will indeed perform satis ctorily in its 
intended function, and 3) to work out such 
details of project implementation as de-
veloping working institutional arrangements 
for project management, raising the necessary 
finances, securing needed political approval, 
and getting user groups to make proper use of 
project output. 
The Planning Process 
The process for water resources planning 
widely accepted as an ideal was outlined by 
Fox (1963), as: 
1. To plan on the basis of objectives 
and criteria specified by legislative action 
or achieved through group consensus prior to 
beginning the planning. The principles 
and standards adopted by the Water Resources 
Council (1973) have since become the official 
federal criteria, and more recently a number 
of changes to them are being seriously 
cons idered. 
2. To expand these broad criteria 
into quantifiable indices of project per 
formance that can be compared to determine 
the relative merits of the des alterna-
tives. 
3. To collect the data relevant to 
water resources management or pro ct de-
sign in the area under study and then to 
use that data to evaluate alternative courses 
of action by comparing them in terms of the 
selected indices. 
4. To select throu!!,h sllch an ilniilysis 
by professionals the s ini!,le best plan or 
mas t promis ing group of plans. A group 
of plans would be selected if nonquantifiable 
factors or conflicts among objectives make 
it impossible for professional analysis to 
decide what is best. 
5. To expose the selected plan or ~roup 
of plans to public discussion for final 
selection or for revision as necessary. 
6. To finalize the design and then 
implement the selected plan. 
In execution, the definition of a worthy 
project varies \vith the viewpoint of the 
evaluator, and project selection is highly 
dependent on prevailing public opinion. 
Detailed design is largely performed by 
technicians and ends up being highly de-
pendent on standards that have come to be 
genera lly accepted by the profess ion. The 
implementation arrangements have largely been 
worked out through political compromise 
rather than thoughtful analysis of alterna-
tives. 
Expanding Scope of Planning 
Considerations 
A wa ter resources planner migh t, for 
example, be charged \vith selecting, de-
signing, and facilitating implementation of a 
scheme for flood damage reduction for a given 
community. In a typical situation, he would 
de termi ne an acceptable leve 1 of protect ion 
(usually against at least the lOa-year flood 
for an urban area), collect the needed data, 
perform alternative designs, and select as 
optimal the design maximizing benefits net of 
cost. The plan, which might be a protective 
levee, would be discussed at a public meeting 
and implemented once benef lclaries obtained 
the necessary funding through the political 
process. In another example, an irrigation 
planner might recommend a small dam diverting 
water into a canal to the service area. 
As the need for larger projects to 
solve larger problems and the need to mini-
mize unnecessary magnification of downstream 
flood peaks and provide a dependable water 
supply during extended droughts turned both 
flood control and irrigation technologies to 
reservoirs, one large reservoir was found to 
be more economical than two smaller ones, and 
the multiple-purpose (combining in this 
case flood control with irrigation) project 
began (Linsley and Franzini, 1964, p. 619-
626). As a number of reservoirs came 
to be built along a river (the Columbia, 
Missouri, or Tennessee), benefits could be 
increased by coord inated operat ion, and 
multi-project systems (combining reservoirs 
in a river basin) began (Krutilla and Eck-
stein, 1958, p. 61-68). As it became obvious 
that project construction had important 
environmental and social as well as economic 
effects, multiple objective planning was 
recommended (Hufschmidt, 1969). 
As water and land resources become 
more fully utilized, the need to account for 
a wide variety of interactions between them 
is becoming increasingly important (Whipple 
et a1., 1976). For example, the need for an 
expanded water supply as well as the quantity 
and quality of the flow in the stream 
depend on land use within the basin. Indeed, 
the movement to increase emphasis on non-
structural measures was an attempt to achieve 
the benefiEs of water planning by changing 
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land use (movin!!, hi!!,hly damageable develop-
ment out of the flood plain for example) 
rather than by constructing more facilities. 
The title of the rinciples and standards 
specified for plann by the Water Resources 
Council (1973) notes that they are to be 
applied to both water and related land 
resources. Interactions between land and 
water use that need to be cons idered (James 
and Lee, 1971, p. 501-503) include 1) the 
extent to which land use determines the 
demand for flood control, irrigation, recrea-
tion facilities, etc.; 2) deterioration 
in water quality as pollution from city 
streets or agricultural chemicals are washed 
into streams; 3) changes in the runoff 
process as the los s of fores t land reduces 
soil moisture and snow pack and as urbaniza-
t ion speeds storm runoff and reduces low 
flows; 4) the extra erosion and sedimentation 
induced by logging, improper soil conserva-
tion practices on agricultural land, or 
construction activities; and 5) increases in 
precipitation associated with forestation or 
urbanization. 
The Importance of land-water-use rela-
tionships is maximum at locations where major 
land use change is occurring. Urbanization 
has an important effect in growing cities. 
Coal and oil shale development are likely to 
have a major impact in the Colorado River 
Bas in. Transpor tat ion f ac 11 It les are 1m 
port ant in determining land use and hence 
the need and spatial pattern for water 
resources development. Policy on providing 
or not providing water and sewer facilities 
can be important in shap ing urban develop-
ment. 
Expansions to the Planning Process 
As outlined in the previOUS section, 
the planning process has been faced \vith 
expand~ng 1) from single to multiple purpose 
projects, 2) from single to multiple project 
systems, 3) from single to multiple plann 
objectives, and 4) from water to more compre-
hensive planning incorporating interactions 
of water with land and other related re-
sources. The first expansion required 
engineering expertise existing within a 
single agency to cooperate in a common 
design and has been executed so successfully 
that the overwhelming majority of the reser-
voirs bu ilt in recent years have been mul-
tiple purpose. The second expansion required 
appl icat ion of the expert ise of a s in~le 
diSCipline, systems analysis or operations 
research, to solve a well-structured optimi-
zation problem a;1d has been generally suc-
cessful. The third expansion reauired the 
cooperative effort of multiple disciplines in 
developing new methodology for reconcil 
differences among multiple viewpoints, 
and multiple objective planning efforts have 
not yet succeeded in doing much more than 
slOWing the planning process to the point 
where very few plans are being implemented 
and the critical water management decisions 
are being made outside the formal framework. 
The fourth expansion requires working inter-
act ion between professional groups educated 
from widely differing perspectives in de-
veloping methodology to deal with processes 
so complex that even researchers operating at 
the front ier of knowledge do not really 
understand them. 
In summary, the planning process has 
successfully expanded from single to multiple 
purpose projects and from single to multiple 
project systems. It has not been able to 
expand from single to multiple objectives 
nor to integrate water with land and regional 
planning. The explanation for this dif 
ference logically lies in the differences in 
the obstacles to success. 
Every experienced water resources 
pIa nne r kn ows tha t there is too much un-
certainty in available information, methods, 
and understanding of the problems to ever be 
sure that one has really arrived at the 
best plan. A planner can always prof it from 
additional information and points of view. 
In the following discussion on how to iden-
tify, define, and overcome the obstacles to 
comprehensive planning, the goal is by no 
me~ns to show how to sell a plan produced by 
experts to a doubtful or a hostile public. 
It is rather to contribute guidelines 
that can help planners listen better to 
various publics and thereby do a better job 
of achieving consensus solutions. 
Technical Obstacles to Comprehensive 
Planning 
The technical obstacles to comprehensive 
planning include limi ted information on the 
relevant physical, economic, social, and 
ecological systems and how their components 
interact with one another, limited ability to 
reason from the information that is available 
in a manner that leads conclusively to a best 
plan, and limi ted availability of the man-
power and finances required to gather and 
analyze information (McKean, 1958). With 
respect to system descr ipt ion, the physical 
sciences are still far from able to describe 
a 11 the in t era c t ion s bet wee n i m~ or tan t 
variables controlling the temporal and 
spatial distributions of the rate of in-
filtration, evapotranspiration, movement 
of water through the soil, etc. (Flemin/!., 
1975). Economists (James and Lee, 1971) are 
an order of magn itude further and sociolo-
gists (Finsterbusch and Wolf, 1977) and 
ecoloi~ists (Corwin et a1., 1975) are even 
another order of magnitude further from being 
able to describe how planning alternatives 
differ in impac ts of the sorts with in their 
respective areas of expertise. 
With respect to evaluative techniques, 
no algorithms are available to optimize 
with respect to the complex object ive func-
t ion that would be needed to portray the 
11 
national economic development goal of v:ater 
resources management as bounded by all 
the complex constraints 1 imi t pract ical 
planning choices for real systems. i.Jork ing 
techniques for collective optimization with 
respect to several relevant goals (economic, 
environmental, and social) as an operational 
form of mult iple object ive planning are an 
order of magnitude further from reality. 
Wi th respect to f inanci ng a~G staff , 
there is not a team of planners that does 
not cIa iIr. that it could do a better job 'i.' i th 
more resources, nor is there a team that 
could not organize more efficiently to do a 
better job with the resources at hand. All 
of these technical obstacles are important. 
Each deserves further research, but all are 
outside the scope of the issues in levels 
of analysis. 
Institutional Obstacles to Comprehensive 
Planning 
The symptoms of institutional obstacles 
to comprehensive water resources planning are 
seen in legal and jurisdictional conflicts, 
slow response to chanl2'ing: conditions, 
and politically imposed constraints on 
a Iternat ives to be cons idered. The causes 
behind these symptoms, however, go much 
deeper and are rooted in the conflicts 
in the desired sorts of land and "rater use 
among people in a free society. Even the 
development plans or management programs that 
do most to promote the public welfare ad-
versely effect some individuals, interest 
groups, and communities. As each group 
takes political action in its own defense, it 
generates forces that make planning decisions 
more dependent on political power, legal 
barriers, and the chance timing of decision 
opportunities than on an objective assessment 
of public welfare. Over the years, !2'roups 
with common interests combine in varying 
alliances on varying issues at varying 
times, and the outcomes of the resul t ing 
political trading are probably the most 
important single influence on decision 
making. Many water resources planners have 
wondered whether careful evaluat ion of the 
alternatives is really worthwhile after 
seeing their best efforts rejected by politi-
cians who have incomplete understanding of 
the impl fcat ions. The essence of the Hi Lua-
tion, however, is that the systems institu-
tionalized for the orderly resolution of 
disputes among conflictinf interests, [or 
protectinl!. individual rights, ,mel for mnln-
telining stable l,"nd and water use policy have 
simultaneously created major obstacles 
to action to meet pressin? social needs. 
Some see 8 remedy to this situation in 
establishing cybernetic systems that will 
make all parties better informed and thereby 
more appreciative of one another's positions 
(Beer, 1975). While better information 
flow systems can do a great deal of good and 
a great deal of effort should be spent in 
their development, the fact that different 
people, all fully informed, would still 
make different choices must also be faced. 
In cases where one individual can choose 
without affecting others, the public interest 
is best served by permi tt ing each ind ividual 
freedom to make his own choice (Pigou, 1938). 
In other cases where a choice made by one 
individual severely affects the lives 
of others, the public interest requires 
1 i mit a t ion son the f r e e d om 0 fin d i v i d u a I 
choice. It is in setting and enforcing those 
limitations that conflicts develop and are 
institutionalized into obstacles restricting 
further action. In summary. the obstacles to 
comprehensive water resources planning 
and management in the United States originate 
in the conflicts resulting because different 
conclusions on how land and water should be 
used are being reached by different groups 
taking different actions to achieve different 
objectives from different jurisdictional 
viewpoints. 
Framework for Institutional Problem 
Identification 
In order to probe these institutional 
obstacles more deeply, a framework is needed 
for systematic inspection of water plann 
institutions so that obstacles can 
identified, classified, and analyzed. The 
descriptive framework used here has four 
Temporal Values 
Different horizons Short £lm vs. long ron 
Ovedal)ping durations Value change 
components illustrated in Figure 2 and 
described in a little wore detail below. 
Each component acts within each element at 
each level of analysis alonp each d iwens ion 
of Figure 1. 
1. The goals or objectives 
being lude economic development 
(increas real incomes), the preservation 
or enhancement of environmental quality, the 
improvement of social well-bei and 
r ional development (increasing rea Income 
a the local or river basin as opposed 
to the national level). 
2. Jurisdiction. The level of the 
decision making ranges from private decision 
making at the individual or family level, 
corporate decision making, general or 
special-district local government decision 
making, decision making at the state level, 
and decision making at the national level. 
3. The physical need and the 
action e ng contemplated for dealing 
with it encompass water resources planning 
flood control, drainage, irrigation, muni-
cipal water supply, navigation, hydroelectric 
power, water quality control, recreation, and 
the protection of fish and wildlife. For 
integrat land with water planning, one 
must add soil and land conservat ion, des ir-
able urban )2:rowth patterns, ouality build-
Jurisdiction Actions 
Changing Doul1~aries Se<llleaCe 
Different horizons Duration 
Model increments Salience and satiation cycles Creation and termination Processes 
of agencies Technological advance 
TemlJOral 
Polarities and affinities Aggregative and Criteria of achievement and 
Different orderings distribu tive effects instrumental actions 
A~gregation Assignment of appropriate "Accidental" conflicts 
functions 




Externalities Capacity and u tiliza tiO'l 
Duplication and overlap tnlfesholds 
Creation and termination 
of agencies 






F 2. Matrix of levels problems within and between planning dimensions. 
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ings, transportation, neighborhood recrea-
tion, industrial growth, mineral development 
and a number of other needs and actions 
'related to land use. 
4 . I~l!!.E.Q!..!!l • Goa 1 s, 1 eve 1 s, and 
actions are constantly changing. As these 
changes occur faster than the institu-
tionalized system can adjust, parties may 
continue to advocate policies that are 
no longer in their bes t interes t because of 
delays in obtaining information on changing 
conditions or because of the difficulties in 
changing a position once adamantly advocated. 
These temporal problems become particularly 
important in the water planning arena because 
periods from project conception to imple-
mentation of 10 to 20 years are ordinary. 
Problem Classification Within 
the Framework 
Within each co~ponent, one finds con-
~licts in values conflicts in jurisdictional 
viewpoints, con Icts in needs emphasized and 
actions taken, and conflicts in time perspec-
,tive. Among components, values, viewpoints, 
perceived needs, and selected actions change 
with time; pursuit of a particular viewpoint 
or once-favored action may be found to 
conflict with basic values; or actions may 
prove not to be really wise. Problems may 
exist in two or more components simultaneous-
ly. Finally, key action alternatives are 
omitted from consideration because they do 
not fall in the advocacy role of any single 
value, jurisdictional viewpoint, nor problem 
area. Each of these problem categor ies will 
be discussed below as illustrated by situa-
t ions regularly faced in water reSOurces 
planning and plan implementation. 
Conflicts Within a Component 
1. Conflicts in values. The study 
of the sources and expressions of human 
values has received considerable attention 
a nd may ul t ima te ly provi de the rea 1 keys to 
reducing the institutional obstacles to 
planning for the common good. For water 
resources planning purposes, values are 
expressed in terms of the twin objectives of 
economic development and environmental 
quality (Water Resources Council, 1973) while 
every individual has some concern for both, 
some people are more concerned wi th employ-
ment and incomes while others feel that they 
can scarcely exaggerate the destruct iveness 
of unfettered economic growth to basic 
human environmental support. The first group 
is going to favor structural water resources 
development for an expanding economy, wh ile 
the second group is going to favor nonstruc-
tural water resources management for environ-
mental protection. Each side is going to 
create every institutional obstacle within 
its power to prevent plans that it opposes 
from being implemented. The diversity 
in values reduces as one goes from smaller to 
larger jurisdictional viewpoints (individuals 
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vary much more in values than do communit ies 
or states), and the intensity of the conflict 
increases as groups with common values become 
better organized. 
One indication of the difficulty in 
resolving conflicts in values is the fact 
that such differences do not occur in ex-
panding from single to mUltiple purpose 
projects nor from single to multiple project 
systems and that these planning expans ions 
have been successful. In contrast value 
confl icts are inherent in expand ing from 
single to multiple objectives and in in-
tegrating water with land planning, and 
neither of these planning expansions have 
been successfully implemented. 
Apparent value conflicts mayor iginate 
in different understandings of the facts or 
in true value differences. In the prevailing 
situation of incomplete information, each 
side tries to overwhelm its opposition with 
alleged "facts" presented in a way to make 
any who take a differing viewpoint seem quite 
foolish. Continued research can hopefully 
separate facts from fantasy so that issues 
can be discussed on a value basis, but 
our current understanding of the environ-
mental and social consequences of human 
activity is still a long way from making this 
possible. To some extent, value conflicts 
may be resolved by permitting individuals 
or jurisdictions with differing values to f!0 
their own way (for exampe by employing 
different standards for water quality control 
or flood plain management), but the adminis-
trative and legal problems in varying 
management policies are very difficult to 
overcome. James et a1. (1976) discussed 
these problems with respect to land use 
controls in flood prone areas. 
2. Conflicts in jurisdictional view-
£oints. Those planning from individual, 
corporate, local, state, or national view-
points may overlook other viewpoints through 
ignorance or purposefully to ach ieve ad-
vantage. The adverse consequences of failing 
to consider other viewpoints depend on 
how the actions of those of one viewpoint 
affect the others, the conseq uences econo-
mists have long labeled as external effects. 
Effects of the actions of one individual on 
other individuals or of one community on 
other communities are true external effects 
and become more severe as population den-
sities and economic development increase. 
Effects of the actions of a higher level in, 
an hierarchy (federal for example) on cOm-
ponent lower level units (states for example) 
are internal to both systems but may be 
considered pseudo-external effects because 
the higher level unit may be less concerned 
over the harm caused because those affected 
are a small portion of its total citizenry or 
because the citizens of other component lower 
units may have compensating opinions or be 
affected in compensatinf! ways. Effects of 
the actions of those at a lower level of the 
hierarchy (individual citizens for example) 
on a high er leve 1 (the i r government) are a 
special pseudo-external effect problem in 
wa ter resources plann ing. Lower leve Is try 
hard to get the higher level to pay for 
projects that they would not be willing to 
pay for themselves because the benef it they 
receive is far more than their portion of a 
cos t spread over the larger group. Many in 
such smaller units seem to believe that they 
are actually getting a "free lunch." 
In comparing these jurisdictional 
viewpoints, it is important to remember that 
while the higher level jurisdictions are able 
to afford larger and more spectacular proj-
ects, the lower level jurisdictions are 
in aggregate spending more money and having 
a larger impact on water resources manage-
ment. For example, less than one third of 
the irrigated acreage in the United States is 
served by federal irrigation projects. In 
addition, the higher level jurisdiction is 
more remote from the action and consequently 
less able to implement its plans. 
Several approaches have been tried to 
resolve conflicts in jurisdictional view-
points. The traditional one at the h er 
levels has been to form river basin com-
missions at which representatives of the 
var ious levels can interact toward ach ieving 
a consensus. The number of elements that 
must part ic ipate causes such group meet ings 
to break down at lower levels. For many 
years management schemes were formulated by 
assuming that individuals, corporations, 
and communities would act rationally with 
respect to the objective function the plan-
ners were using, but experience showed 
this not to be the case, probably because 
these other groups were not planning from the 
same criteria. Many federal water projects 
have not produced anticipated benefits 
because the individuals who stood to gain did 
not respond as anticipated. The recent 
emphasis on nonstructural measures may in 
part be viewed as an effort to force in-
dividuals to comply with government plans 
for flood plain use, water conservation, etc. 
Implementation requires laws forcing the 
lower levels to conform to the higher level 
viewpoint or providing economic or other 
incent ives to encourage them to do so. The 
former method is less in keeping with the 
democratic tradition, but the latter method 
generally gives planners a less secure 
feeling about the outcome. 
3. ~£~ili~£~_i~_~~Eh~~i~~~_~~~~. 
Those who perceive a particular physical need 
as extremely important and are consequently 
do ing a 11 they can to meet that need (for 
example, a community recently devastated by a 
major flood and seek ing flood control) may 
come in conflict with others who are trying 
to meet some other need (such as irrigation 
water). If both groups are planning from 
the same viewpoint (d ifferent agencies in 
the government of the same state), the need 
is to improve coordination among units within 
the administrative structure, a phenomenon of 
growing importance as the complexity of 
government increases. The need for inter-
14 
federal agency coordination resulted in 
creation of the Water Resources· Council at 
the national level, inter-allency river basin 
commissions at the state and regional level, 
and other appropriate coordinating units. 
The need to coordinate water with land 
planning, however, has not been resolved. 
Those planning for flood control communicate 
much better wi th those planning for irr iga-
t ion that with those planning for parks or 
mineral development. The second pair of 
administrative units may be so far apart in a 
governmental hierarchy that new coordinating 
mechanisms have to be established and, what 
is often worse, the disciplines predominating 
in the two un its may va ry so grea t ly in 
profess ional va lues that a new common lan-
guage has to be established for exchanging 
viewpoints. 
4 . i 
The p ann ng 
operate from various time· perspec 
tives. Professional water resources planners 
characteristically think of project justi-
fication in terms of 50 or 100 years, whereas 
the politicians making the choices often 
emphas ize accomplishments to be aeh ieved by 
the next election. Professional water 
resources planners characteristically 
design from an assumption that the public 
using project output (protected flood plain 
land or irrigation water) will respond to 
that output as seems wise from the public 
planning perspective, when in reality those 
in business in the pr ivate sector expect a 
higher rate of return on their investment and 
payback over a shorter planning horizon 
(Grant and Ireson, 1970, p. 456-493). 
The various discount rates used by different 
planning jurisdictions (normally ranging from 
high values in the private sector to low 
values in government) are a manifestation of 
this variation in time perspective that 
causes a great deal of difficulty as the 
various planning jurisdictions attempt to 
implement conflicting plans. Local government 
is often required by law to pay back bor-
rowed money within a period much shorter than 
50 years. Hydroelectric power developments, 
wh ich are frequently planned by the pr i vate 
sector, are characteristically formulated 
from a different time perspective than are 
other types of wa ter projects. Land use 
planners also tend to plan for a shorter time 
period than do water resources planners. 
Very little has in fact been done in 
response to the problems caused by these 
conflicts in time perspect ive. Adjustments 
are made to the private or market value of 
land to estimate an equivalent public value 
for planning purposes (James and Lee, 
1971), and other similar adjustments are 
also made by planners in the rub li c see tor. 
These, however, do not get at the lJ'ore 
fundamental problem of a difference in time 
perspective caus projects to be undertaken 
in the public sector even though they would 
be ected as unprofitable by the private 
sector (Hirschleifer et aI., 1960). A more 
general solution would require economic 
incentives that actually bring private sector 
planning more in line wi th general welfare 
criteria. 
Conflicts Among Dimensions 
1. Time-value conflicts. Values change 
with time. The irrigation program of the 
Bureau of Reclamation was in part established 
to move people out of the congested, in-
dustrialized east to settle uninhabited 
areas. Today, the first and fourth states in 
population are in that then under-populated 
area. In the 1950s, structural water 
res ources deve lopment was very popular, and 
many were strongly push ing a low soc ial 
discount rate so that more water development 
p,rojects would be built for the benefit 
of future generations. A gene,ration later, 
the shift in values from an economic to 
an environmental emphasis has created a 
s ituat ion where many would be happier wi th 
fewer dams. The use of present va lues for 
long-term planning is in effect assuming that 
people from now to the planning horizon will 
cont inue to hold the same values that they 
hold today. Recent experience shows that 
values are not stable, and the danger of 
dis tort ing the des ires of those who come 
after us increases as planners shift from 
economic criteria to other and more volatile 
values in multiple objective planning. 
2. Time~~!~~EQ!~!_cQ~ill£!~. The 
goals of those operating fiom a particular 
jurisdictional viewpoint change with time. 
Individuals tend to pursue more basic human 
needs in poverty s ituat ions and personal 
f ul f illment needs when they become more 
affluent (Maslow, 1954). Special short-run 
situations may cause deviation from long 
r un goals. Governments change goa Is as 
elections replace decision-makers. While all 
these groups are free to change their 
opinions, water projects require a financial 
commitment and an operating schedule for 
dividing project outputs (conservation versus 
flood control storage within reservoirs for 
example) that cannot easily be changed with 
time. Major projects must be reauthorized at 
the congressional level before ~hanges in the 
allocation of stored water among benefici-
aries can be made. One of the major planning 
issues of coming years is likely to be how to 
maintain the flexibility of project operation 
required to maximize achievement of planning 
objectives and yet to achieve the stability 
r eq ui red to honor f inanci al commi tments and 
contractual obligations to the or inal 
project beneficiaries. 
3. Time-need conflicts. Water planning 
in the United States has passed through 
periods emphasizing inland navigation, 
irrigation, hydroelectric power, flood 
control, and now water quality control (James 
and Rogers, 1976). These changes in needs 
have occurred in response to advances in 
transportation technology, the harnessing of 
electrical energy, climatic cycles bringing 
concentrated per iods of floods or droughts, 
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alterations in net food supply, and the need 
for the public to protect itself against the 
external effects of polluters who do not 
consider others in their waste disposal 
decisions. Each need has lead to an insti-
tutionalized system for installing the 
reservoirs, treatment plants, zoning legisla-
tion, etc., required to satisfy it. These 
systems have grown into large organizations 
that are often slow to change with shifts 
in ublic need, particularly when such 
shi would reduce the role of the organiza-
tion. The removal of outdated institutional 
structures is exceedingly difficult to 
implement in the public sector. 
4. Value-viewpoint conflicts. In-
d ividuals, corporations, localities, states, 
and the federal government have different 
value perspectives. The federal government 
is now officially committed to planning from 
the twin objectives of economic development 
and environmental quality. The other view-
point levels and elements at a given level 
have not formally defined their planning 
values and vary greatly among themselves in 
preferred objectives. In fact, one of the 
basic strengths of the American sy~tem of 
government is that it provides a structure 
for different elements in soc to pursue 
different objectives and to reconcile con-
flicts among their courses of action. The 
federal government, the state, and the 
community can each study a water resources 
planning or management situation, come to 
their own conclusion on what action is 
best, and then arM trate the ir di fferences. 
In practice, however, the system has been 
greatly handicapped by the much greater 
expertise and financial resources available 
to the federal government, making it im-
possible for the other viewpoints to negoti-
ate on an equal basis. The recent trend away 
from federal structural measures and toward 
state and local actions (structural as well 
as nonstructural) to fill the vacuum is 
working in the opposite direction. 
5. Need viewooint conflicts. Those 
operating from different jurisdictional 
viewpoints tend to meet needs through the 
types of act ion wi th wh ich they are mos t 
familiar or best able to implement. For 
example, individuals develop parcels of land 
and decide on their use of water project 
outputs. Corporations make similar decisions 
at a larger scale; communities adopt land use 
and utility service plans; states regulate 
water rights and water quality standards; and 
the federal government constructs large water 
deve lopment projects. Furthermore, our 
constitutional form of government limits what 
each level can do. The federal government 
cannot engage in land use zoning, and private 
parties cannot build large projects. Fur-
thermore, those planning to meet a given kind 
of need are predisposed toward the set of 
alternatives commonly used for achiev that 
purpose and are unlikely to think of working 
with those meet ing other needs in a mul t i 
purpose solution. Consequently, plans tend 
to take on characteristics popular with those 
planning in the jurisdiction with primary 
responsibility even where some other type of 
plan may be more efficient. As examples, the 
Corps of Engineers has bu ilt la flood 
control structures where flood pIa zoning 
may have produced grea ter net benef its, and 
may individuals continue ventures that they 
find profitable even though another less 
familiar venture might be even more profit-
able. 
6. Value-need conflicts. Those working 
to satisfy particular needs tend to emphasize 
values that they perceive as most likely to 
develop support for their cause. Economists 
have complained that their skills are used to 
sell rather than to select projects (Smith, 
1974); and in recent years, economic argu-
ments have been used by environmentalists to 
strengthen opposition to projects they 
oppose. The basIc problem is that the 
public and its politically-chosen decision 
makers are generally unwilling to select how 
the total water resources budget should be 
divided among needs nor how the budget for 
a particular need (municipal water supply 
for example) should be divided among projects 
based on the results of an impartial multiple 
objective analysis of the alternatives. 
The decision making is in reality based on 
other criteria or values. Formal value 
statements (such as the princi les and 
standards released by the Water sources 
Council) in th is sett ing become tools for 
selling what has already been decided as 
needed. For example, water quality control 
measures are not planned on the basis of 
these principles and standards and are 
justified to the public on the grounds of the 
fundamental importance of environmental 
protection. Water quantity supply measures 
are now relatively much less salable in terms 
of intrinsic merit and consequently are 
justified, but less often successfully so, on 
the basis of the principles and standards. 
If a detailed analysis shows that continuing 
to pollute a stream is better than to treat 
the wastes, environmentalists are much more 
1 ike ly to s tart look ing for flaws in the 
methodology than to be convinced. 
7. Higher-order combinations. The re-
lational framework of values, viewpoints, 
needs, and time components is used above to 
classify institutional obstacles to water 
resources planning within a given component 
or between pairs of components. One can also 
visualize obstacles created by her-order 
conflict situations generated by s taneous 
differences in three or even all four com-
ponents. Qualitatively, these conflicts 
represent combinations of factors outlined 
above. Quantitatively, however, the more 
complexity that exists in a conflict situa-
t ion, the more powerful the obstacles to 
rational rel'olution become. More areas of 
disagreement provide those taking extreme 
positions more lines of argument to prevent 
compromise and provide more points requiring 
compromi se. 
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In such multi-component conflict situa-
t ions, greater external pressure is uired 
to force a compromise resolution 0 the 
issues, and the nature of the compromise 
reached is less likely to depend on meri t. 
Each component has elements that tend to 
dominate, but those dominating ch over 
time. The federal government usua dom-
inates the viewpoint component, at least in 
cases where the key federal agenCies bel ieve 
it their mission to do so. Water quality 
control has been moving to the front as the 
dominant water planning purpose, but the 
juxtaposition between water and land planning 
is not yet clear. One senses a owing 
attitude, however, that water p has 
had its chance and failed and that land 
planning is the upcoming favored cureall to 
national ills. Economic development was 
long the dominant planning goal and probably 
still is even at the federill level where 
environmental quality is nominally but not 
operationally equal. 
Conflicts in~ Between 
Components 
The existin? institutions for water and 
related land resource planninf have evolved 
in response to the needs for act ion that 
people have seen and worked together to 
implement. Technological advance, resource 
depletion or degradation, population shifts, 
changes in world economic or political con-
d it ions, and a number of other f actors are, 
however, continually generating new 
ments for water resources management 
not fall directly within the values, juris-
dictional viewpoints, and needs emphasis of 
the prior institutIonal framework. Water 
quality control and groundwater management 
in humid areas where supplemental irr ation 
is expandi illustrate needs that water 
planning ins itutions have recently had to 
expand to accommodate. Where water problems 
crossed previous jurisdictional boundaries, 
river basin commissions, interstate com-
pacts, and regional commissions of local 
governments have had to be established. The 
recent environmental movement was able to add 
a new environmental quality perspective to an 
institutionalized system that previously 
placed little emphasis on these factors. 
These efforts have been able to achieve 
the pOlitical clout to change the system but 
only after a period of time. One wonders 
what planning inefficiencies occur during 
the period required to effect the change and 
what inefficiencies continue to occur because 
worthy needs are unable to change the system. 
Some of the areas that are probably more 
significan nelude tributary land use 
management to minimize downstream flood Clnd 
water quality problems in urban areas, water 
and power conservation programs, water 
quality control strategies relying on methods 
other than treatment, and provision for 
variation in water quality or flood plain 
land use standards according to the needs of 
the local community. 
The above framework and discussion 
suggests the principal institutional obsta-
cles to effective and coordinated water and 
land resource planning as 1) limitations in 
available factual information that make it 
possible for special interest groups to sway 
public choice through biased presentation of 
the alternatives, 2) viewpoint and time 
perspective differences among planning 
sectors (public v. private or national v. 
local) that cause conflicting land and water 
use policies, 3) the inability of the top 
decision-making levels to deal effectively 
simultaneously with more than one problem at 
a time (other problems are being relegated to 
the background now that water quality control 
~s the central focus), 4) insufficient 
recognition of the magnitudes of the changes 
in values, viewpoints, and needs that occur 
over the long planning horizons (50 or 100 
years) typically used for water and land 
resources (one can consider the difficulty 
a planner in 1880 would have in formulating 
projects to meet the needs of today), 5) the 
formal commitments during plan implementation 
that make subsequent beneficial change very 
difficult, 6) the concentration of planning 
funds and expertise in groups of biased view-
points or constrained perspective, 7) gaps 
between planning and implementation agencies 
that favor plan selection to be based on 
familiarity or le~al authority rather than 
merit, 8) use of planning capabiity to 
prepare cases for selling plans already 
selected rather than to gather facts that 
can be used to compare the merits of possible 
alternatives, and 9) problem areas that are 
not properly handled because they either fall 
in the gaps between responsibilit ies in the 
institutionalized system or become a source 
of conflict because more than one element 
perceives responsibility. 
One observation of the total land and 
water management process would be that the 
nine institutional obstacles are more effec-
t ive in prevent plan implementation than 
plan formulation. A skeptic of the planning 
l?rocess could make a good case for a cIa im 
that most comprehensive planning never leads 
to implementat ion, that the forces creat ing 
the nine obstacles never appear as strong 
d ur ing planning as they are when imple-
mentation seems imminent (people do not 
respond to hypothetical alternatives in the 
same way that they will later to real con-
ditions), and that therefore one needs rather 
to work on improving management pract ice by 
beg inn from (more limited) plans that are 
being implemented. "Comprehens ive plannin~" 
would be better advised to drop its search 
for an idealistic optimal management scheme 
and concentrate on devising implementable 
actions that could improve what is occurring. 
Planning should concentrate on implementable, 
incremental improvements. The logical con-
clusion to this reasoning is that the 
"levels-of-analysis" obstacles to compre 
hensive river basin planning are unneces-
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sarily aggravated by an inappropr iate plan-
ning strategy. The ideal or ultimate plan 
should be only a goal for use in judging 
proposals or observed activity within the 
basin. The emphasis within the planning 
process should be to identify a limited 
number of priority actions to be promptly 
implemented. 
On the whole, land and water planning 
institutions have been responsive to problems 
that they could solve within a single admin-
istrative structure (mUltipurpose projects 
for example) but have not been effective in 
solving problems requiring conflict resolu-
tion or cooperation between decision ele-
ments. Conflicts severe enough to gain 
public attent ion rise to and are eventually 
resolved in the political arena (for example 
the allocation of Colorado River water among 
the basin states or the one-time failure of 
federal flood control agencies to make suf-
f icient use of flood plain management), but 
many lesser issues are never resolved. 
Often, no part of the institutional structure 
really feels responsible for consequent de-
lays or inaction. 
The existing system is not good at re-
sol vi ng confl ic ts among separated agenci es. 
Technological advances (for example upgrading 
from the rational method to watershed model-
ing for estimat flood peaks) are only 
slowly adopted by professionals or agencies 
established in previous methodologies. When 
problem solving requiring ch to existing 
institutions, implementation an order of 
magnitude more difficult. Carefully orga-
nized research to identify the basic causes 
of resistance to technical innovation and 
institutional change within the water and 
related land resources planning arenas is 
sorely needed. The problems outl ined above 
provide a good list of needed changes that 
are not bringing needed responses and thus 
a good starting point for needed research. 
Recommendations For Dealing With 
Institutional Problems 
One reason that the above institutional 
obstacles are more effective in preventing 
plan implementation than in preventing plan 
formulation is that planners become so 
attached to their recommendations that 
they do not recognize legitimate opposition 
and fail to give proper consideration to 
other viewpoints. Special effort needs to be 
made to understand the opposition to plan 
implementation. PRDPDEMM provides a powerful 
tool that can be used for this purpose by 
bringing out specific issues of controversy 
that need to be resolved in solving the 
levels-of-analysis problem. 
One of the pervasive difficulLies 
with comprehensive river basin planninf.': as 
currently practiced in the United States is 
that it is interpreted as requiring a general 
comprehens iveness that cannot be delivered. 
Consequently, few practical results appear, 
the public becomes disillusioned by planners, 
and the funds required for planning are 
threaFened poli~ically. 
Once problem elements are identified, 
one needs to cons ider the alternatives for 
dealing with each one. Here again Figure 2 
is helpful. If the planner uses it to 
distinguish differences in who is act to 
ach ieve what physical changes in pursu of 
what basic goals, he can then analyze the 
situation to identify alternatives that dis-
satisfied actors might find equal or even 
prefer. The s i tua t ion may be resolved by 
providing such information to the key par-
ties. Failing identification of equivalent 
or preferred alternatives, the planner could 
at least fall back to the alternative in 
volving minimum net sacrifice from the 
previous position. 
One of the root causes of difficulty in 
water resources planning practice is that the 
political decision making system often has 
good reason for not waiting for a compre-
hensive and objective analysis before select-
ing a course of action. In a situation of 
partial information, those operating from 
more powerful levels of analysis have been 
able to fill in the unknowns with assertions 
favoring their udgment or have developed 
decision making titutions that 1) produce 
decisions that they regard favorably or 2) 
keep th ings work ing smoothly enough to avoid 
unpleasant confrontat ions. They then 
ceive institutional ch as a threa to 
this desirable state of a fairs and resist 
change efforts. 
A second root cause lies in the limita-
t ions of human capability to absorb complex 
information and use it in rational decision 
making. This also leads to biased selection 
of information and the same sorts of dif-
ferences in conclusion depending on the level 
of analysis. 
The logical response to this situation 
is to develop more factual information rele-
vant to water and related land resources 
decision making and to present that infor-
mation in a way that those at the various 
leve Is of analys is can unders tand. Spec if ic 
research thrusts might address 1) more com-
prehensive development of factual information 
with particular emphasis needed in the en-
vironmental and social areas, 2) incentives 
to minimize rather than aggravate viewpoint 
differences, 3) methods for institutions to 
deal with many problems simultaneously, 4) 
methods for coping with time changes in 
viewpoints and needs, 5) ways to introduce 
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new flexibility into the commitments required 
at project implementation, 6) more equal 
distribution of planning resources among the 
various viewpoints, 7) more equal capability 
for implementing the various possible mea-
sures, 8) greater commitment to search out 
facts for evaluation by merit rather than 
sell previously made decis ions, and 9) more 
complete coverage of the spectrum of plann 
needs. 
As progress is made on doing a better 
job of getting the facts together, levels of 
analysis differences will be reduced toward 
those based on differences in values. The 
next research need will then be in the area 
of deve ing a better system for resolving 
value di either through compromise 
in decision making or through providing for 
greater diversity among the various segments 
of society without undue adverse external 
effects on one another. Another key com-
ponent to better value-d i fference resolut ion 
is deriving ways to accelerate the decision-
making process toward more timely respon 
ses to decision needs. 
Summary 
Th is chapter began explor the leve Is 
of analysis problem in water resources plan-
ning by defining planning as a threefold 
process combining selection, desi?n, and 
implementation of a worthy alternative and 
by outlining the planning process. A de 
scription of how this process has worked and 
how it has responded to the need for change 
with time showed how the changes required to 
make tbe process work better that can be 
made without caus confrontations among 
existing planning groups have largely suc-
ceeded but that changes whose implementation 
would lead to intergroup conflict have seldom 
come to pass. Such stalemate situations are 
reSUlting where different groups are taking 
different actions to achieve different 
objectives from different jurisdictional 
viewpoints and address ing different time 
frames. Nine principal institutional ob-
stacles to effect ive and coordinated water 
and related land resources planning were 
enumerated from these conflicts and analyzed. 
The result was recommendations for research 
and findings application to 1) develop the 
factual information that will help planners 
overcome these obstacles and 2) quickly 
resolve the value conflicts remaining once 
the facts are known. This generalized 
analysis together with the specific problems 
identified in the Colorado River Basin 
provide a basis for more detailed investiga-
tion into levels of analysis problems. 
CHAPTER III 
ISSUES AND INSTITUTIONS FOR WATER RESOURCES PLANNING IN 
THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN, UTAH, AND THE UINTAH BASIN 
tion 
The first step in developing a working 
understanding of real world experience with 
'levels of analysis problems was to identify 
such issues in the history of water planning 
for the Colorado River Basin. The water of 
the Colorado River is the lifeblood of the 
arid Southwestern United States where it sup-
plies major needs in seven states (Colorado, 
Wyoming, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, 
and California).l The primary source areas 
for runoff in this desert climate are the 
high mountain areas near the crest of the 
Rockies and in scattered other intermountain 
ranges. These areas constitute such a small 
fraction of the total basin that the Colorado 
produces less water per unit area than does 
any other major river bas in in the country. 
The runoff is collected from these mountain 
ranges and carried 1440 miles from the head-
waters to the Gulf of California along a 
route where water, because of its scarcity 
in the desert, is extremely valuable for 
agriculture and municipalities. 
Despite this competition for water with-
in the basin, the concentration of water in 
the Colorado River has proved very attractive 
to cities outside the basin. The river 
serves 2.5 million people who reside in the 
basin and 12.5 million people through water 
exports to the metropolitan centers of 
Denver, Salt Lake City, Los Angeles, and San 
Diego. It supports wildlife and recreation in 
areas of unparalleled aesthetic value, and at 
the same time supplies water for ci ties, 
irrigated agriculture, energy production, 
industry, and mining. 
Table 1 generalizes current land use-
wa ter use relat ionsh ips with in the Colorado 
River Basin. The two principal water de-
pletions are seen to be the large water 
exports and irrigated agriculture Although 
irrigated lands occupy only 1.8 
lSince many recent and generally 
available reports contain detailed physical 
descriptions of the Colorado River system 
(Bureau of Reclamation, 1971,1974,1975; 
Bishop et al., 1975; Bishop, Chambers, Mace, 
and Mills, 1975; Water Resources Council, 
1974; Lichtenstein 1977), only a brief 
overview is present here. 
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percent of the bas in, they account for 40 
percent of the consumptive use. Th is estab-
lished agricultural use, which has histori-
cally been in competition only with limited 
municipal use within the basin is now 
experiencing pressure from a new and develop-
ing water demand for energy resource extrac-
tion and processing. 
As the pr inc i pal source of water in 
seven arid states, it is not surprising that 
issues of Colorado River water management 
have generated much political heat, and that 
many actors and institutions have been 
involved at national, multi-state, state, and 
substate levels. This complex institutional 
history, can be reviewed for implications for 
solving problems in levels of analysis from 
three different levels or perspectives: the 
Colorado River Basin as a whole, the State of 
Utah, and the Uintah Basin in the north 
eastern corner of Utah. 
The discussion is organized under two 
main headings: Issues and Institutions. 
Under the heading of "Issues," attention will 
be given to water allocation, Indian and 
federal water rights, water development 
projects, energy development, l60-acre 
limitation, water quality, and the 1976-77 
drought. Under the heading "Institutions, II 
attention will be given to the institu-
tional actors and institutional settings in 
wh ich these issues have been debated and 
r esol ved. 
Issues 
Until just the last 10 or 15 years, the 
"Law of the River"--an amalgamation of 
statutes, compacts, treaties, court deci-
sions, contracts, regulations, and adminis-
trative rulings--has dealt almost entirely 
with allocation and development of the waters 
of the Colorado River Basin. The allocation 
system for the Colorado River and its tribu-
taries operates at four levels: inter-
national, interregional, interstate, and 
intrastate. 
At the international level, a formal 
division of water between the Uni ted States 
and Mexico was accomplished by the ~lexican 
- -:1: 
Table 1. Summary of land and water use in the Colorado River Basin. 








Urban (M&l) 0.9 
Other 3.2 
Water Surface 1.4 
(water export) 
(fish & wildlife) 
1OT.lJ 
Source: lWater Resources Council (!97l). 
2Salinity Control Forum (June, 1975). 
aOn-site use of precipitation. 
% of AF % of 
Basin (1000's) Total 
58.3 a 
35.2 a 
1.8 3,636 40 
0.5 a 
0.5 255 3 
1.9 
0.8 (evaporat ion) 
5,189b 57 
rm:r:o TOO 
bOf this, 4,538 maf are exported to Southern California, of which about 1 maf are 
diverted by the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California primarily for M&I use, and 
the balance by the Imperial Irrigation District and the Coachella County Valley Water Dis-
trict predominantly for irrigation use. 
Water Treaty of 1944. Mexico was guaranteed 
an annual amount of 1.5 maf, except in times 
of extreme shortage. 
At the interregional level, the 1922 
Colorado River Compact (fTvidea the basin 
states according to whether the drainage 
entered the river above or below Lee 
Arizona, into the Upper Basin (composed 
the "upper divis ion" states of Colorado, New 
Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) and the Lower 
Basin (composed of the "lower division" 
states of Arizona, California, and Nevada). 
Some of the area in Arizona is in the Upper 
Basin while small parts of Utah and New 
Mexico are in the Lower Basin. The Compact 
assured the Lower Basin that depletions by 
the Upper Basin states would not prevent at 
least 75 maf of aggregate flow per 
period from reaching the Lower Basin at 
Ferry. The Lower Basin received a guaranteed 
ten-year (not annual) minimum flow; the Upper 
Basin became the guarantors. At the time of 
the compact, the available record of measured 
streamflow was very sparse and average annual 
virgin flow was estimated to be in the 
of 15 rna f. One of the major problems as 
been that this estimate has proved too high. 
Average annual flows have been about 13 
maL 
Allocation of Colorado River water at 
the interstate level was achieved by the 
Upper Colorado River - Bas in Compact of 1948 
(for the Upper Basin states) and the Arizona 
v. California Supreme Court case of 1963 (for 
the Lower Basin states). The 1948 Compact 
allots to Arizona 50,000 acre feet per annum 
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and appor t ions the ba lance of the annua 1 
consumptive use available to the Upper Basin 
to Colorado, 51. 7 5 percent; to New Mexico, 
11.25 percent to Utah, 23 percent: and 
to Wyoming, percent. The Arizona v. 
California decision divided the total of 7.5 
maf available in an average year to the Lower 
Basin by giving California an annual entitle-
ment of 4.4 maf; Arizona, 2.8 maf; and 
Nevada, 0.3 maf. Utah and New Mexico can use 
water originat in their small portions 
of the Lower Basin area. This decision 
affirmed the allocation among the three 
states made by the Boulder Canyon Project 
Act of 1928. 
At the intrastate level, the benef ic ial 
consumptive use of water has been allocated 
through the creation and recognition of state 
water rights. Although the water rights 
systems of the Colorado River Basin states 
differ in certain respects, all of them are 
based on the "appropriation doctrine," which 
was described by the National Water Commis-
sion in its for t 
(l973) as fol 
The basic tenets of that system are 
that (1) a water ,right can be 
acquired only by the acauiring 
party diverting the water from a 
water course and apply ing it to a 
beneficial use and (2) in ac-
cordance with the date of acquisi-
tion, an earlier acquired water 
right shall have priority over 
other later acquired water rights. 
Water in excess of that needed to 
satisfy existing rights, is viewed 
as unappropriated water available 
for appropriation by diversion and 
application of the water to a 
beneficial use. The process of 
appropriation can continue until 
all of the water in a stream is 
subject to rights of use through 
withdrawals from the stream. (p. 
271. ) 
Assuming 15 maf/year as the aver 
flow, Utah's share of Colorado River water s 
about 1.4 maf/yr (0.23 (15.0 - 7.5 - 1.5». 
The Utah Divis ion of Water Resources esti 
mates that current depletions from the 
Colorado River Basin in Utah are about 
100,000 acre feet. This leaves about 700,000 
acre feet not currently being used; however, 
the State Engineer has estimated that the 
exercise of additional approved filings, 
including those which have been approved for 
the Central Utah Project, would deplete 
Utah's ent itlement by another 600,000 acre 
feet. In addition, a substantial number of 
filings are awaiting action by the State 
Engineer. Although no definitive tabu-
lation of these unapproved filings has been 
made, they are believed large enough that if 
they were approved and exercised the total 
water use would exceed Utah's compact en-
titlement. For all intents and purposes, 
therefore, Utah's share of Colorado River 
water has already been appropriated. 
Three major tributaries (the Green, 
the Yampa, and the White Rivers) join the 
Colorado River in the Uintah Basin. Although 
Colorado has agreed that Utah is entitled to 
500,000 af/yr from the Yampa, no quantitative 
agreement has been reached concerning 
Utah's entitlement from the White. Utah's 
share from the Green (flowing from v,lyoming) 
is also an unsettled issue. 
Indian and Federal Reserved Water Rights 
By a statute enacted in 1866, the United 
States is recognized as the original owner of 
the vast public domain in the West. Over the 
course of time, the federal government has 
set aside large tracts of land for national 
parks and forests, wildlife refuges, and 
other uses. When a tract of land is reserved 
from the public domain for some such purpose, 
the government also reserves sufficient water 
from sources pert inent to the reserved land 
to accomplish that purpose; the water thus 
reserved is the federal 
Unlike the appropriat ·"--:"':;"':;'r""-i-"':";~· 
water users obtain from sta 
the federal right remains valid even if the 
water is not actually used (the "use it or 
lose it" principle does not apply). 
The heart of the federal reserved water 
rights problem is that many water users, 
whose right is junior to the 1866 federal 
statute, fear that the water that they have 
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been able to use for years because the 
federal government has not been exercis ing 
its right will be lost as the U.S. chooses to 
utilize the full quantity of its right. The 
unresolved issue has created an atmosphere of 
uncertainty and controversy in which the 
Carter Administration expects to move expe-
ditiously to identify areas where federal use 
is of highest importance and to quantify 
reserved rights consistent with the priori-
ties set out. 
Indian water righ~ reserve water for 
Indian reservation land. Like federal 
reserved rights, Indian water rights cannot 
be lost through nonuse. Also like federal 
reserved rights, most Indian water rights 
have not been quantified. 
There is a strong pressure from all 
parties-at-interest to resolve the uncertain-
ty in this situation. Administration policy 
favors quantification through negotiation and 
the use of federal (not state) cour ts to 
litigate Indian claims when negotiations are 
not successful. The preference for solvJng 
the issue of Indian water rights claims 
through administrative means appears to be 
widespread. The Senate Select Committee on 
Indian Affairs introduced (in 1978) a bill to 
remove certain legal obstacles to tribes and 
states interested in entering into compacts 
or intergovernmental agreements. A National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) task 
force, composed of 'state legislators and 
tribal repre'sentatives, proposed the estab-
lishment of a commission to explore and 
test on a pilot basis forms of intergovern-
mental cooperation (coordination, mediation, 
conciliation) at the state-tribal level. In 
addition, the National Association of Coun-
ties (NACO) is collaborating with the Civil 
Service Commission and the National Tribal 
Chairmen's Association to initiate an effort 
which would experiment with such inter-
governmental form of cooperation at the 
tribal-county level. These initiatives 
reflect a dissatisfaction with judicial or 
single, blanket legislative approaches to 
solving the complex and highly diversified 
jurisdictional problems involving the Indian 
tribes. 
The issues of Indian and federal re-
served water rights are of great importance 
for the Uintah Basin. Exercise of the 
federal reserved water rights for the Flaming 
Gorge National Recreation Area, the extensive 
Forest Service land in the llint.1h Nal ionaJ 
Forest, and BLM land holdings could, when 
quantified, add up to a substantial claim. 
The Indian water rights claim by the Ute 
Tribe on the Uintah and Ouray Reservation is 
also substantial. The Utes claim 129,201 
acres of irrigable land on the reservation, 
for a minimum entitlement of 387,000 acre 
feet based on 3 acre feet of water per 
irrigable acrE'. 
The tribe signed an agreement in 1965 to 
defer some of its water ril!,hts until 2005 so 
the Central Utah Project (CUP) could proceed. 
But several tribal members objected and sued 
the CUP in order to insure that Indian water 
needs will be met before CUP water is export-
ed to the Salt Lake City metropolitan area. 
Water Development Projects 
The Colorado is one of the most highly 
regulated rivers in the world. Its many dams 
and reservoirs, water diversion and convey-
ance systems, and aqueducts for out-of-basin 
exports are the product of a long history of 
interaction between water planners, decision 
makers in the political arena, and the 
public. 
From the passage of the Reclamation Act 
of 1902 to the present time, major water 
development projects in the basin have, for 
the most part, been undertaken through 
the Bureau of Reclamation. Local institutions 
have worked through their representatives in 
Congress and state water agencies in getting 
the federal government involved. Federal 
subs idies have been an important factor 
in making projects financially feasible. 
Irrigation development has had strong public 
support in the basin states and has been 
supported nationally as part of an equitable 
apportionment of funds for regional deve 
ment. State agencies have played impor 
poli t ica 1 roles in the process, as have 
multi-state coalitions such as the Upper 
Colorado River Basin Compact Commission, 
working to resolve conflicts, build coali 
tions, and get faCilitating legislation 
through state legislatures. 
The variability of annual flows has been 
an important stimulus for construction in the 
Upper Basin. Since a growing population 
and economy cannot be maintained with an 
undependable water supply, legislat ion was 
enacted to provide for the cons truct ion 
of storage facilities to minimize the impact 
of yearly flow variations (Boulder Canyon 
Project Act of 1928, Colorado River 
Project Act of 1956, and the Colorado River 
Basin Pr t Act of 1968). 
Pr ior to passage of the Colorado River 
Stor Project Act of 1956, most water 
deve opment rojects served che Lower 
Basin. De ned to develop and beneficial-
ly use its appor t ioned share of Colorado 
River water (California has consistently used 
far more than its 4.4 maf entitlement) and 
fearful that nonuse might result in the 
loss of its entitlement, especially in view 
of the increasing severity of the problem of 
salinity, the Upper Bas in has since pushed 
hard for completion of the numerous pr 
au thor ized under the Storage Projec Act 
(includ the Central Utah Project in Utah 
which involves several units of special 
significance to the Uintah Basin). The 
Bureau has invested over $380 million in the 
State of Utah, much of it allocated to 
construction of Flaming Gorge Dam and 
the Vernal Unit of the Central Utah Project. 
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The political controversy a ociated 
with water project in the Colora 0 River 
Basin became more heated the Carter Adminis-
tration announced its "hit list" in the 
sing of 1977. Dismayed by the backlog 
o projects,2 the very substant federal 
outlays that would be required to implement 
these projects, and the belief that many of 
them were uneconomic or environmentally 
unsound, Pres ident Carter ordered a review 
of 342 projects. After an initial screening, 
32 were selected for extensive study (with 
public hearings). Of these, nine were 
recommended for continued funding, five for 
modification, and 18 for deletion. While 
the Bonneville Unit of the Central Utah 
Project was one of the nine "reinstated 
projects," three Colorado projects (Fruitland 
Mesa, Savery-Pothook, and Narrows) were among 
the 18 recommended for deletion. The House 
Appropriations Committee approved only six 
deletions (including the three Colorado 
projects), but put the other 12 back in the 
bill which the President reluctantly signed 
in October 1977. 
The water projects issue flared up again 
when the President transmitted his recom-
mendations for new project starts to Congress 
in June 1978. While the President's recom-
mendations for new construction starts 
included 17 Corps of Enginee-rs projects and 
nine Bureau of Reclamation ojects, notice-
ably absent were Fruitl Mesa, Savery-
Pothook, and Narrows (in Colorado) and the 
Uintah and Upalco Units of the Central 
Utah Project. 
The House Public Works Committee 
produced a bill that far exceeded the Ad-
ministration's recommendations. It provided 
for 53 new construction starts (27 more than 
those recommended by the President) at a cost 
of $1.8 billion. Included were the (above) 
three Colorado projects and the U intah and 
Upalco Units of the Central Utah Project. 
Dismayed by the reappearance of the six 
projects that had been deleted the previous 
year, the absence of fund for the Wa ter 
Resources Council (which he wished to playa 
key role in implementation of his water 
policy), a provision that would mandate 
the hirin~ of more than 2,300 new Corps and 
Bureau employees, and the high price ta~, the 
President vetoed the bill in October 1978. 
Failing to override the veto, a substitute 
bill cons istent wi th the Pres ident' s des ires 
was hurriedly passed and s into law. 
Since the Pres ident' s recommended new 
construction starts sought to follow the 
project evaluation criteria articulated 
2Th irty Bureau and 233 Corps projects 
with construction underway; 17 Bureau and 254 
Corps projects authorized but not funded; and 
numerous other projects in various sta~es of 
plannin~. 
in h is June 1978 Water Policy Message to 
Congress, the successful veto perhaps signals 
*reater use of objective analysis and less of 
porkbarrel" water politics in funding 
decisions. Since the Uintah and Upalco Units 
of the Central Utah Project--authorized two 
decades ago in the Colorado River Storage 
ProJ"ect Act--have not been approved for 
fun ing, it appears likely that these proj-
ects will have to meet the standards dis-
cussed in the next section. 
Water Policy 
In his June 1977 Environmental Message 
to Congress, President Carter announced that 
he was directing the Water Resources Council, 
th~ Office of Management and Budget, and the 
Council on Environmental Quality to undertake 
a comprehensive review of water resources 
policy, The review would cover criteria for 
project planning, cost-sharing arrangements, 
conservation strategies, and other matters 
continuing a long series of previous efforts 
,to establish a uniform national water policy. 
Early investigations in the Carter review 
revealed that 25 separate federal agencies 
collectively spend more than $10 billion per 
year on water resources projects and related 
programs. Furthermore, states are primarily 
responsible for water policy within their 
boundaries and yet are not integrally in 
volved in setting priorities and sharing in 
federal project planning and funding. 
In order to improve planning practice 
and ach ieve more efficient management of 
federal water resources programs, the Presi-
dent announced in a message to Congress in 
June 1978 that he would direct the Water 
Resources Council to 1) add water conserva-
t ion as a specific component of both the 
economic and environmental objectives of the 
Principles and Standards; and 2) require 
explicit formulation and consideration of a 
primarily nonstructural plan as an alterna-
t ive to each structural water project plan-
ned. 
Additional announced criteria were 
that projects 1) be actively supported by 
state and local officials; 2) require a 
state financial contribution above existing 
cost sharing; and 3) provide for recovery of 
federal and state costs (when vendible 
outputs are involved). 
160-Acre Limitation 
The 1902 Reclama t ion Ac t limi ts the 
del Ivery of federal reclamation water to 
farms of !60 acres or less and requires 
that the owner of the farming operation 
actually live on the land. Both the 160-acre 
limitation and residency requirement have 
been unpopular and generally not enforced. 
In compliance with a directive from the 
U.S. District Court in the District of 
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Columbia, Interior Secretary Andrus proposed 
rules and regulations (in August 1977) for 
their enforcement. 
Witnesses participating in the hearings 
held throughout the West on the proposed 
rules and regulations were generally opposed, 
even though approximately 90 percent of the 
acreage in the 17 Reclamation states meets 
the 160-acre limitation. The widespread 
opposition led to a new Administration 
policy presented by Secretary Andrus to 
Congress in April 1978. This policy would 
increase the individual acreage from 160 to 
320 acres; require that an individual must 
live within 50 miles and be involved in the 
farming operation to be eligible; disallow 
minor children as eligible for acreage 
allotments; allow an individual with less 
productive land within a project area to 
receive additional land to achieve "equi 
valency"; allow an individual to lease up to 
one-half of his allotment or to acquire up to 
480 acres through an ownership/lease combina-
t ion; set the maximum amount of acreage in 
single operations el ible for reclamation 
project water at 960 acres; allow partner-
ships if they meet the size, residency, and 
farming involvement requirements; and allow 
the sale of excess land to family, neighbors, 
and long-term tenants and employees and 
otherwise require the sale of land by 
lottery. 
Energy Development 
The Colorado River Basin contains large 
energy resources. There is more oi 1 in the 
shale deposits of northwest Colorado, north-
east Utah, and southwest Wyoming than in all 
.the Middle East. The Colorado plateau of 
Colorado, Utah, and the Navajo Reservat ion 
has 95 percent of dll the uranium in the 
country. The total amount of sub-bituminous 
and lignite coal in the region is estimated 
to be 1.3 trillion tons--enough to provide 
the U.S. with fuel, at its present rate of 
cons ump t ion, for more than three centur ies 
(Bureau of Reclamation, 1975). 
The Uintah Basin itself contains vast 
reserves of oil shale, tar sands, coal, oil 
and gas, and some uranium. The "oil boom" 
began in the area in the mid-1960s and is 
still going strong. Two large tracts of land 
in the basin were selected by the Department 
of the Interior as prototypes for oil shale 
development. The leases on these tractg are 
held by the White River Shale Oil Project 
(Sun, Sohio, and Phillips). Much of the 
basin's energy resources are on the Uintah 
and Ouray Reservations. 
Estimated production from the oil 
shale deposits is 300,000 bbl per day by the 
early 1980s, increasing to 2.8 million bbl 
per day by ~he mid 1990s (Bureau of Reclama 
tion, 1975). Bishop et a1. (1975) has 
estimated that, .mder current technology, a 
100,000-bbl/day operation would require about 
17,000 acre feet of water per year. Keith, 
Andersen, and Gardner (1975) estimated the 
consumptive use of water required for energy 
development to total between 700,000 acre 
feet and 2,300,000 acre feet. 
Approximately 90 percent of water use in 
the Colorado River Bas in now occurs in the 
agr icul tural sector. When energy companies 
can afford to pay $400 or more for an acre 
foot of water that benefits farmers by 
amounts in the $7-16 range, significant 
shifts in water use from agriculture to 
energy can be expected, provided that 
the institutional environment (state water 
use priorities, prohibitions on intersectoral 
transfers, level of federal subsidy to 
agriculture, cost sharing arrangements for 
new projects, etc.) does not impose prohibi-
tive limitations. 
A shift in water use from agricultural 
to energy development will have significant 
economic, environmental, and social impacts. 
Wi th respect to environmental concerns, 
use may improve or degrade the water 
qua ty depending on the extraction and 
processing technologies selected for the 
energy resource. Transfers to energy 
uses which have a high return flow would 
increase water quality since the energy use 
would not pollute the water and the leaching 
of salts from irrigated cropland would be 
reduced; however, transfers to consumptive 
energy uses would provide less water for 
dilution and thus reduce water quality. 
Many other economic, environmental, and 
social impacts could be cited which are just 
as important. 
In the first half of the century, 
siltation was regarded as the most serious 
water quality problem in the basin. While 
soil conserva t ion pract ices and the sed iment 
trapped in reservoirs have reduced siltation 
problems, increased leach ing of soil salts, 
reservoir evaporation, and diversion of fresh 
water from the basin have caused the problem 
of salinity to grow steadily more serious. 
Natural systems contribute half to 70 percent 
of the salt load. Of the man-caused sources, 
most salt is contributed by irrigated agri-
culture. Again estimates vary, but a 1972 EPA 
publication estimated that 33 percent of the 
total salt load comes from agriculture, with 
only 2 percent coming from municipal and 
industrial sources. The Bureau's Water 
Quality Improvement Program contains efforts 
to upgrade on-farm management as a means of 
solving the problem, but implementation is 
constra ined by factors from other perspec-
tives working against farmer acceptance. 
fly the 19/~Os, salinity had become a 
miljor issue in U.S.-Mexican relations. 
Although the 1944 Mexican Water Treaty does 
not specifically refer to the issue of 
salinity, Mexico has repeatedly voiced the 
belief that the United States had obligated 
itself to deliver to Mexico water of the same 
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quality as that delivered at Imperial Dam. 
The issue reached a head when Wellton-Mohawk 
drainage water and reduced flows associated 
with upstream development caused salinity 
levels in the waters reach ing Mexico to 
increase to 1500 ppm in 1962. The Mexican 
government reopened negotiations that 
resulted in Minute 218 (1965) and an agreed 
reduction of salinity levels in Mexico's 
received waters (1240 ppm in 1971). 
Still dissatisfied, however, Mexico's 
President Echeverria stated in 1972 that 
Mexico would not accept drainage water 
from the Wellton-Mohawk project. He further 
stated that the only valid interpretation of 
the 1944 is that Mexican farmers must 
receive water the same quality as that at 
Imperial Dam. The following round of 
negotiations led to Minute 242 (1973), which 
called for the reduction of the salinity 
of water delivered to Mexico to a level no 
more than 115 ppm (+ 30) in excess of the 
salinity at Imperial -Dam. This goal was to 
be ach ieved by the cons truct ion of a large 
desalinization ant to treat the Wellton-
Mohawk dra and led eventually to the 
1974 Colorado Basin Salinity Control 
Act which implemented Minute 242 and author-
ized a number of other salinity control 
projects (mostly in the Upper Basin). 
Increases in salinity reduce agri-
cultural productivity, damage equipment and 
plumbing, and limit the use of water in 
industry and municipali ties. Bishop et a1. 
(1975) estimated that salinity damages amount 
to about $230,000 per mg/l at Imperial Dam, 
and the Bureau of Reclamation (1974) shows 
a possible reduction of $16 per acre in net 
farm income for the Imperial Valley if 
salini ty increases by 320 mg/l by the year 
2000. 
A new philosophy of salinity control 
within the United States was adopted with the 
passage of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972 (P.L. 92-500). 
Section 402 of the Act makes the discharge of 
pollutants into receiving waters illegal 
unless the discharger has complied with the 
effluent limitations specified in a permit. 
The states are encouraged to assume responsi-
b ili ty for the permi t program. Four of the 
Colorado River Basin states ptesently have an 
approved t program. Utah is one of the 
three s that does not. 
Section 301 of P.L. 92-s00--the effluent 
limitation program--required that point 
source effluents from agriculture and in-
dustry be limited to levels achievable 
through appl icat ion of the best pract icable 
tech (BPT) by 1977 and the best avail-
able t nology (BAT) by 1983. The goals 
are to rna k e W 11 t e r sa [ e for a qua tic I ire 
and wildlife by 1983, and to achieve zero 
pollution discharge (ZPD) by 1985. 
It was strongly argued by \-later (lnd 
agricultural interests in the Colorado River 
Basin that P.L. 92-500 is baSically muni-
cipally and industrially oriented and should 
not be indiscriminately applied to irrigated 
agr iculture. Early and vigorous efforts on 
the par t of EPA to apply the permi t and 
effluent limitation programs to agriculture 
met strong resistance. There were no 
technically feasible salinity control mea-
sures that farmers could afford. 
In 1973, EPA clarified application of 
the permi t program to irrigated agriculture 
by specifying that permits would only 
be required when there is a point source 
of disch and when the return flow is from 
more than ,000 cont iguous acres wh ich use 
the same drainage system. The regulation was 
temporarily struck down in 1975 through a 
suit brought by the Natural Resources Defense 
Counc iI, wh ich wanted cont inuat ion of the 
permit requirements for small farmers, but 
that rul was later overturned. 
In 1974, EPA issued a regulation re 
quir the states to adopt numeric standards 
,for sa inity, consistent with the poli 
of maintaining average annual salinity leve 
in the lower main stem at or below 1972 
levels (nondegradation) and to submit a plan 
of implementation not later than October 18, 
1975. The Salinity Control Forum, formed by 
the Colorado River Basin states in 1972 to 
deal with EPA in implementing the Act, 
developed numeric standards based on the 
nondegradation policy and succeeded in 
gaining EPA concurrence in setting these 
standards at locations below Hoover, Parker, 
and Imperial Dams (as opposed to state 
boundaries as earlier advocated by EPA). The 
approved implementation plan is based on the 
Bureau of Reclamation's Water Quality Im-
provement Program, which incorporated the 
salinity control projects authorized by 
the 1974 Salinity Control Act and other 
salinity control measures. 
The winter months of 1976-77 saw 
spreading and deepening conditions of drought 
throughout the Colorado River Basin--indeed, 
by the spring of 1977, moderate to severe 
'drought covered large portions of the coun-
try. Measurements of Colorado River flow at 
Lee Ferry in April and May showed the 
lowest flows in over 70 years of record. 
I As conditions worsened, private and 
public concern rose sharply and led to 
remarkable state and federal responses. 
Over 60 drought-related bills were introduced 
in Congress, inc Iud ing those mak ing up the 
president's $844 million "drought package," 
and many existing federal programs were 
mobil i zed to dea 1 with the problem. The 
result was one of the most expensive (an 
estimated $4 billion total) and one of the 
mos t rap idly mounted relief effort" in the 
nation's history. Action at the state level 
was no less impressive, with emergency powers 
being granted to governors, scores of 
drought-related bills being introduced in 
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state legislatures, and local, 
multistate task forces bein 
develop plans and programs for 




Desp ite the widespread drough t cond i-
tions, the 1977 crop year was one of the best 
in U.S. history. A number of factors 
were responsible for this anomalous outcome. 
The soil conservation measures and added 
reservoir storage implemented after droughts 
of the 1930s and 1950s helped mitigate 
potential damages. Extensive groundwater 
pumping saved many crops. In many areas, 
production was up despite drought-related 
lower yields s imply because more acres were 
planted. Farmers in some areas were simply 
lucky--infrequent rains came at the right 
time. Nevertheless, many farmers and live-
stock producers were hard hit with the 
greates t losses occurr ing in lives tock and 
dryland farming operations. 
Institutions 
Survey of Interstate Institutions 
The issues characterized above have a 
long and continuing history that has gener-
ated many contesting interests. In the 
process of becoming one of the most regulated 
rivers in the world, the Colorado has also 
become one of the most institutionally 
complex. This section describes the princi-
pal institutions and how they have interacted 
to determine how the waters of the Colorado 
are used. 
Owing to the large amount of public 
lands in the basin and the national policy of 
irrigating desert areas, the federal govern-
ment has exerted a strong influence on 
Colorado River Basin development. The Bureau 
of Reclamation has played a preeminent role 
in water project development. The Supreme 
Court resolved interstate allocation issues 
in the Lower Basin. Federal courts have 
been involved in the resolution of Indian 
water rights issues and--despite the movement 
to seek nonjudicial solutions in this 
difficult and sensitive area will no doubt 
continue to be involved in future decisions 
concerning the nature and extent of Indian 
water rights. The Environmental Protection 
Agency has played a central role in the field 
of pollution control and, along with the 
Bureau of Reclamation, has been a key actor 
in controversial efforts to reduce salinity 
levels in the Colorado and its tributaries. 
While federal action~ have been a 
dominant force in the development and use of 
Colorado River water, institutions within the 
basin have been effective in "shaping" the 
federal involvement. A sign if icant port ion 
of the basin's institutional development has 
occurred as a result of state initiatives and 
multi-state agreements. The basin's numerous 
water-related interests and the dynamics of 
"distributive water politics" have created a 
large variety of multi-state organizations of 
wh ich the 12 shown in Table 2 provide a 
representative sample. 
The role that regio~al and state 
organizations have played In influencing 
federal policy is aptly described by Mann 
(1975). Adopting Lowi's (1972) concept of 
" dis t rib uti v e pol i tic s ," Man n has show n 
how different organizations with divergent 
missions have banded together in loose 
coalitions for the purpose of realizing 
common object ives. Coali t ions have appeared 
when organizations within the basin have 
perce ived a common threat or a common bene-
fit, and when collective action has been 
perceived as an effective strategy for 
avo id ing the threat, obtaining the benef it, 
and ensuring that associated costs and 
benef its are worked out in an "equi table" 
manner among competing basin interests. 
Example coali tions and agreements have been 
forged to influence Congressional water 
project authorizations and appropriations, 
t.o minimize federal dictation in interstate 
allocation decisions, to ensure that federal 
concessions to Mexico do not compromise basin 
i nteres ts unduly, to ward of f "unreasonable" 
EPA pollution standards and enforcement 
actions (especially in regard to salinity), 
and to prevent a federal preemption of the 
preroga t ives and r igh ts of states to manage 
water within their boundaries. 
Example Performance of the Western 
States Water Council during the 
Drought Emergency 
By the winter of 1976-1977 several 
western states had already experienced 
drought conditions for a year or more and 
initiated drought mit tion programs. As 
conditions worsened, the states began to turn 
to collective action and federal assistance. 
Growing concern was evident at a January 
20 meeting of the Western Governors' Task 
Force on Regional Policy Management in 
which possible multi-state actions were 
discussed, and at a January 28 meeting of the 
Western States Water Council. It was decided 
at the latter meeting that the Council should 
publish a weekly bulletin, 
Conditions, 1977. 
These two meetings led to a third 
meetinf!. on February 20, attended by the 
governors of 14 western states and Interior 
Secretary, Cecil Andrus. Three notable 
agreements were reached at the meeting; 1) 
the Secretary of the Interior would seek 
appointment of a federal drought coordinator 
in the Executive Office (Jack Watson was 
appOinted February 22), 2) each overnor 
would appoint a state drought coor inator 
and, 3) the governors would meet one week 
later at the National Governors Conference to 
consider further steps (Western States Water 
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Council, 1978). That meeting resulted in the 
formation of the Western Regional Drouf!.ht 
Act ion Task Force (WRDATF), staffed by the 
Western States Water Council and the In 
stitute for Policy Research. 
The WRDATF was organized to serve 8S an 
information clearinghouse on drought relief 
programs, represent the states' interests 
before Congress and the Administration, and 
organize special studies. The prinicpal 
achievements of WRDATF were: 
1. Weekly publicat ion of 
Drought Conditions: 1977. 
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2. Coordination of state efforts with 
four federal agency (the Federal Disaster 
Assista.nce Administration, the Bureau of 
Reclamation, the Department of Agriculture, 
and the Corps of Engineers) programs. 
3. Review from the state viewpoint of 
the proposed $844 mi 11 i on Wh i te House 
"drought package" and exchange of information 
on problems and actions of the individual 
states. 
4. Assignment of a representative to 
the Office of the White House Drought Co-
ordinator to monitor and report on Ad-
ministration and Congressional drouf!.ht 
initiatives and to prepare, publish, and 
distribute a "directory of federal drought 
assistance." 
5. Formation of working groups to 
deal with issues and problems in the areas of 
crops and irrigation; livestock and range-
land; fish, wildlife, and recreation; 
energy, business, and industry: and Task 
Force Management. 
6. As s ignment of a member of the 
Utah Department of Agriculture to USDA on a 
temporary duty ass ignment to coord inate 
federal and state agriculture programs. 
7. Initiation and organization of 
efforts leading to the passage and signing 
of a bill which gave the Secretary of the 
Interior authority to reallocate funds 
from h is "water bank" program to other 
programs (e.g., state grants) (Western 
Governors' Policy Office, 1978, p. 26-27). 
The significant role achieved by the 
states in shaping the federal droufht mitiga-
tion program was made possible by establish-
ing a temporary, special purpose multi-state 
organization (WRDATF) which was able to 
mobilize the existing resources of es 
tablished organizations (Western States 
Water Counci 1 and Western Governors' Policy 
Office). As preCipitation levels increased 
in the winter of 1977-78, the common need for 
the Task Force diminished; and the organiza-
tion was dissolved in the spring (Western 
Governors' Policy Office, 1978). 
Example Performance of the Western States 
water CouncIL In InfluencIng Carter 
Administration Water Policy 
When the President announced a six-
month study of water policy on May 23, 
1977, the Western States Water Council (WSWC) 
obtained and disseminated inrormation that 
became available prior to formal publication 
of the options on July 15 in the Federal 
Register. A draft briefing paper informed 
the western governors of the issues emerging, 
but the Council decided that it could not 
make a formal statement at the July 28-29 or 
August 1-2 hearings because of the short time 
period between publication of the options and 
the hearings (Western States Water Council, 
1978) . 
The Western Governors' Conference 
convened in September in Anchorage, Alaska, 
with Secretary of the Interior Andrus and 
other federal officials in attendance. A 
special committee of the Council had used the 
additional time to prepare a briefing docu-
ment to assist the governors in their dicus-
sions with the federal officials. Many 
western governors perceived a threat of 
encroachment on state water perogatives, 
and saw a need for formalizing a policy to 
assert state interests. 
Articulation of these concerns led to 
a meet ing in Reno of the western governors 
with Vice President Mondale and Secretary of 
the Interior and a following meeting with the 
Pres ident in Denver. Both meet ings sought 
administration assurance that there would not 
be encroachment on state and local peroga-
tives, but the western governors remained 
skeptical. 
The 13 executive orders of July 1978 
documented the water policy decisions made by 
the President to that point and lead to 
creation of 19 task forces responsible for 
making recommendations on particular water 
policy issues. The Western States Water 
Council has been monitor ing the progress of 
these task forces and has repeatedly taken 
the pos it ion that the implementat ion recom-
mendations be brought back to a high level 
policy pos ition for review (Barnett, 1979). 
Because of the difficulty of obtaining 
informed gubernatorial response to so many 
wa ter policy proposals, the National Gover-
nors' Association (with Utah Governor Scott 
Matheson chairing the water subcommittee) 
adopted 13 principles for water policy to 
provide the states a common reference against 
which future Administration policy initia-
t ives could be measured. The WSWC worked 
closely with the National Governors' Associa-
tion while these principles were developed. 
Up to that point, the Council had 
refrained from expressing an official posi-
t ion to avoid diversive regional responses. 
Once a Western States' position was estab-
lished, the Council becarr.e convinced that a 
statement was in order. One was approved in 
October 1978. Highlights include: 
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1. An appeal ror maximum flexibility in 
the manner and methods by which states' are 
permitted to contribute their share of water 
project costs. 
2. An objection to the preclusion or 
state court adjudication of federal reserve 
and Indian water rights. 
3. A request that the Secretary or the 
Interior direct federal officials to observe 
state water rights laws in the operation of 
federal reclamation projects, and to recog-
n ize the primacy of the state role in water 
resources allocations. 
4. A call for application of conserva 
t ion measures to meet s ite-specif ic needs. 
5. A call for consistency in rederal 
funding level for state planning efforts. 
6. A reassertion of state primacy in 
the protect ion of groundwater supply and 
instream flows (Western States Water Council, 
1978). 
These positions provide excellent 
examples of state-federal differences in 
western water policy. 
State Water Organizations 
At prese~t, water planning in Utah 
is performed In three distinct executive 
agencies: Office of the State Engineer, 
which is responsible for the administration 
of the state's water rights law; Division of 
Water Resources, which administers water 
conservation and development projects and 
represents Utah in negotiations involving the 
state's interstate waters; and Water Quality 
Section of the Bureau of Environmental 
Health, which administers the State's Water 
Quality Act and represents Utah's water 
quality interests in the Colorado River Basin 
Salinity Forum (Crawford and Weatherford, 
1975) . 
The Division of Water Reosurces was 
assigned the task of formulating a state-wide 
water resources plan. The agency is act ive 
in planning small-scale water projects, 
assessing alternative uses for Utah's remain-
ing unappropriated water, and looking into 
options on how the state can meet its future 
water needs. 
The Water Quality Section of the Bureau 
of Environmental Health is responsible for 
state water quality planning. Several 
levels are involved. Under Section 106 of 
the Federal Water Pollut ion Control Act 
Amendments, Utah is required to submit to EPA 
each year a state program plan which outlines 
the state's prinCipal water quality problems, 
reviews accomplishments during the previous 
year, and shows how the state will allocate 
resources during the ensuing year among the 
water quality program areas, including 
planning, the permit system, monitoring 
I\) 
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Table 2. Water-related regional organizations in the Colorado River Basin. 
Name of Organization 
Upper Colorado River 
Commiss ion 







Old West Regional 
Commission 














Type of Organization Mission 
Compact Commission Apportionment of Colorado River water uses; determine upper 
basin states' delivery obligations at Lee's Ferry; resolve 
controversies; secure upper basin agricultural and indus-























Administer La Plata River Compact; moniter and maintain 
stream gaging stations 
Provide means of coordination of interests, policies, 
programs and activities of states and federal agencies 
in water and related land resources investigations, 
planning, construction, operation, and maintenance; 
provide means of conflict resolution 
Distribute and administer federal funds for infra-
structure development under the Public Works and 
Economic Development Act of 1965 
Distribute and administer federal funds for infra-
structure development under the Public Works and 
Economic Development Act of 1965 
Promote interstate cooperation on salinity and other 
interstate water problems 
Promote cooperation among western states in planning 
for programs leading to integrated development by state, 
federal, and other agencies of western water resources 
Advise the State Department on Colorado River salinity 
problems in negotiations with Mexico 
Coordinate international, interstate, and intrastate 
weather modification activities to attain legislative 
uniformity and effective information exchange while 
maintaining state and local control 
Provide a forum for expression of states' viewpoints on 

































Source of Funding 
From states in same 
proportion as upper 
basin consumptive use 
allocation 
Activities carried 
out by state engi-
neers of member 
states (Colo. & N.M.) 
Staff support and 




Staff support and 
other costs provided 
by members 
Mostly from state 
assessments 
Staff support and 
other costs provided 
by members 
Membership dues 















2 Carter Administration water policy 
3 Water quality 
4 1976-77 drought 
5 Indian and federal water rights 
6 160-acre limitation 
7 Energy development 
Coordination of water supply forecasts and techniques 
of snow surveying watershed management, conservation and 
use 
Forum to discuss· state water rights administration; 








Membership dues and 




and enforcement, f aci Ii ties cons truct ion, 
training and certification of operators, 
development of stream standards, public 
participation, and administration. 
At another level, Utah has been working 
on basin plans for its rivers. These plans 
provide classifications of each segment of 
the streams according to waste assimilation 
capacitiies in relation to the water quality 
standards established by the state. They 
analyze future population growth and economic 
development and outline systematic management 
and regulation approaches for maximizing 
public benef it with minimum public expendi-
t ures. 
The bas in plans provide a framework 
for two other levels of planning, namely 
area-wide and facilities planning. Area-
wide (or so-called "208") lans will be 
developed for all areas of state having 
serious pollution problems. The Uintah Basin 
is one such area. Among other things, these 
plans call for the control of nonpoint 
sources of pollution, the protection of 
flroundwater, and the r ulation of the 
location and construction any facilities 
which may result in pollution. In effect, 
Section 208 of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments calls for the integra-
t ion of land use and water management plan-
ning. Facilities planning involves engineer-
ing and economic feasibility studies for 
the construction of wastewater treatment 
facilities, with the objective of integrating 
such facilities into basinwide waste manage-
ment systems. 
A closely related institutional issue 
is the perceived need for the integration 
of water and land use planning. In it 
final report, Water Policies for the Future 
the National Water Commission (1973) con-
c luded: "Water planning is not adequately 
integrated with planning for the land uses 
that water developments are expected to 
serve." The Commission recommended that if 
Congress enacted land use planning legisla-
t ion, it should provide for coordination of 
water planning and land use planning at 
all levels of government. As noted above, 
Section 208 of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972 also calls for 
an integrated planning approach. 
An effort, known 
was initiated several 
as the "Utah Process" 
s ago in th€ Office 
Coordinator, to 
planning the state. 
office summarized its 
of the State Plann n 
coordinate all levels 
In a 1972 report, that 
accomplishments: 
t. 1 t proposes and to some 
degree hilS systema<tized, applied, 
ilnd tested, a structure to im-
plement and maintain a coordin-
ated planning procedure. 
2. It has designed this 
structure to bring into the plan-
ning process the administrators 
of the various governmental 
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agencies, agency planning special-
ists, and other decision makers. 
3. It has made use of a 
planning concept (Alternative 
Futures) wh ich provides for the 
continuing consideration of pos-
sible future events, singly and in 
various combinations, which can 
significantly alter future require-
ments for governmental services 
and the order of their priority. 
4. I t has evolved a means 
(Economic and Demographic Impact 
Model) by which known statistical 
data, in combination with antici-
pated but uncertain events, can 
be projected to obtain a more 
dependable picture of what the 
relationship of public needs and 
available resources will be five or 
ten s in the future. 
It has evolved a planning 
process which at every step is 
or iented toward establish in!" an 
effective relationship between 
planning: and budgeting (Office of 
the State Planning Coordinator, 
1972) . 
Uintah Basin Water Organizations 
Planning within the Uintah Basin com-
bines regional efforts instigated by state 
government with the activities of the 
various counties and communities. 
There are three counties in the Uintah 
Basin: Daggett, Duchesne, and Uintah. 
Each is governed by a Board of County Com-
missioners elected at large. by voters in the 
county. A measure of continui is provided 
for the board by the biennial e ion of two 
of the commissioners to a four-year ovet-
1 term. The th ird commiss ioner is 
e for a two-year term. 
There are four third class cities 
(Vernal, Roosevelt, Duchesne, and Myton) and 
three towns (Manila, Tabioni, and Altamont) 
in the Uintah Basin area. The four third 
class cities operate under the mayor-council 
form of government. In each odd-numbered year 
a municipal election is held in which either 
the mayor and two councilmen or three 
councilmen are elected to office. 
The Ute Indians, who occupy 15 percent 
of the land in the area, have a tribal 
council form of government. The Indian lands 
are held in thrust by the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs which occupies off ice space in Fort 
Duchesne (Horne, 1973). 
The three counties of the llinlah Kasin 
compose one of seven intercollnty planning 
districts in the state through the Uintah 
Basin Association of Governments (UBAG) 
created in 1970 to assist municipalities and 
counties in planning and promoting basin-wide 
development. UBAG also sponsors and ad-
ministers federal grants and programs for 
counties and municipalities in the basin and 
aids local officials in the preparation and 
revision of plans and guidelines for resource 
development. 
The Governor in 1974 established the 
Planning and Development Advisory Council and 
a supporting Technical Committee under the 
direction of the Executive Director of the 
Uintah Basin Association of Governments 
(UBAG). The Council was created primarily to 
provide information and planning assistance 
for local jurisidictions, in anticipation of 
growth induced by energy development. 
The Planning and Development Advisory 
Council has 13 members and consists of 
elected officials from cities and counties of 
the basin. The Technical Committee was 
formed as a means of providing specific data, 
documents, and studies to the Advisory 
Council. The committee provides expertise 
in socio-economic, environment, transporta-
tion, education, finance, water, and com-
munity service. 
Observed Levels Problems 
The above description of Colorado 
River Basin water issues brings out a number 
of problems in levels of analysis. In 
the order of the issues and institutions 
presented, some of them are: 
1. The Colorado River water allocat ion 
has been set politically without reference 
to desirability in terms of the basic nation-
a 1 water planning objectives of economic 
development and environmetal quality. 
Furthermore the negotiation process that 
produced this allocation was so protracted 
and strenuous that the parties are not 
interested in reopening the issues by study-
ing the equity of the results. 
2. The allocation set by water inter-
ests has major implications for the develop-
ment of one of the largest sources of fossil 
fuels' in the world. Specifically, the exist-
ing allocation may constrain develop-
ment in ways highly detrimen to the 
national interest in an era energy 
shortage. 
3. Overes t ima t ion of average annual 
runoff from the basin at the time the waters 
bf the river were legally allocated has 
probably worked to increase development 
dependent on the water and intensify con-
flicts among user groups. The situation 
provides an excellent example of the need for 
better coordination among dimensions in 
decision making (Figure 1). 
4. The institutionalization of Indian 
and Federal Reserved Water Rights has 
created situations in which certain water 
uses are favored over others for reasons 
having little to do with current benefits 
from use and over which state and local 
interests have little voice. 
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5. People are beneficially using water 
which by right should go for federally 
reserved pruposes or use by Indians. Severe 
differences in opion can be anticipated 
should these rights be quantified (a process 
likely to begin soon) or exercised. 
6. Indian water rights appear to be 
in at least partial conflict with water 
export to metropolitan Salt Lake City. The 
values to be used in resolving the issue have 
not been defined. 
7. The institutions for water develop-
ment in the Colorado River Bas in have been 
strongly oriented toward irrigation, and much 
uncertainty exists as to how they will 
respond to growing pressure to use more of 
the water for municpal and energy-related 
uses. 
8. Historical water allocation and 
use decis ions are not in harmony wi th a 
nat ional water policy trend toward dec is ion 
making by objective criteria. Continued 
clashes can be expected between those promot-
ing a common evaluative framework for all 
water planning and those who believe that 
they can better promote their interest 
through the political process. 
9. The push by the executive branch 
of the federal government toward water 
conservation (defined as reduction in use as 
part of a nonstructural water management 
effort) runs strongly counter to the water 
use values of the people in the Colorado 
R i ve r Bas ina n din ma n y res p e c t s tot h e 
physical facts of return-flow hydrology in an 
arid basin. The national emphasis can thus 
be expected to generate s ificant conflicts 
in the West. 
10. The recently proposed compromise 
revision to the 160-acre limitation is of a 
sort that never makes all sides happy and is 
probably going to be a subject for continuing 
discussion. If farmers react to acreage 
limitations by making greater use of private-
ly financed groundwater development, impor-
t ant implicat ions would r esul t for both 
water resources managment and energy conser-
va t ion. 
11. Since the western irrigation proj-
ects were justified in part as promoting 
family farming, any major shift of water use 
from agr iculture to the large corporat ions 
engaged in developing fossil fuel resources 
raises important issues related to water 
pricing and the equity of federal subsidy. 
12. The probable shift of water use from 
agriculture to energy is being considered 
in the context of fragmentary information on 
consequent economic, environmental, and 
soc ial impacts. When people exper ience 
unanticipated impacts as these shifts are 
made, their policy are likely to 
change drastically. One can expect a rather 
unstable water plann environment. 
13. Adopted salinity standards represent 
another case in wh ich management goals were 
established through the political process 
without reference to the objective analysis 
advocated by national water policy. The 
situation reinforces a state perception 
of a nat lonal government that does not use 
its own rules when planning salinity control 
measures in national favor but then forces 
states to comply with very stringent planning 
requirements before funding their projects. 
14. The difference in goals and values 
between the national government and ir-
rigators is seen in farmer resistance to 
federally promoted on-farm salinity control 
practices. The differences will have to be 
reconciled for decision making at the in-
dividual level to promote national goals. 
15. Drought-period decision making 
is much less thorough than that done more 
leisurely at other times. When water manage-
ment policy is not determined before drought 
conditions develop, the quickly determined 
water policy prove less than adequate and 
ye t cont inue or a long time af terwards. 
When policy is determined beforehand, drought 
conditions create strains among water users 
that put it to a severe test. Fortunately, 
the 1977 drought in the Colorado Basin did 
not reach a severity that created such a 
test, largely because of the extensive 
carryover storage available in large reser-
voirs from previous years. 
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16. Institutionally expressed state-
federal water policy differences stress 
desires on the part of each side to increase 
their management responsibility and do not 
explicity address the problems of resolving 
important differences in policy preferences. 
The existing interstate and state-federal 
framework is focusing on procedural but not 
well on substantive issues. 
17. Organizations institutionalized 
for planning at the national level are 
oriented toward achieving national objectives 
and have competent technical staff for 
promoting them. At lower levels of analysis, 
organizations tend to be swayed more by 
national priorities and programs than 
by local needs or desires. Local people can, 
however, express their desires and are 
likely to be able to be more effective in 
do ing so when dea li ng wi th Congress than by 
interacting through administrative channels. 
Conclusion 
The above description of issues and 
institutions in the Uintah Basin of the 
Colorado River drainage area were used to 
list 17 issues related to differences in 
levels of analysis. The list is suggestive 
rather than exhaustive, but it provides a 
reasonable idea as to the issues existing 
among planning levels in an arid climate. 
CHAPTER IV 
PROPDEMM: AN APPLICATION OF A POLICY SIMULATION 
COMPUTER MODEL TO A MULTILEVEL, 
MULTI GOAL PLANNING SYSTEM 
. In a third approach to a better under-
standing of levels of analysis problems, a 
simulation was attempted of the local region, 
state, and national viewpoints on water 
management in the Uintah Basin. The hope was 
that the more explicit representation forced 
by having to quantify relationships for ~ 
model would provide additional insights that 
would contribute to conceptual representation 
of levels of analysis problems. 
Computer Simulation of Partially 
Hierarchial Systems 
Recent advances in our understanding of 
the relationsh ips among physical, economic, 
environmental, and social factors in land and 
water planning have been made possible, in 
part, by use of sophisticated computer 
technology for data processing and analysis. 
The increased capacity to process information 
has increased our ability to analyze larger 
and more complex systems in greater detail. 
This, in turn, has increased the potential 
benefits from computer modeling (Riley, 1976, 
p. 18-19). A wide range of managment alter-
natives can be evaluated as systematic 
information storage and retrieval permit 
focus attention on component parts without 
losing sight of the larger tern. Clarity 
in system definition is ncreased, and 
information deficiencies and needs are 
identified. 
A computer model is a set of equations 
representing some real system. The model 
defines functional relationships within a 
system, defines constraining parameters at 
system boundaries, and .transforms raw in-
formation into a useful format for the 
~nterpretation of large system activities. 
The variety and complexity of models 
\lave increased with advances in computer 
technology. Basically, however, there are 
two approaches to model development: mathe-
matical programming (optimization) and 
s imulat ion. Mathematical programming seeks 
to identify management decisions that do the 
best job of achieving some defined goals. 
Simulation models attempt to represent system 
behavior in response to defined sequences of 
external s timulat ion. Both types can con-
tribute valuable information on impacts on 
planning objectives of a range of feasible 
a Iternat ives. 
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For realistic representation of real 
world conditions, water resources planning 
models needs to recognize the value, juris-
diction, action, and temporal components of 
decision making as shown on Figure 2 in the 
framework of multiple levels decidinp: at 
multiple levels as shown on Figure 1. The 
practical problem prevent this sort of 
representation is that a suff cient conceptu-
al basis is yet to be established. This 
point is made in recognition that the theory 
of multilevel, multigoal hiera~chical systems 
has been advanced by Mesarovic, Macko, and 
Takahara (1970) and applied by Haimes (1976) 
to planning for the Maumee River Basin. The 
point shown in Figure 1 is that real world 
decision systems are not entirely hierarchial 
and further work is needed to plan in th is 
context. Economic analysis has developed 
rules for dealing with situations where 
conditions depart from the assumptions of 
perfect competition. Planning theory needs 
rules for dealing with varying degrees of 
departure from hierarchial decision systems. 
General Structure of PROPDEMM 
Th is chapter uses the PROPDEMM s imu la-
tion to identify levels of analysis problems. 
The PROPDEMM (Programmed Policy Decision 
Making Model) simulation was developed by 
Mulder in 1974 under a grant from the Utah 
State University Environment and Man Program 
sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation 
(Hoggan et al., 1974). The simulation is an 
application to water resources planning of 
concepts adapted from PRINCE, a simulation of 
international relations developed by Coplin 
and O'Leary at Syracuse University. In 
previous applications, Hoggan et a1. (1974) 
utilized the simulation to determine the 
effect of group interact ions on alternat ive 
plans for the Willamette River Basin, and 
Keith et al. (1977) used it to determine and 
evaluate social, political, and environmental 
trade offs in a multiobjective planning for 
the Virgin River Basin. During the course 
of th is project, PROPDEMM was mod if ied 
to eliminate erroneous formulae and increase 
the rogram efficiency. The altered version 
is to as PROPDEMM II. 
PROPDEMM was developed to tis imulate 
decision processes which involve political 
and social-ecological interactions" from 
information on the cons iderations shown in 
Figure 3. According to Mulder (1974), 
general policy decision making involves four 
factors: interest groups, group values, 
policy objectives, and courses of action. 
The PROPDEMM simulation is built on the 
following assumptions about the relationships 
between these four factors: 1) interes t 
groups represent the general populace in 
articulating policy demands, 2) the interest 
groups possess value preferences for some 
present, or future, state, 3) the decis ion 
maker is responsible for converting these 
values into policy objectives, and 4) the 
policy object ives will be used to formulate 
plans, or courses of action, which will 
ach ieve the object ives, and hence the more 
a bs tract va lues of the re levant interes t 
groups. For example, an interest group may 
desire to maintain, or even increase, 
its level of attainment of some value. When 
this desire is communicated to the decision 
maker, he will devise a course of action by 
which the value attainment will be preserved 
or increased in the future. 
I INTEREST GROUPS : 




A second feature of PROPDEMM is its 
characterization of interest groups and their 
interactions (Mulder, 1974: Hoggan et a1., 
1974; Keith et a1., 1977). For this study, 
five interes t groups were used. Each is 
characterized by 1) environmental value 
preferences, 2) environmental value salience, 
3) power to affect a course of action, 4) 
potential for punishment or reward as deter 
mined by the decision maker, 5) degree of 
dogmatism 6) cos t consciousness, 7) poten-
tial to feet and, in turn, be affected by 
the other interest groups, and 8) openness to 
change. F 4 illustrates the relation-
ship of in est group attributes to the 
general policy decision model. 
The follow ing da ta inputs are req u ired 
and generally must be estimated subjectively 
for the modeling. 
1. Group dogmatism vector. One dog-
matism value for each group is entered by an 
ordinal integer value between 1 and 7. 
A high dogmatism is indicated by a ranking of 
7. 
I VALUES I I 
I 
I IMPACT ON VALUES 
~I 
I COURSES OF ACTION (POLICY) I INDEPENDENT 
SOCIAL AND I .,..,.. 
MODIFIED SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
VARIABLES VARIABLES 
Figure 3. General policy decision model. 
I I COURSES OF ACTION I DECISION MAKER I I 
I I 
I GROUP POWER I GROUP VAWE PREFERENCES 
I AND VALUE SALIENCE PUNISHMENT -
COST CONSCIOUSNESS I I REWARD 
I DOGMATISM POTENTIAL I GROUP AFFECT I OPENNESS TO CHANGE I 
I 
OTHER INTEREST INTEREST GROUP 
GROUPS 
Figure 4. Relationship of interest groups to the general decision model. 
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2. Punishment-reward potential vector. 
One punishment-reward potential value for 
each group is entered by an ordinal integer 
value between -3 and .3. A -3 indicates a 
high potential for punishment by the decision 
maker. 
3. Cost consciousness/cost level 
vectors. -1'h-e--'-cost- consciOusness-vector--fs 
entered by an ordinal integer value between 1 
and 7. A ranking of 7 represents a high level 
of cost consciousness among a group. The 
cost level vectors are also inputted by 
ord inal integers between 1 and 7. There is 
~ne cost level for each course of action. 
4. Q~£~E_~ii~£!_ve£!£~. For each 
group, a set of affect vectors is entered to 
~epresent the affect of that one group on all 
pther groups. The affect vectors are 
supplied as ordinal integers between -3 and 
3. A -3 represents a high negative affect; 
no affect is represented by 0; and, a high 
positive affect is represented by 3. 
5. Group values vector. Ten environ-
mental values are entered for each group. 
The group values are entered USing -3 to 3 on 
an ordinal scale representing the degree 
of preference. 
6. Group salience vectors. Ten sa-
l ience vectors are entered for each group. 
The salience vectors represent a degree of 
commi tment to each of the ten environmental 
values. An ordinal scale of 1 to 7 is 
used. 
7. Q~£~E_Eow~~_ve£!£~~. Fifteen 
values for each group represent the power 
that that group has to impact each course of 
action. A 1 to 7 ordinal scale is used to 
rank the group power. 
8. Environmental impact value vectors. 
A -3 to 3 ordinal scale is used to enter the 
impact of a given environmental factor on 
the environmental values. A scale of 1 to 
5 is used to rank each environmental factor 
with respect to impact intensity on the 
e nvi ronmental va lues. A 1 represents the 
most intense. 
9. Outcome value vectors. There are 
five posSIb~utcomes for each course of 
action. These outcomes, with associated 
probabilities, are entered using an ordinal 
scale ranging between -3 and 3. The-3 
represents a high negative outcome or 
impact. 
10. Indicated salience level. The 
indicated-sarrence-leveT-Is-that-level of 
salience which is regarded as significant to 
the decision process. This level is entered 
using an ordinal ranking of 0 to 7. 
From input information on the above 
factors, PROPDEMM simulates outputs to aid 
the decision maker. The first output 
is the Environmental Value Modification 
vector indices. These indices indicate the 
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match between existing environmental condi-
tions and group environmental values. The 
dec is ion maker is able to view these indices 
and propose courses of action to improve the 
fit. 
Following formulation of applicable 
courses of act ion, an output is pr ovided in 
the form of a preliminary Nonsystemic 
Political Feasibility Index (NSPFI). This 
output gives the decision maker his first 
information on how each interest group 
stands with regard to the formulated courses 
of action. The output is preliminary 
because it treats each interest group as if 
it were affected only by the envi ronmental 
conditions and the courses of action. From 
this output, the decision maker is able to 
determine those aspects of a course of action 
that are liked or disliked by the interes t 
group. This knowledge may permit the 
decision maker to modify some undesirable 
features or develop alternatives more likely 
to be acceptable. 
The final output of the PROPDEMM simula-
tion is the Sytemic Political Feasibility 
Index (SPFI). This index utilizes the NSPFI 
i n d e x and inc 0 r po rat est h e imp a.c t t hat 
other interest groups may have on a given 
group's support for particular courses of 
action. The model thus provides for the fact 
that the selection of a political strategy by 
an interest group requires an estimate of 
support and opposition from other groups. 
The SPFI, when compared to the NSPFI, gives 
the decision maker information on the im-
portance of group interactions and on pos-
sible coalitions among interest groups. 
Refinements can be made in order to des ign 
alternatives capable of generating greater 
support. 
Uintah Application 
The model was applied to three levels 
of decision making--the Uintah Basin, the 
State of Utah, and the Colorado River Basin--
chosen according to a combination of hydro-
logic and political jurisdiction criteria. 
The three levels correspond to the planning 
perspectives emphasized in recent national 
legislation. For example, basin-wide plan-
ning and state planning are encouraged in 
Title II of the Water Resources Planning Act 
of 1965 (PL 89-90). The Pr inciples and 
Standards require multiobjective project 
evaluation. Subbasin planning and area-wide 
planning are encouraged in the 1965 Act, and 
in Sections 201, 208, 209, and 303 of the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 
(PL 92-500) (Mulder et al., 1978). 
It is of interest to note, however. how 
the degree to which the units fail to overlap 
geographically produces problems in the 
part-whole relation in the level structure. 
The Uintah Basin is a hydrologic subdivison 
of the Colorado River Basin, and covers 
portions of southwest Wyoming, northwest 
Colorado, and northeast Utah. The Uintah 
Basin Asso~iation of Governments is a politi-
cal subdivision of the State of Utah and thus 
covers only a portion of the hydrologic 
region. At the state level, Utah is a member 
of the Colorado River Basin Compact, but 
hydrologically it is divided approximately in 
half between the Colorado Basin and the 
Great Basin where most of the people live. 
Finally, at the basin level, the member 
states of the Compact cover the entire 
drainage area of the river, except a small 
portion in Mexican territory, but the states 
also cover a great deal of additional terri-
tory--not one is exclusively within the 
Colorado River Basin. 
Other levels of analysis in the govern-
mental dimension of Figure 1 could have been 
chosen. The lowest political subdivisions--
counties, cities, and special purpose water-
related districts were not included. Neither 
was the federal government. Also excluded 
were levels along the physical-natural 
dimension, such as the smaller hydrologic 
areas (six in the Uintah Basin) and the upper 
and lower basins and levels in the economic 
social and cultural dimensions. Since 
PROPDEMM was applied to only three of the 
many possible levels of analysis and in only 
one of the five dimensions, the results could 
not be expected to provide planning answers, 
but they hopefully would ident ify planning 
problems. 
In opting for three general purpose 
governmental units, this application glossed 
divisions that might be better for a special 
purpose perspective. If water quality is the 
priority interest, the river concourse would 
be the prominent object of attention. If 
electricity generation were the primary 
consideration, water quantity would be the 
important water consideration, and trans-
mission lines would determine the units. 
Different results would be obtained by 
focusing on the other major historic water 
development goals, such as irrigation and 
flood control. All of these possibilities 
could not be incorporated in one PROPDEMM 
simulation. 
Having identified the decision making 
levels, the next step was to determine the 
values being pursued by prominent interests 
within each jurisdiction and a set of alter-
native courses of action for water develop-
ment at the respective decision levels. This 
information was derived from a general values 
survey of residents of the Uintah Basin area, 
a content analys is of the major da ily news-
papers in the Colorado River Bas in, inter-
views with government officials at the three 
levels, and a review of the reports of 
government agencies concerned with Colorado 
River water. Since the collected information 
could not be objectively transformed into 
model inputs, the modeling effort must be 
cons idered as heuristic (although probably a 
fair representation of the interest of actors 
in the planning system). Because the purpose 
of this PROPDEMM application was to develop 
insights into levels of analysis problems 
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rather than to resolve particular water 
resources planning issues in the Uintah 
Basin, the groups and the information de-
scribing them used in the model will not be 
spelled out in this report. Greater specifi-
city in that regard would be expected to add 
controversy away from the desired thrust of 
this study. 
The first use of the simulation model 
was to select courses of action for the 
planning systems. To accomplish this task, 
the relevant interest groups, group data, and 
environmental data (Appendix B) were entered 
into the PROPDEMM II model (Appendix A) to 
generate an environmental state for the 1990 
planning horizon. The generated environ-
mental state represents the most desired 
environmental factors, the least desired 
environmental factors, and the most probable 
environmental factors. 
Following the generation of the environ-
mental states, the Environmental Value 
Modification Vector Indices were computed. 
These indices (Table 3) measure the match 
between the environmental states and the 
values of the interest groups. From these 
indices it is possible to derive suitable 
courses of act ion (Table 4) des igned to 
improve the ma tch between group va lues and 
environmental factors, increase the potential 
to achieve more desired environmental condi-
tions, and mitigate, or minimize, occurrence 
of the less desired environmental conditions. 
By achieving these objectives, the 
course of action becomes a tool to increase 
interest group value satisfaction, or goal 
attainment. In order to permit multilevel 
impact assessment, PROPDEMM I I has been 
structured so that each planning level can 
not only identify its own course of action 
preferences but also its peferences for 
courses of action at the other two levels. 
For each planning level, five alterna-
t ive courses of act ion were devised. These 
courses of action are a composite of present, 
or past, water resource project plans. Each 
course of action is assigned five possible 
outcomes with probabilities of occurrence 
approximating a normal distribution. In 
Table 5, the values seen by the State of 
Utah planning system for the possible courses 
of action at all three simulated levels of 
decision making are tabulated. 
The most probable outcome of each COllfse 
of action is rated at a 40 percent prob-
ability of occurrence. The next two outcomes 
tabulated, rated at 20 percent probability of 
occurrence, represent somewhat more optimis 
tic and pessimistic impacts respectively. 
The final two outcomes, rated at 10 percent 
probability of occurrence, represent the 
maximum positive and negative impacts. Each 




the problems of mult iple 
cross impacts of courses of 
Table 3. Environmental value modification vector indices. 
THE SMALLER THE INDEX VALUE, THE CLOSER THE FIT BETWEEN 
EXISTING CONDITIONS AND A SET OF GROUP VALUES 
FORMULAE ARE: XEMV ~ ABS(EIVV-GRPVAL)!GRPSAL 
PXEMV = XEMV!PROBABILITY OF CONDITION 
State of Utah 
Environmental State 1 Most Probable 
Selected 
Envi ronmental Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Vector 
Cond Prob XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV ( PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) 
1443500 People 44 4.0 ( 9.1) 4.5 10.2) 4.1 ( 9.4) 6.9 ( 15.7) 4.5 10.2) 5.0 11.3) 3.2 ( 7.3) 
8 .5 MAF Annual 33 5.6 ( 17.0) 3.0 9.0) 2.9 ( 8.7) 6.3 ( 19.2) 4.5 13.n 3.2 9.5) 1.8 ( 5.5) 
15166 AF M-I WTR 38 4.9 ( 12.8) 3.8 10.0) 3.6 ( 9.4) 6.6 ( 17.3) 3.7 9.7) 4.8 12 .5) 3.1 ( 8.2) 
Social Service 3 40 6.4 ( 15.9) 3.0 7.4) 4.4 ( 11.0) 6.0 ( 15.1) 3.3 8.2) 3.7 9.4) 2.3 ( 5.7) 
$856M PUB Invest 43 6.0 ( 14.0) 3.1 7.2) 3.8 ( 8.8) 7.0 ( 16.3) 3.9 9.1) 3.5 8.2) 2.0 ( 4.]) 
5702 MW Energy 40 3.4 ( 8.4) 3.7 9.3) 4.3 ( 10.6) 8.7 ( 21.9) 5.0 12.4) 3.4 8.4) 1.8 ( 4.6) 
500 MG/L IDS 33 8.2 ( 24.7) 3.8 11.4) 5.6 ( 17.0) 7.6 ( 23.0) 2.8 8.5) 6.3 19.0) 4.2 ( 12.7) 
6.0-8.0% UNEMP 40 5.9 ( 14.6) 3.9 9.7) 4.1 ( 10.2) 6.3 ( 15.8) 3.1 7.7) 4.7 11. 7) 3.1 ( 7.8) 
29M Tourist Days 38 5.7 ( 14.9) 3.5 9.1) 3.6 ( 9.4) 5.9 ( 15.4) 3.6 9.4) 3.7 9.7) 2.2 ( 5.9) 
137 Quad BTU's 40 4.8 ( 12.0) 4.2 10.5) 3.9 ( 9.8) 9.3 ( 23.3) 4.8 12.1) 3.4 8.5) 1.8 ( 4.5) 
Environmental State 2 Most Desired 
Selected 
Envi ronmental Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Vector 
Cond Prob XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEM\l (PXEMV) 
1443500 People 44 4.0 ( 9.1) 4.5 ( 10.2) 4.1 9.4) 6.9 ( 15.7) 4.5 ( 10.2) 5.0 ( 11.3) 3.2 7.3) 
10. 2 MAF Annual 9 7.7 ( 85.7) 3.3 ( 36.5) 3.5 39.1) 7.5 ( 82.9) 5.5 ( 61.5) 2.2 ( 23.9) 1.5 17.0) 
13166 AF M-I WTR 18 4.9 ( 27.4) 3.3 ( 18.1) 3.3 ( 18.6) 5.1 ( 28.2) 3.3 ( 18.1) 4.3 ( 23.7) 2.8 15.7) 
Social Service 5 9 6.0 ( 66.9 ) 3.3 ( 36.5) 4.1 ( 45.7) 6.4 ( 71.5) 3.3 ( 36.2) 4.1 ( 45.7) 2.6 28.9) 
$856M PUB Invest 43 6.0 ( 14.0) 3.1 ( 7.2) 3.8 ( 8.8) 7.0 ( 16.3) 3.9 ( 9.1) 3.5 ( 8.2) 2.0 4.7) 
5702 MW Energy 40 3.4 ( 8.4) 3.7 ( 9.3) 4.3 ( 10.6) 8.7 ( 21.9) 5.0 ( 12.4) 3.4 ( 8.4) 1.8 4.6) 
400 MG/L TDS 12 9.8 ( 81.5) 4.7 ( 39.0) 7.5 ( 62.2) 7.7 ( 64.2) 2.2 ( 18.1) 7.2 ( 60.3) 5.0 41.4) 
3.0-4.5% UNEMP 12 5.0 ( 41.8) 3.0 ( 24.6) 3.4 ( 28.4) 5.8 ( 48.6) 3.9 ( 32.7) 3.8 ( 31.8) 2.3 18.9) 
32M Tourist Days 27 5.7 ( 21.1) 3.2 ( 12.0) 4.9 ( 18.2) 5.2 ( 19.2) 4.7 ( 17.5) 3.8 ( 14.0) 2.3 8.4) 
137 Quad BTU's 40 4.8 ( 12.0) 4.2 ( 10.5) 3.9 ( 9.8) 9.3 ( 23.3) 4.8 ( 12.1) 3.4 ( 8.5) 1.8 4.5) 
Environmental State 3 Leas t Desired 
Selected 
Environmental Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Vector 
Cond Prob XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEM\l (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) 
1353000 People 20 4.5 ( 22.4) 4.4 22.2) 4.0 ( 19.9) 6.8 ( 34.1) 4.1 ( 20.4) 4.9 ( 24.4) 3.2 (. 15.8) 
6.8 MAF Annual 12 4.9 ( 41.0) 8.8 73.1) 8.7 ( 72.4) 9.5 ( 79.4) 3.3 ( 27.3) 8.8 ( 72.9) 6.5 ( 54.4) 
17166 AF M-I WTR 20 5.6 ( 27.8) 5.3 26.5) 4.1 ( 20.7) 9.6 ( 47.9) 5.0 ( 24.9) 5.3 ( 26.3) 3.4 ( 17.2) 
Social Service 1 12 5.8 ( 48.5) 3.0 24.6) 5.2 ( 43.7) 5.6 ( 46.8) 4.7 ( 38.8) 4.0 ( 32.9) 2.6 ( 21.7) 
~770M PUB Invest 20 5.9 ( 29.2) 3.1 15.6) 3.9 ( 19.6) 6.2 ( 30.9 ) 3.4 ( 17 .1) 3.9 ( 19.7) 2.4 ( 12.2) 
6272 MW Energy 20 3.8 ( 18.9) 4.8 24.2) 5.0 ( 25.1) 9.6 ( 48.0) 6.8 ( 34.0) 4.2 ( 21.1) 2.8 ( 13.8) 
600 MG/L TDS 15 6.8 ( 45.3) 3.1 ( 20.8) 4.0 ( 26.9) 6.9 ( 45.9) 3.2 ( 21. 3) 5.0 ( 33.6) 3.2 ( 21.3) 
10.0+ % UNEMP 5 6 .. 2 023.7) 5.1 001.3) 5.3 005.2) 6.5 029.4) 2.7 ( 53.6) 5.8 (115.7) 4.2 ( 84.7) 
26M Tourist Days 20 6.0 ( 30.1) 3.3 ( 16.4) 4.1 ( 20.6) 6.4 ( 32.2) 3.3 ( 16.3) 4.1 ( 20.6) 2.6 ( 13.0) 
~51 Quad BTU's 23 3.9 ( 17.0) 5.9 ( 25.7) 4.8 ( 21.0) 11.2 ( 48.9) 6.9 ( 24.8) 4.2 ( 18.2) 3.2 ( 13.8) 
... ~~-----
action for other planning systems are entered 
into the simulation. These cross impacts 
are represented, for the Utah level, in level 
1 and level 3 of the course of action outcome 
value vectors. Levell outcome value vectors 
are the course of act ion outcome impacts on 
the State of Utah planning system of the five 
courses of action designed for the Uintah 
Basin planning system. This recognizes that 
planning activities in the Uintah Basin will 
have some effect on the values and interest 
groups at the statewide decision making 
level. 
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Level 3 outcome value vectors represent 
the impacts on the State of Utah planning 
system of courses of action designed for 
the Colorado River Basin planning system. 
The outcome value vector impacts of courses 
of action designed for the State of Utah as 
they affect the Uintah Basin and the Colorado 
River Basin planning systems are entered into 
Table 4. Courses of action. 
Uint ah Basin l: 
Uintah Basin 2: 
Uirtt ah Basirt 3: 
Uintah Basin 4: 
Uintah Basin 5 : 
State of Utah l: 
State of Utah 2 : 
State of Utah 3 : 
State of Utah 4: 











Completion of Jensen Unit of Central Utah Project as planned in final EIS 
Completion of irrigation phase of Jensen Unit of Central Utah Project as planned in 
final EIS 
Completion of municipal-industrial phase only of Jensen Unit of Central Utah Project 
as planned in final EIS 
Completion of Trout Creek alternative for Jensen Unit of Central Utah Project as 
planned in final EIS 
Completion of Brush Creek Tunnel alternative for Jensen Unit of Central Utah Project 
as planned in final EIS 
Completion of all phases of Central Utah Project. Completion of all phases of Virgin 
River Project 
Completion of Central Utah Project with no export to the Sevier River Basin 
Completion of Jensen, Uintah, and Upalco units of Central Utah Project with water 
allocated to energy development. Completion of small scale Virgin River Project for 
limited energy production 
Completion of Jensen, Uintah, and Upalco units of Central Utah Project with water 
allocation to agriculture only. Completion of lVirgin River Water Project for 
agricultural use only 
Completion of Bonneville Unit of Central Utah Project only. Completion of all phases 
of Virgin River Project 
Completion of Central Utah Project. Completion of Central Arizona Project 
Implement USBR Colorado River Water Quality Improvement Program. Completion of Central 
Utah Project. Completion of Central Arizona Project. Develop groundwater supplies in 
Upper Basin 
Completion of Central Arizona Project. Completion of Dolores Project 
Completion of Navajo Indian Irrigation Project, Dolores Project. Implementation of 
USBR Colorado River Water Quality Improvement Program 
Completion of Uintah, Upalco units of Central Utah Project for energy development. Develop 
groundwater in Upper Basin. Implement USBR Colorado River Water Quality Improvement Program 
th e two other PROPDEMM i tera t ions wh ich 
simulate the policy interact ions of Uintah 
Basin groups, values, and environmental data, 
and Colorado River Basin groups, values, and 
environmental data, respectively. 
The first two types of cost represent a-
t ions present a problem when fitted to the 
data requirements of the PROPDEMM simulation. 
In earlie!: applications of PROPDEMM, a seven 
point scale was adequate. The cost levels 
of the courses of action, although numeri-
cally different, were of the same o!:der of 
magnitude. For example, all course-of-action 
cost levels were in one case between $100 
million and $125 million. The seven point 
scale is set to cover the extremes. 
By providing course of action cross 
impact analysis, PROPDEMM allows a policy 
maker the option of assessing the desir 
ability of the programs of others in terms 
of their effects on his planning system. 
Th is enhances the potential for coordinated 
policy formulation to mitigate, or minImIze 
adverse impacts and to support favorable 
ones. 
In addition to the data concerning 
the desirability and likelihood of outcomes 
of alternative courses of action, PROPDEMM 
also uses course-of-action cost estimates. 
The cost level factor can represent the total 
cost of the p!:oject, the amortized annual 
cos t of the project, or the cost of the 
project per unit of benefit. The last 
representation is to be generally preferred, 
but it was not available for most of the 
alternatives for this simulation. 
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I n the present PROPDEMM s imulat ion, 
the costs of the available courses of action 
are quite different among the three levels. 
This presents problems of scale comparison 
and sensitivity. For the Uintah Basin, the 
costs of the available courses of action 
range between $10 million and $33 million. 
For the State of Utah, the estimated cou!:se-
of-action costs range between $100 million 
and $620 million. For the Colorado River 
Basin courses of action, the estimated costs 
begin at $300 million and go to well over 
$1.3 billion. If the scales which represent 
these cost levels were applied only to 
their respective planning systems, no problem 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5. Continued. 
OUTCOME VALUE 
ECON 
Outcome 3 1 
Outcome 4 3 
Outcome 5 1 
CRB 2 ECON 
Outcome 1 2 
Outcome 2 3 
Outcome 3 1 
Outcome 4 3 
Outcome 5 1 
CRB 3 ECON 
Outcome 1 0 
Outcome 2 0 
Outcome 3 0 
Outcome 4 0 
Outcome 5 0 
CRB 4 ECON 
Outcome 1 0 
Outcome 2 0 
Outcome 3 0 
Outcome 4 0 
Outcome 5 0 
CRB 5 ECON 
Outcome 1 1 
Outcome 2 2 
Outcome 3 0 
Outcome 4 2 
Outcome 5 0 
would occur. But, cross 
among planning systems r 
three cost factor scales 
single scale of reference. 
ENER MUNI AG W 
0 1 1 
3 3 3 
0 1 0 
EMER MUNI AGW 
1 3 1 
2 3 1 
0 2 -1 
3 3 1 
0 2 -1 
EMER MUNI AG W 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
-1 0 -1 
0 0 0 
-1 0 -1 
EMER MUNI AGW 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
-1 0 -1 
0 0 0 
-1 0 -1 
EMER MUNI AGW 
2 1 1 
2 1 1 
1 0 0 
3 2 1 
0 0 0 
impact analys is 
uires that all 
attached to a 
In th is appl icat ion of PROPDEMM, the 
cost factor problem was resolved by making 
all cost level factors equal using the State 
of Utah planning system as the center of 
analysis. The simulation will be analyzed as 
if a policy maker for the State of Utah were 
going to use the results to formulate a state 
water resources plan and negotiate for 
coordination with plans of the other two 
levels. In centering the analysis on the 
State of Utah, potential scale problems are 
minimized. No planning tern is more than 
one step removed from he system under 
examination. 
The final input variable affected by 
the levels problem is the group power vector. 
This vector represents the potential of a 
group to influence a course of action. Table 
6 shows the power of the Utah interest 
groups to affect not only courses of act ion 
designed for the State of Utah plannin!?, 
s y stem, but a 1 sot h 0 s e for the U in t a h 
Basin and Colorado River Basin planning 
systems. 
As might be expected, interest groups 




IND REC ENV LAND FISH PVT 
1 -1 -1 -2 -1 -1 p"".20 
3 0 2 2 1 p= .10 
1 -1 -2 -3 -1 -1 p= .10 
IND REC ENW LAND FISH P\rr 
3 1 0 2 1 1 p"".40 
3 2 0 2 2 1 p=.20 
2 -1 -1 -2 0 -1 p= .10 
3 2 0 2 2 1 p=.l0 
2 -1 -2 -3 -1 -1 p=.l0 
IND REC ENW LAND FISH PVT 
0 0 0 0 0 0 p=.40 
0 0 0 1 0 0 p=.20 
0 0 0 0 0 0 p=.20 
0 0 0 0 0 0 p= .10 
-1 0 0 -1 0 0 p=.10 
IND REC ENV LAND FISH P\rr 
0 0 1 0 1 0 p=.40 
0 0 1 -1 1 0 p=.20 
0 0 1 0 1 0 p=.20 
0 0 1 0 1 0 p= .10 
-1 0 1 -1 1 0 p=.10 
IND REC ENV LAND FISH PVT 
2 1 -1 1 1 1 p=.40 
2 1 -1 1 1 1 p"'.20 
1 0 -1 -1 1 -1 p=.20 
2 1 -1 1 1 1 p=.l0 
0 -1 -2 -1 1 -1 p= .10 
action designed for their own system. 
The Utah interes t groups have more power to 
affect Uintah Basin activities than Colorado 
River Basin activities because of the politi-
cal-institutional structure of the planning 
systems. The county-state relationships are 
legally defined in the statutes of the 
State of Utah which establish a hierarchical 
relationship with the state serving as a 
locus of power. The Colorado River Bas in-
State of Utah relationship, on the other 
hand, is less well defined. The planning 
system for the Colorado River Basin of seven 
member states plus management agencies of the 
federal government is really a loose con-
federation of political sovereignties. It 
h as no hierarch ical arrangement that would 
permit a central authority to impose its will 
on the states. The participating federal 
agencies can veto any plan proposed by the 
member states, but each state can veto 
projects within its own boundaries. 
Results of the PROPDEMM Simulation 
The first phase of the simulation 
analysis provides an assessmenL of Lhe 
political feasibility of the courses of 
action considered. This assessment is 
presented for the State of Utah in the 
Systemic Political Feasibility Indices, shown 
in Table 7. Level 1 represents the desir-
Table 6. Group power vectors. 
GROUP POWER VECTORS 
UB UB 2 UB 3 UB 4 UB 5 
* 
UT 1 
:IND-ENERGY DEV 3 2 4 3 5 * 
COMMERCE-TOURISM 3 2 2 2 2 * 
AGRICULTURE 3 4 2 4 3 * 
RECREATION 2 3 2 3 4 * 
~NVIRONMENTAL 5 4 4 7 6 * 
DECISION MAKER S 5 S 5 5 * 
ability of the five courses of action de-
signed for the Uintah Basin ·from the view-
point of the State of Utah, level 2 repre-
sents the desirability of the five courses of 
act ion designed for the State of Utah, and 
level 3 represents the desirability of the 
five courses of action designed for the 
Golorado River Basin in the State of Utah. 
According to the total Systemic Politi-
cal Feasibility Indices for the State of 
Utah, the most desirable, or politically 
feasible, course of action is CA 14 (UT 4), 
followed by CA 15 (UT 5) and CA #3 (UT 3). 
The SPFI of UT 4 is the sum of the course-
of-act ion va lues for the five State of Utah 
interest groups. 
The value structure of the interest 
groups reflects a high preference for eco-
n omi c growth, agr icult ura 1 water supply, 
recreational opportunity, and private prop-
erty control. UT 4, which calls for the 
completion of the Jensen, Uintah, and Upalco 
units of the Central Utah Project for agri-
cultural water supply with limited emphasis 
on energy water supply and also the comple-
t ion of the Virgin River water project for 
agricultural water supply, provides a moder-
ate to high contribution to the attainment of 
these values. It is the most preferred 
alternative for four of the five interest 
groups and the course of action the policy 
makers for the Utah plann system would try 
to implement. 
For the desired multilevel, multigoal 
plann scenario, PROPDEMM was modified to 
recogn the inter-level impacts of dif-
ferent policy alternatives. The next step, 
therefore, was to review the effect of 
c our ses of act ion des igned a t other leve Is 
on the State of Utah planning system. This 
can also be accomplished from the Systemic 
political Feasibility Indices (SPFI) in Table 
7. 
Level 1 of the SPFI table represents the 
U intah Bas in courses of act ion. Of these 
five courses of action, CA 14 (UB 4) and CA 
15 (UB 5) make the grea tes t contr i bu t ion to 
the goal attainment of the Utah planning 
system interest groups. UB 4 appeals most to 








UT 2 UT 3 UT 4 UT S 
* 
CRBl CRB2 CRB3 CRB4 CRBS 
4 6 3 6 * 3 3 1 1 4 
3 3 4 4 * 2 2 1 1 2 
3 3 6 4 
* 
4 5 1 1 1 
3 2 4 3 * 3 4 1 1 1 
6 6 S 4 * 7 . 7 3 4 5 
5 5 5 5 * S 4 1 1 3 
recreation interest groups, while UB 5 
appeals most to the industry-energy develop-
ment and environmental interest groups. A 
policy maker for the State of Utah, acting to 
minimize levels of analysis conflicts, would 
encour age the adop t ion of one of these two 
courses of action to enhance his own policies 
contained in UT 4. 
Level 3 of the SPFI table represents the 
.f ive courses of action designed for the 
Colorado River Basin planning system' and 
their contribution to the goal attainment of 
the Utah interest groups. Courses of action 
CA 12 and CA 11 (CRB 2 and CRB 1) make the 
greatest contribution by appealing to the 
va lues of commerce-tour ism, agr icul ture, 
and recreation interest groups. The environ-
mental group prefers CA #4 (CRB 4) while the 
Industry-Energy Development group prefers CA 
15 (CRB 5) by a large margin. Again, the 
Utah policy maker would encourage the 
adoption of CRB 2, or CRB 1, to complement 
h is own pOlicies designed for the State of 
Utah plann system. 
At this point, the State of Utah policy 
maker knows which courses of act ion, at 
all levels, will make the maximum contribu-
t ion to the goal attainment of the Utah 
interest groups. He can formulate a policy 
of coordinated plans which will be optimal 
from his planning perspective. Unfortun-
ately, the optimal policies for the State of 
Utah might be nonoptimal for the interest 
groups of other planning systems. For th is 
reason, it becomes necessary to examine the 
SPFI outcomes from the perspective of the 
other planning systems as they appear in the 
remaining two PROPDEMM iterations. The 
computer printout is in Appendix B. 
Analysis of the course-of-action pre-
ferences from the three PROPDEMM i terat ions 
indicates the policy conflict shown in Table 
8. 
The Uintah Basin plannin~ system sees 
its course of action UB 4 as optimaL Both 
Utah and the Colorado River Basin planning 
systems also see UB 4 as the Uintah Basin 
course of action which makes the greatest 
contribution to their own goal attainment . 
Thus, no policy conflict potential exists in 
~ 
Table 7. Systemic political feas ibi li ty indicies. 
SYSTEMIC POLITICAL FEASIBILITY INDICES 
THE LARGER THE INDEX VALUES, THE MORE FAVORABLE THE COURSE OF ACTION 
FORMULAE AREA SIP = 00 * NSIP 
SPFI = STP * PWR * SSN 
Level 1 
CA in CA in CA it3 CA #4 CA #5 
Group SSN. SIP PWR SIP PWR SIP PWR SIP PWR SIP PWR 
(SPFI) (sPFIl (SPFI) (SPFI) (SPFI) 
Ind-Energy Dev 4.2 0.52 3 -0.13 2 1.13 4 -0.11 3 0.47 5 
( 6.6) ( -1.1) ( 19.1) ( -1.3) ( 9.9) 
Commerce-Tourism 4.8 3.40 3 3.81 2 3.75 2 4.17 2 2.36 2 
( 48.5 ) ( 36.2) ( 35.6) ( 39.6) ( 22.4) 
Agriculture 4.4 2.55 3 2.35 4 1.86 2 2.38 4 1.35 3 
( 34.1) ( 41.4) ( 16.4) ( 41.9) ( 17.9) 
Recreation 3.9 4.19 2 3.15 3 2.35 2 3.03 3 2.00 4 
( 32.6 ) ( 36.8) ( 18.3) ( 35.4) ( 31.2 ) 
Envi ronmenta1 5.6 0.23 5 0.75 4 0.60 4 0.69 7 1.80 6 
( 6.4) ( 16.9) ( 13.4) ( 27.3) ( 60.8) 
Total SPFI ( 128.3) ( 130.2 ) ( 102.8) ( 142.9) ( 142.3) 
Level 2 
CA it! CA in CA it3 CA it4 CA it5 
Group SSN SIP PWR SIP PWR SIP PWR SIP PWR SIP PWR 
(SPFI) (SPFI) (SPFI) (SPFI) (SPFI) 
Ind-Energy Dev 4.2 0.72 3 1.03 4 1. 97 6 -0.25 3 0.45 6 
9.1) ( 17.4) ( 49.8) ( -3.2) ( 11.4) 
Commerce-Tourism 4.8 2.53 3 2.64 3 2.47 3 2.92 4 2.49 4 
( 36.0) ( 37.7) ( 35.2) ( 55.5) ( 47.3) 
Agriculture 4.4 2.21 4 2.03 3 1.43 3 2.38 6 1. 75 4 
( 38.9) ( 26.9) ( 18.9) ( 62.9) ( 30.8) 
Recreation 3.9 2.75 3 2.26 3 3.25 2 2.75 4 2.47 3 
( 32.1) ( 26.4) ( 25.3) ( 42.9) ( 28.9) 
Environmental 5.6 -0.31 6 -0.00 6 -0.10 6 0.82 5 0.38 4 
( -10.3) ( -0.1) ( -3.4) ( 23.1) ( 8.4) 
Total SPFI ( 105.8) ( 108.3) ( 125.8) ( 181.2) ( 126.8) 
Level 3 
CA #1 CA #2 CA #3 CA it4 CA #5 
Group SSN SIP PWR SIP PWR SIP PWR SIP PWR SIP PWR 
(SPFI) (SPFI) (SPFI) (SPFI) (SPFI) 
Ind-Energy Dev 4.2 0.72 3 0.37 3 -0.28 1 -0.54 1 1.14 4 
( 9.0) ( 4.7) -1. 2) -2.3) ( 19.2) 
Commerce-Tourism 4.8 2.93 2 3.02 2 2.42 1 2.48 1 2.60 2 
( 27.8) ( 28.7) ( 11.5) ( 11.8) ( 24.7) 
Agr icu 1 t ure 4.4 2.18 4 1. 75 5 1.43 1 1.42 1 2.022 1 
( 38.3) ( 38.4) ( 6.3) ( 6.2) ( 8.9) 
Recreation 3.9 2.20 3 1.67 4 2.33 1 2.48 1 1.61 1 
( 25.7) ( 26.1) ( 9.1) ( 9.6) ( 6.3) 
Environmental 5.6 -0.16 7 0.03 7 1. 58 3 2.19 4 0.38 5 
( 
-6.2) ( 1. 3) 26.7l ( 49.3) 10.7) 
Total SPFI ( 94.6) ( 99.2) 52.4) ( 74.7l 69.7) 
the adoption of this course of action. 
The State of Utah planning system sees course 
of action UT 4 as its optimal policy, the 
Uintah Basin and Colorado River Basin 
planning systems concur, and thus again 
there is no policy conflict. 
At the level of the Colorado River 
Basin, the PROPDEMM simulation does indicate 
a policy conflict. The optimal course of 
action for the Colorado River Basin is CRB 5 
with CRB 4 as a second preference. This is 
not a good policy for the State of Utah 
planning system but could satisfy the Uintah 
Basin second preference, CRB 5. If, however, 
CRB 5 is adopted, there will be greater 
disagreement between the State of Utah and 
the Uintah Basin than if CRB I were adopted. 
The PROPDEMM s imulat ion can then be used by 
the policy maker to identify the source of 
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Table 8. Conflicting COA optimals. 
Preferred Course of Action For 
Planning Perspective 
Uintah 
UINTAH BASIN UB 4 
STATE OF UTAH UB 4 
COLORADO RIVER BASIN UB 4 
this conflict, and by so doing, take steps to 
achieve a satisfying solution. That specific 
application to levels of analysis problem 
solving is beyond the scope of th is report. 
Evaluation of PROPDEMM 
Since it has been shown that the 
PROPDEMM simulation indicates policy pre-
ference conflicts among levels of analysis, 
the rema ining question is whether, in light 
of the PROPDEMM formula analysis performed by 
Kimball (1978), the indicated conflicts are 
valid. The PROPDEMM simulation may be 
divided into 1) formulae which help the 
decision maker create courses of action, 2) 
formulae which determine the political 
feasibility of courses of action for given 
interest group factors and 3) indices 
which provide additional information for 
iterative purposes but are not tied to the 
other parts of the program. 
The analysis of the first set of for-
mulae indicated some conceptual problems in 
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Utah First Second 
Performance Performance 
UT 4 CRB 1 CRB 5 
UT 4 CRB 2 CRB 1 
UT 4 CRB 5 CRB 4 
division operations diminishes the importance 
of increasing salience. This problem does 
not invalidate the course-of-act ion des ign 
for two reasons. First, although the mar-
ginal impact of the group salience index 
diminishes as group salience increases, the 
intent of this input factor is not reversed. 
Figures Sa and 5b illustrate, the problem. 
Figure 5a represents the ideal relation 
between GRPSAL and its impact designing 
courses of action, while Figure 5b represents 
the represent at ion in the PROPDEMM s imula-
tion. The direction is correct, but the 
relationship is biased so as to undervalue 
salient interes ts. Th is will usually result 
in courses of action being altered towards a 
closer fit between environmental conditions 
and group values but will not achieve the 
match desired by the interest groups. The 
selected courses of action are meeting some 
interest group expectat ions but are not as 
effectively designed as they could be. 
A second desirable feature is that each 
couts e of act ion in the PROPDEMM s imulat ion 
is assoicated with five possible outcomes 




This minimizes the impact of any single 
course-of-act ion outcome vector and broadens 
the potential outcome impact. 
The analysis of the formulae which 
comprise the main part of the PROPDEMM 
simulation indicated two problems which might 
affect the validity of the PROPDEMM political 
feasibility assessment. The first problem is 
a sensitivity problem identified in the 
Selected Salience Number (SSN) computations. 
In Table 7, the Uintah Basin courses of 
action were ranked in terms of their contri-
bution to the State of Utah planning system 
goals. The SPFl indices would place course 
of action UB 4 above UB 5 as a preferred 
course of action. The net difference in the 
two indices is 0.6. Given the precision 
of the SSN index, a factor used in computa-
tion of the SPFI index, one cannot really 
distinguish between the two courses of action 
in desirability. 
The second problem encountered in 
the main part of PROPDEMM is peculiar to the 
levels of analysis applications. This 
problem centers around the use of a seven 
point scale of measurement and was most 
evident in the cost factor computations. 
In the present application, this problem 
was minimized through use of the State 
of Utah planning system as the level of 
analysis. However, the problem was not 
removed. In the two sets of iterations which 
were completed for each planning perspective, 
the change from seven point cost factor 
rankings to cost level equalization accounted 
for five changes in SPFI ranking at the State 
of Utah level, eleven changes in SPFI ranking 
at the Uintah Basin level, and eleven changes 
in ranking at the Colorado River Basin level. 
This illustrates both the importance of the 
cos t factor in the PROPDEMM simulation and 
the validity problems which arise when this 
factor is removed through equalization. 
The seven pOint scales are controversial 
in another aspect, as well. In PROPDEMM, the 
numbers are treated as if they possessed 
interval or ratio properties, although they 
are clearly ordinal. Recent developments in 
psycho lcal measurement suggest that in 
many cases such manipulations of ordinal 
numbers do not lead to inconsistent results 
(Long and Wilken, 1974). Although no tests 
were conduc ted on PROPDEMM to determine 
whether the necessary assumptions on the 
uniqueness of orderings are warranted, the 
analys ill of progr.1m formulae that was done 
would lead one to suspect problems in the 
reliability of "close" rankings. 
Finally, it should be observed that 
the full theoretical model has not been 
operationalized. The vector representing 
pun ishment -r eward potential, for example, is 
being used but must be modified in order to 
overcome the conceptual problem of a single 
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input vector. Also, to complete the modeling 
of the political process, an information 
segment of the model must be developed to 
allow input of vectors representing positive 
and negative information connected wi th the 
perceived impacts of courses of action and 
the salience of the positive and negative 
information vectors. The development of 
these additional input factors will enhance 
the model and simulate a more realistic 
version of the actual political decision 
making process. 
Summary 
The PROPDEMM simulation was instrumental 
in identifying and clarifying three levels 
problems: 
1. 1~~~!iiZi~&_~~£i~iQ~_l~~el~· 
The PROPDEMM simulation requires speciFica-
tion of the decision making domain- or 
domains--in a multilevel setting. Sometimes 
the real boundaries are difficult to discover 
and compare among levels In the present 
case, the political and hydrologic boundaries 
for each level cover different territory_ 
In general, when multilevel decision systems 
do not exhibit subset relations from the 
highest to the lowest levels, it is more 
difficult to represent the levels and their 
interrelationships in a model. 
2. Identifying a set of alternatives 
£Q~~~~Ql~_~crQ~s_levels. Part of the 
problem of identifying comparable alterna-
t ives is a carryover from the problem of 
identifying the decision making levels, from 
whose perspectives the alternatives are 
defined. One would expect ill-defined levels 
to create a corresponding problem of ill-de-
fined alternatives. The PROPDEMM simulation 
assumes some exclusivity in the courses of 
action. Even though some courses of action 
overlap with other courses of action designed 
for different levels, the final physical 
action associated with a course of action 
takes place at a local site(s). This makes 
it difficult to distinguish between courses 
of action which are local and regional. The 
difficulty of locating a course of action at 
one level or the other is increased by the 
fact that water resource projects and pro-
grams tend to be multipurpose and multi-
sponsored. 
3. Integrating evalua~ions of alterna 
t ives. In wa ter resources development. bas in prans typically cons ist of combinations of 
local projects. Benef its that accrue to 
people outside the project locality, and 
especially costs borne by nonlocal interests, 
are less likely to enter into project evalua-
tions from a local perspective than from the 
basin perspective. This is one reason 
for di fferent rank ings of planning a lterna-
t ives. 
CHAPTER V 
PROBLEMS TO ADDRESS IN CONCEPTUALIZING A PLANNING THEORY 
Introduction 
At the beginning of this report, the 
relational problems in water resources 
planning defined to be of particular interest 
were those in the area of levels of analysis 
broad ly defined as the problems needing to 
be solved to optimize the planning process .. 
I t was subsequently noted that progress in 
solving levels of analysis problems requires 
a conceptual basis for putting it all to-
gether; but that before one can begin to 
build that basis, he needs to understand the 
;problems that the planning theory needs to 
deal wi th. These problems were searched out 
in Chapters II, III, and IV. Chapter II 
found a number of levels of analysis issues 
through qualitative review of planning as 
practiced in the Colorado River Basin. 
Chapter III found issues in nationwide 
planning practice, and Chapter IV found some 
in a simulation of planning as practiced in 
the Uintah Basin. The identified problems 
are listed at the end of each chapter, and 
the purpose here is to sort them into an 
integrated set for the subsequent theoretical 
development. 
Problems of a Unitary Planning Agency 
One of the classical justifications used 
for governmental planning is that individ-
uals, when left on their own or only limited 
by market forces, do not adequately consider 
external effects on others in their decision 
making. A favorite approach to the problem 
is to internalize the externalities within a 
common management. After doing so, one 
would, of course, still have the problems of 
aggregating common values for the constitu-
ency of the plann ing uni t, work ing from 
incomplete information, coping with a variety 
of uncertainties, and preserving flexibility 
to deal with circumstances that come along. 
The dimensions used in Figure 1, how-
ever, demonstrate the flaw in this approach. 
One would have, to make this method effec-
t ive, not only to internalize by enlarging 
the physical and governmental units to 
include all those affected (the whole world 
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would have to be included to be complete). 
He would also have to enlarge to include the 
economic, social, and cultural d imens ions. 
and this expansion would get the planners 
into some areas where few people tvant them. 
Finally available planning tools are not 
capable of optimizing a system large enough 
to internalize the relevant world. 
Classification of Identified 
Levels Problems 
The 17 levels problems identified in 
Chapter III from the analysis of planning 
issues in the Colorado River Basin and 
the three levels problems identified from the 
PROPDEMM application to the Uintah Basin 
described in Chapter IV are classified by the 
scheme shown in Figure 2 and described 
in Table 9. All 20 problems were classi-
fied within a single combination or a com-
bination pair rather than as "higher order 
combinations" or "gaps between components" 
even though many of the problems certainly 
display higher-order or gap aspects. Each 
problem is referenced in the table back to 
its chapter of or igin and problem number 
there. 
The 20 levels problems included at 
least one in nine of the ten classifications 
with five classified as conflicts in juris-
diction and four as value-need conflicts. 
Four other classifications had two problems, 
and three had one problem. Altogether 
nine problems had jurisdictional aspects, 
nine had value aspects, nine had need as-
pects, and four had time aspects. 
Summary 
The identification of levels problems 
showed them to be widely distributed among a 
diversity of classifications and not con-
centrated in a few. Since the identification 
did not attempt to be exhaustive and no 
effort was made to weight the problems 
identified by severity, one cannot at this 
point state a preference for any part icular 
emphasis in the needed conceptual advance. 
Table 9. Classification of levels of analysis problems identified from Colorado River 
Basin Review or by PROPDEMM. 
1. Conflicts in Values 
a. Conflict between water users and government on l60-acre limitation (3-10). 
b. Conflict between water users and government on salinity control practices (3-14), 
2. Conflicts in Jurisdiction 
a. Competition between Indians and Wasatch Front for water (3-6). 
b. Federal planners have much more extensive staff support than do those at other 
levels (3-17). 
c. Jurisdictions in decision systems do not exhibit subset relations (4-1). 
d. Courses of action among jurisdictions are difficult to distinguish when the bound 
aries among jurisdictions are poorly defined (4-2). 
e. Jurisdictions conflict in position as they experience different impacts from one 
another (4-3). 
3. Conflicts in Emphasized Need 
a. Planning to supply the need for water is not coordinated with planning to supply 
the need for energy (3-2). 
b. Competition in municipal and energy uses taking water from agriculture (3-7). 
4. Conflicts in Time Perspective 
None 
S. Time-Value Conflicts 
a. Individual water allocation and use decisions out of harmony with water planning 
value framework (3-8). 
6. Time-Jurisdiction Conflicts 
a. Individuals have begun to use water which will later have to be taken from them 
to sat isfy Indian and Federal Reserved Water Rights (3-S). 
7. Time-Need Conflicts 
a. Political allocation of COlorado"River water before firm flow information was 
available (3-3). 
b. Emergency water allocation during drought emergencies that sets precedences for 
future (3-lS). 
8. Value-Jurisdiction Conflicts 
a. 
b. 
Indian and Federal Reserve water rights are defined through state-federal juris-
dictional compromise outside water planning value framework (3-4). 
Federal emphasis on water conservation defined as a reduction in use is not 
accepted by Utah jurisdictions (3-9). 
9. Need-Jurisidiction Conflicts 
a. Institutionally expressed state-federal water policy differences emphasize juris-
dictional rights to protect need differences (3-16). 
10. Value-Need Conflicts 
a. Political allocation of Colorado River water outside official water planning 
value framework (3-1). 
b. Shift in water use from agriculture to energy conflicts with values used previously 
in water development (3-11). 
c. Shift in water use from agriculture to energy conflicts with current water planning 
value framework (3-12). 
d. Political establishment of salin standards outside official water planning 
value framework (3-13). 
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CHAPTER VI 
PLANNING PERSPECTIVES AND LEVELS 
Introduction 
Conceptualization of comprehensive 
planning has introduced the concepts of 
multiple objectives and public participation 
into water resources management. Plans must 
row be considered from multiple perspectives. 
As planners have moved away from eva luat ing 
alternatives solely in terms of their contri-
bution to economic development as seen from 
the perspective of the nation as a whole, 
they have found that the decision making 
principles and tools which were developed 
over the years for single perspect ive plan-
ning to be inconclusive in multiple per-
spective situations. Because available tools 
are not leading to timely decision making 
within the framework of officially adopted 
planning principles, the institutionalized 
water resources planning and management 
process is continually falling further 
beh ind. 
The line of invest tion used here 
to address this situat on is to seek a 
conceptual framework that can be used to 
ach ieve acceptance of a common plan ful-
filling a variety of needs as seen from a 
variety of jurisdictional and value view-
points. Consensus acceptance of a common 
conclusion requires that the perspectives 
formed as analyses are made at many levels 
and from many viewpoints be reconciled to 
some acceptable degree of common satisfac-
t ion. The development and management of 
water resources involves decisions by in-
dividuals and private firms, by local, state, 
and national levels of the political system, 
and by actors infllJential in the economic, 
social, cultural, governmental, and technical 
dimensions of society. The decisions made by 
actors in each element at each level are 
based on analyses (informed, uninformed, or 
misinformed; superficial or profound) using 
concepts that provide a degree of generality 
suitable to the objectives of the analyst. 
The different objectives of different deci-
sion makers imply that analyses will proceed 
at different levels of generality and use 
different concepts. Progress in reconciling 
divergent conclusions that result from these 
differences must be based on a sound under-
standing of how levels of analysis are 
related. The strategy here is to develop a 
working concept in this chapter of how levels 
of analysis are related and then deal with 
specific problems in applying that concept in 
Chapters VII and VIII. 
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The Concept of a Planning Perspective 
The most serious difficulties in formu-
lating and implementing water resources 
management plans genera lly or ig ina te in 
conflicts among the choices of interested 
parties. The conflicting choices frequently. 
arise from differences in perspective. In 
art, the term "perspective" is used when 
talking of the distances, positions, and 
proportions of the objects represented, 
relative to the position assumed by the 
artist. If the artist changes position, 
he acquires a different perspective. An-
alogously, as Baier (1965, p.91) observes, 
when we speak of perspectives on issues 
requiring decisions, "we have in mind the 
demands, goals, or aims of persons holding 
certain special positions or jobs or func-
tions in a society," and each position can be 
expected to lead to somewhat different 
resolutions to common issues, based on 
different reasons or justifications. 
A decision maker adopts a perspective, 
either explicitly or implicitly, as he 
forms a position on an issue. The perspec-
tive provides "characteristic modes of 
explanation"--answers to: what is the nature 
of the problem, what are the important 
factors, what will happen if X is done--and 
the justifying reapons for action--answers 
to: what are my (our) responsibilities and 
obligations, what are my (our) goals, how 
efficient and effective are the various 
possible courses of action in fulfilling 
these goals and responsibilities? (Moline, 
1968; Weiler, 1976.) Consequences of taking 
a perspective thus include: 1) limiting 
one's set of aims and interests; 2) relying 
primarily on evaluative criteria related to 
achievement of those aims; 3) regarding other 
interests as less relevant; 4) biaSing one's 
interpretation of the "facts"; and 5) agree-
ing with others (in matters related to the 
first four tendencies) who share (or to the 
degree that they share) the same perspective 
(Moline, 1968, p. 195). A perspective, then, 
can be thought of as a perceptual filter for 
selecting some considerations as relevant and 
rejecting others. A perspective once adopted 
in the process of deciding an issue will set 
a precedent that will be more likely to be 
followed than reversed in the future. 
An expliCit, general principle of 
relevance is found in Moline's succinct 
statement: 
A consideration C is relevant from 
a point of view P to the extent 
that ignoring C avoidably prevents, 
interferes with, or fails to take 
advantage of an opportunity to 
facilitate the accomplishment of 
the aims which are characteristic 
or P. (1968, p. 197.) 
The principle, however, may be difficult 
to apply. Uncertainty as to the aims char-
acteristic of P causes the set of relevant 
considerations to be ill-defined. Moreover, 
determination of what "prevents, interferes 
with, or fails to take advantage of an 
opportunity" cannot generally be done a 
pr iori, but requires experience. The judge-
ment of which obstacles are avoidable depends 
on the agent's capabilities and his beliefs 
in his capabilities--not to mention all of 
the further conditions that need to be 
accounted for in causal judgments. Such 
beliefs must have some grounding in the 
actual experience of the agent. These points 
suggest four dimensions to perspective: 1) a 
set of characteristic aims or values, 2) a 
scope of control or jurisdiction in which 
these values are pursued, 3) possible actions 
with consequences relevant to the achievement 
of the values, and 4) the time frame in which 
the issue at hand must be decided. The four 
dimensions are illustrated graphically in 
Figure 6. 
The values d imens ion. Everyone can 
probably agree with the idea of va lue as 
a general standard for plan formulation, 
selection, and justification. Albert (1956) 
observes that values 1) are normative ele-
ments in the definition of a situation, 2) 
may be implicit or explicit, 3) are relative-
ly persistent through time, and 4) are 
interrelated in culturally or individually 
distinctive patterns. Economic efficiency 
has provided the first explicit and long-time 
standard of federal project evaluation (James 
and Rogers, 1976), although analysis of 
actual historical choice patterns show that 
it has not been the sole criterion (Haveman, 
1965). 




































Figure 6. Four dimensions of the Colorado River Basin plann system. 
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The scoee of control dimension. Plan-
ning activItIes are lImIted by geographically 
identifiable boundaries and by functional 
assignments. A metropolitan water af!;ency 
plans for water supply in the area under 
metropolitan control, but does not plan for 
health care, nor for wa ter servi ces ou ts ide 
of the lIletropolitan area. The configuration 
of political and functional boundaries has a 
significant effect on planning coordination 
and on the alternatives considered. Inte-
grated water and related land resources 
planning, for example, is hindered by the 
fragmented authority in land use controls. 
The action dimension. The authority 
and capability of the planning agent is 
also specified in the action dimension. 
rhe problem here is that conception of 
alternatives is far more flexible than 
ability to implement them. Even large 
organizations have difficulty in implementing 
alternatives with which they have not had 
previous experience. 
The temporal dimension. Timing issues 
penetrate each of the other dimensions. 
Planners generally think in terms of se-
quences of events extending to some time 
horizon. The events, then, constitute the 
basic temporal units for analysis, and the 
time horizon serves as the boundary beyond 
which identification of possible events is 
either unnecessary or else so uncertain that 
the effort is not worthwhile. Before the 
horizon is reached, the values pursued by a 
decision maker, and the boundaries of his 
scope of control, may change, requiring 
periodic updating of plans. In addition, 
implementation of a plan requires the accom-
modation of temporal relations among activi-
t ies and of the delayed consequences of 
act ions taken. 
The desirability of water resource 
development and management schemes cannot be 
defined until the planning system boundaries 
and elements have been identified. But needs 
a nd a lternat ives for meet ing them can be 
viewed from many perspectives, each leading 
t.o a different identification of "the plan-
n ing system" and its components (Wimsatt, 
1974). 
One may encounter differences in points 
of common reference, differences in division 
into subunits, and differences in level 
structures. For example, the boundaries of 
un its def ined by poli t ica 1 cons iderat ion. 
(nations, states, counties, etc.) do not 
correspond to the watershed units identified 
by hydrologic considerations, and economic 
trade regions provide yet a. different set of 
units. As one influential philosopher has 
argued, one cannot speak about objects 
absolutely, but only from a perspective 
(QUine, 1969). Only by adopting uncritically 
a background ontology can one interpret 
what another is referring to by the use of 
certain expressions, and there is not just 
one "correct" background ontology to adopt. 
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A logical determination of what to 
include in a planning system must be based 
upon an understanding of how or why in fact 
certain distinctions are important. A guide 
is found in Mo line I s pr inci pIe of relevance 
defining the important distinctions as those 
believed to be necessary to the effective 
pursuit of goals. The word "belief" in this 
definition is not used to say that one 
perceives only what one wants. The high 
degree of agreement in ident if icat ion of 
phys ica 1 objects sugges ts that many th ings 
are perceived independently of the purposes 
of those perceiving them. 
Campbell (1958) has suggested that 
the criteria used to identify physical 
objects can be of assistance in sharpening 
identification of systems with less tangible 
boundaries. These tests for determining 
whether an object is a member of some system 
include: 1) a common fate, defined as 
covariation of some attribute over time; 2) 
similarity, where members have, and non-
members do not have, some relevant property 
or set of properties; 3) proximity; 4) 
resistance to intrusion; 5) uniformity 
of diffusion. Application of these tests may 
improve the clarity of system definition, but 
they cannot guarantee that different in-
dividuals' definitions agree. Since the 
number of elements that might be considered 
in defining a complex system is likely to 
exceed the information processing cap-
abilities of the analyst, the criteria for 
inclusion become relative as one defines as 
large a system as he can handle by adding 
elements in order of decreas ing importance. 
The real problem, as Van Gigch (1974, p. 17) 
observes, resides in compromising between 
those who attempt to take into account too 
little and distort reality and those who 
attempt to take into account too much and are 
incapable of reaching a solution. Different 
results will be obtained by different an-
alysts using the same basic methods, due to 
differences in analytical capability and 
interest in the analysis. 
The planning purposes of the analyst 
provide an additional pragmatic grounds for 
defining the system to consider. Accumulated 
planning experience has evolved to a pOint 
giving the planner a fairly good idea of what 
to look for when the analysis begins. 
Pract ice has ach ieved general agreement on 
the planning purposes and what should be 
included in comprehensive analyses. In 
Chapter II these purposes were defined as 1) 
the selection of water development or manage-
ment schemes that are worthy investments for 
limited capital resources considering the 
consequent economic, environmental, and 
social effects, 2) development of a detailed 
design that will indeed perform satisfactori-
ly in its intended function, and 3) speci 
fication of such details of project imple-
mentation as working institutional arrange-
ments for project management, raising the 
necessary finances, securing needed political 
approval, and getting user groups to make 
proper use of project output. 
The purposes of management scheme 
selection, .design, and implementation can be 
accommodated in a planning system defined 
according to the four dimensions of planning 
perspective. In comprehensive river basin 
planning, planning activities that affect 
the use of water resources in the basin are 
obvious choices for inclusion. Once the 
river basin planner defines his system, his 
decisions begin to be made from the viewpoint 
of that system as a whole. The river basin 
planner, therefore, develops his own per spec-
t ive but must also recognize and relate his 
perspective to other decision makers, without 
introducing more complexity than he can 
handle. 
In practice, the river basin planning 
perspective is typically conceived as de-
rivative of the common interests of juris-
dictions in the basin. Although the analyst 
is likely to give too little attention to 
the perspect ives adopted by others, the 
acceptability and implementation of the 
resulting plans will suffer when he does. 
Perspective Adoption a l1d Adjustment 
. It was suggested earlier that a perspec-
tive is ~haracteristically formed during the 
process of human decision making. This claim 
assumes people to be purposive creatures, 
who in pursuit of various purposes dif 
ferentiate between perceptions of features 
associated with successful achievement 
and of features that thwart pract ical pur-
suits. For the pragmatist, the obstacles 
have epistemological primacy. Consensus is 
more eas ily ach ieved as planning factors to 
avoid than as goals to pursue. This inherent 
human purposiveness, then, is at the core of 
adopting a planning perspective, but clearly 
a learning process is required to develop a 
repertoire of act ions that wi 11 further the 
chosen purpose to recognize the limits of 
one's control. The learn ing process can be 
described in terms of a feedback process 
involving a perceived deficiency, an action 
intended to remove the deficiency, and an 
evaluation of success. 
I t is important to remember that an 
essent ial part of this learning process is 
social. There are many possible purposes or 
values, in many combinations, that can be 
pursued; there are many possible actions by 
which values can be pursued; there are many 
individual decision centers and thus many 
potential combinations of choices to be made. 
The social environment of an individual 
decision center prevents some possibilities, 
and more importantly, the socializing insti-
tution" provide instruction that an in-
djviduul would otherwise have to learn by 
trial and error, if at all. 
Organizations can be viewed analogously 
as acquiring a perspective by continuous 
articulation of organizational goals and 
developing a set of operating procedures 
found to be effective in achieving them. 
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Organizations are different from persons in 
being composed of many autonomous decis ion 
units. If cooperat ion in pursuing organiza-
tional goals through selected tasks is to be 
attained, individual members will have to 
take the probable actions of other members of 
the organization into account. In other 
words, individuals assume the perspectives, 
or at least some of them, of others in the 
organization. Indeed, acquiring the ability 
to take the perspective of another is an 
essential part of the socialization process. 
People and governments 
are often ted in try ing to induce a 
particular change in another's perspective by 
rational means. One attempts to persuade 
another that his perspective is deficient in 
some respect, and that there are good reasons 
to make some alteration. Individuals' 
perspectives and organizational perspectives 
may be criticized for being too narrow, and 
less often, for being too broad (Moline, 
1969, p. 193). 
Criticisms of scope of perspective 
require the assumption of at least one 
dimension as fixed, usually some part of the 
values dimension. In one sense, this re-
quirement amounts" to no more than the re-
cognition that the critic, too, must have a 
perspective. More importantly, it would not 
be rational to change a perspective in 
response to criticism unless the reason 
warranting the change is already included in 
the perspective. Thus, rational improvements 
in the planning perspectives involved in the 
planning system require that individuals be 
able to adopt several perspectives, and that 
there is ample opportunity for dialogue 
(Habermas, 1975; Friedmann, 1973). 
Water resources management decisions 
are made at both individual and collective 
levels. Individuals decide on such things as 
land use, water conservation, and flood 
proof ing. Governments decide on structural 
measures such as dam or channel construction, 
and on nonstructural measures such as zoning 
ordinances or water utility price regulation. 
The schematic of Figure 6 indicates 
decisions be,fng made in governmental, techni-
cal, economlC, social, and cultural dimen-
sions. Decisions in the governmental dimen-
s ion directly relate to water resources 
management while the decisions made in the 
other dimensions are unlikely to be purpose-
fully related to water resources cons idera-
tions. Governments decide on water projects, 
but the processes forming cultural nOrlns nre 
generally not strongly dependent on wnter 
policy and can more appropriately be con-
sidered as part of the water planning context 
than as part of the expl icit water plann ing 
system. 
For th is 
mak fng leve Is 
reason, 
commonly 
the four decision 
taken as with in the 
system within which water resources planning 
operates are private individuals, local 
governments, state governments, and the 
national government. Ea~h of these levels is 
related to the others (as well as to decision 
making levels in the other dimensions that 
influence but are not defined as within the 
water planning system) in various ways. If 
the general forms of these relationships 
tould be identified, the planning effort 
could be substantially improved. 
The general problem presented by mul-
tiple decision making levels is that project 
proposals are generated and evaluated from 
the different perspectives of each decision 
maker. The ana lyses of each dec i s ion maker 
a re based on the concepts and degree of 
detail that he deems appropriate to the 
,purposes at hand. The result is that dif-
ferent proposals are chosen as preferable 
from different viewpoints for different 
reasons. The problem of constructing a 
unified water resources management plan in a 
setting of multiple decision levels therefore 
emerges from the difficulties of reconciling 
the conclusions of analyses carried out at 
different levels of analysis. 
Progress in resolving these difficulties 
requires a better understanding of what a 
level is. One philosopher who has given a 
good deal of attention to the meaning of 
"level" has identified nine senses of the 
term relevant to science or philosophy 
(Bunge, 1963, Ch. V). Four of them are of 
i nteres t to the present study. One of the 
most common uses of the term identifies 
levels with degrees or amounts on a static 
scale. In the context of a river-basin 
study, the concern wi th water surface level 
is an obvious example. More generally, th is 
sense of "level" is found in the phrase "a 
high (low) leve 1 of X, II where "X': is any 
abstract quality that a thing could have more 
or less of. This use is not usually a source 
of difficulty, except when threshold effects 
are associated with different levels. Water 
level in a river can be measured on a con-
tinuous scale that reaches the flood stage at 
some point. For some purposes it is neces-
~ ary on ly to know that the flood stage has 
been reached; for other purposes it may be 
important to know what the flood stage is. 
In this case, both interests can be satis-
factorily accommodated. But when different 
?erspect ives focus on di fferent ranges of a 
.continuous scale, as occurred in the cost 
compar isons between the U intah and Colorado 
Bas ins in PROPDEMM, a single satisfactory 
resolution is less likely. 
A second sense of "level" is degree of 
complexity. One system is at a higher level 
than another if the former has more con-
stituent parts and interrelations than the 
latter (LaPorte, 1975, p. 12-13; Metlay, 
1975, p. 26). The planning and management 
structure for water in a river basin is at a 
higher level, in this sense, than planning 
and management for water in an irrigation 
canal because there are more elements 
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and interrelationships in a river basin that 
must be considered. Care must be taken here, 
however, to recognize the role of conceptual 
frameworks and pract ical purposes in char-
acterizing complexity (LaPorte, 1975, p. 7; 
Wimsatt, 1974, p. 69-74; Wittgenstein, 1953, 
Sections 46-48). 
The third sense of level involves the 
relation between parts and wholes; its most 
familiar occurrence is found in various forms 
of anti-reductionism: "the whole is more 
than the sum of its parts." The import of 
these statements is often unclear because of 
the multiple senses of "whole," "part," and 
"sum" (Nagel, 1952). Generally the terms 
"whole" and "part" are used correlatively, 
so what is needed is an account of the kinds 
of whole there are to better understand how 
wholes may be composed of parts (Nagel, 1952; 
GrOSSman, 1973). For exampl'e, it is fairly 
unproblemmat ic to say that a river bas in is 
composed of all those subbas ins, the dra in-
ages of wh ich merge at some point. Adopt ing 
this hydrological perspective, it is seen 
that the area of the basin is the sum of the 
areas of the subbasins. But this sort of 
additive composition relationship does not 
hold for other properties of interest: it is 
not clear how to interpret "sum" in the 
statement "water quality of a river basin is 
the sum of water quality of the subbasins of 
which it is composed." 
In many cases, the statement that the 
whole is greater than the sum of the parts is 
invoked as a claim for the existence of 
emergent properties at the level of the 
whole. That is, we think of levels when the 
whole .exhibits properties not exhibited by 
the parts and especially when there is no 
apparent explanation for the property in 
terms of the parts. In the first case, we 
have at least descriptive levels (Wimsatt, 
1974), and in the second case, the stronger 
claim of irreducibility. Generally, macro-
economics is said to be reducible too, or 
derived from, micro-economics; nevertheless, 
it is more convenient to use macro-level 
terms to describe macro-level phenomena 
(Brodbeck, 1968). It is much less clear that 
all social aggregate terms are reducible to 
descriptions of the individuals composing the 
aggregates (Lukes, 1973, p. 110-122; Gellner, 
1968). 
A fourth sense of "level" of interest 
to this study is hierarchy--an asymmetric 
ordering of strata. The formally pyramidal 
structure of authority in military organiza-
tions is generally thought to be the best 
example. Weber's ideal-typical rational 
bureaucratic form of organization (which 
he thought would become the dominant modern 
form because of its efficiency) has hier-
archical arrangement as one of its central 
characteristics (Weber 1946, p. 197). The 
definition of a hierarchial system has been 
carefully set out in Mesarovic, Macko, and 
Takahara (1970), and hierarchical aspects of 
water planning and management systems have 
been modeled by Haimes (1973), among others. 
In our culture, the term "hierarchy" has a 
somewhat negative connotation, perhaps 
because it appears to be antithetical to the 
ideal of democratic uality. Actually, it 
would be unusual to ind an example of a 
social institution that did not exhibit some 
elements of hierarchy and equally unusuar-tO 
find ah institution that was perfectly 
hierarch ical. 
The concern with identifying levels and 
their interactions is rooted in the potential 
benefit from doing so. There are at least 
two reasons (not independent of each other) 
for this benefit. First, natural systems 
appear to be organized into .levels, and 
levels concepts can thus be used to improve 
understanding of how they operate. Second, 
Simon (1969) has suggested that organization 
into levels is a natural way of coping with 
complexi ty.. Th is cop ing refers both to the 
advantages in performance that complex 
s ys terns can ach ieve and to the problems of 
control that accompany increased complexity. 
The advantage of complexity is in that 
specialization becomes poss ible when rela-
tively simpler entities are joined together, 
and specialization increases ability to 
pursue opportunities and resist hazards. The 
control problems arise from the need to 
coordinate specialized activities by channel-
i ng the inf orma t ion each un i t needs if it is 
to make timely contributions to collective 
goals. 
The observation that complex systems are 
composed of relatively less complex sub-
systems suggests that understanding of 
complex systems could be improved by analyz-
ing them in terms of their component parts. 
This is the basic idea in reductive explana-
t ions; one of the more successful modes of 
explanation is science. A reductive explana-
tion consists of showing how the macro-phen-
omenon to be explained is the result of, or 
composed of, micro-phenomena. One might, for 
example, expla in the dec is ion of an agency 
to undertake a given project as the result of 
actions by certain individuals in the agency. 
The distinct ion between micro and macro is 
relative; the micro level contains smaller 
units that stand in some composition relation 
to the macro units (Everson and Paine, 1973). 
Thus, individuals are micro relative to 
counties, and counties are micro relative to 
states (though the macro-micro relations are 
not of the same type). 
One practical effect of complexity is to 
i nh ib i t act ion. The use of leve Is in con-
ceptualizing problems can therefore be seen 
as a way of reducing complexity to facilitate 
action. Large problems, that seem overwhelm-
ing when taken as a whole, may be solved 
satisfactorily once defined into a set of 
smaller problems. Similarly, if the know-
ledge required to perform certain tasks can 
be organized into levels of concepts (going 
from g e n era 1 t 0 s p e c i f i c), the pro c e s s 0 f 
transmitting this knowledge can be improved. 
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In selecting the level of analysis to 
use in a water resources planning study, 
an investigator should focus on the level 
wh ich bes t accounts for the phenomena to be 
explained (Winsatt, 1974) because they are of 
interest to those who will use the results of 
the planning. A reductive approach to 
explanation requires use of the lowest or 
"bottom" level because a reduct ive explana-
tion is not complete unless the reduction is 
carried that far. Such is the position of 
the methodological individualists in the 
social sciences, who claim that persons are 
the fundamental social units and thus that no 
explanat ion of social phenomena is complete 
unless all relevant predicates describing 
social aggregates have been reduced to 
predicates describing individual behavior 
(Brodbeck, 1968; Watkins, 1968). 
Opposed to the methodological indivi-
dualists are the emergentists or holists, who 
claim the existence of irreducible social 
facts. Proponents of this approach argue 
that predicates describing social groups or 
institutions appear in complete explana-
tions of soc phenomena (Durkheim, 1964; 
Gellner, 1968; Agassi, 1975). 
Advocates of this approach thus suggest 
that reduction to the lowest possible level 
is not necessarily desirable. It requires 
extra work and makes explanation of irre-
ducible social facts imposs ible. According 
to this position, the levels of analysis 
employed in any particular inquiry, should 
depend on the explanatory needs of the 
investigator. Simon (1969) suggests that 
planners seldom achieve explanatory benefits 
worth the efforts of employing more than 
three levels: the focal level to be ex-
plained, the level above, of which it is part 
(the context or environment), and the level 
below containing the parts into which focal 
units are to be analyzed. 
Sometimes the selection is dictated 
by methodological concerns, as when data 
are available only in highly aggregated form 
(Dogan and Rokkan, 1969). In many cases, 
investigators adopt different level foci for 
different purposes (Singer, 1961). This can 
create problems in utilization of the results 
because relevance to policy actions in a 
given functional area varies from one policy 
maker to another--compare the needs of a 
county board responsible for flood plain 
Zoning with those of the director of the 
National Flood Insurance Program. Planning 
studies should therefore be carefully de 
signed so that the level of analysis employed 
by the planner corresponds to that of the 
user. At the same time, of course, the user 
must recognize the possibility that data br 
methodological problems may make it impos-
sible to achieve results at the level de-
sired. 
An excellent example of employing 
different focal levels to explain the same 
phenomenon is found in Allison's study (1971) 
of the Cuban missile crisis. He applied 
three analytic approaches to political 
science and provided three different, 
but plausible, explanations of what took 
place in October 1962. The three models are 
summarized in Table 10. Model I is the 
hatiohai actor model frequently used in 
international relations. An equivalent in 
water planning would be to treat an entire 
basin as a single decision unit and determine 
the best basin-wide allocation of water in 
terms of national principles and standards. 
Government act ion is interpreted wi th in the 
framework of the value-maximizing behavior 
adopted for decision analyses. Model II 
focuses on the set of organizations involved 
in the formulation and execution of govern-
ment policy_ According to the model, complex 
organizations can only act through an estab-
lished routine which must order the actions 
of a large number of individuals. Th is 
implies that effective organizational re-
sponse to any new situation must be in terms 
of established routines. In other words, the 
price of being able to perform complex tasks 
is the limitation of flexibility. Finally, 
Model III is the bureaucratic politics 
paradigm which interprets government actions 
as the result of a sequential bargaining 
game. 
The bureaucratic politics model 
sees no unitary actor but rather 
many actors as players, who focus 
not on a single strategic issue but 
on many diverse intra-national 
problems as well, in terms of no 
consistent set of strategic 
objectives but rather in terms of 
various conceptions of national, 
organizational, and personal goals, 
making government decisions not by 
rational choice but by the pulling 
and hauling that is politics 
(Allison, 1969, p. 407). 
All three of these models can be pro-
f itably employed to analyze processes in a 
planning system. Model I provides a per spec-
t ive for choos ing among the development 
alternatives for a bas in-wide plan; but 
implementat ion of a plan determined in th is 
manner must be tempered by recognition that 
implementation will be constrained by the 
established repertoires of existing organiza-
t ions as in Model I I and by the rather 
unpredictable outcome of bargaining as in 
Model III. In short, comprehensive planning 
requires all three levels of analysis and 
must be sensitive, therefore, to the problems 
of consistency that arise in shifting focus 
from one level to another_ 
The foregoing remarks suggest that in 
many cases a mUltiple level focus is ap-
propriate for comprehensive planning. 
Ideally, one would hope that as the analysis 
shifts focus from one level to the next, 
the understanding gained will be complemen-
tary and cumulative. This is seldom the 
case. Propositions and recommendations at 
one level may be of little consequence from 
the perspect ive of another level, or worse, 
they may actually confl ict. In the latter 
case, the investigator rna simply have to 
choose the level that wi dominate. In 
these cases, one would expect decisions to 
favor the level paying for the study (Brewer, 
1973), creating imbalances when resources for 
analysis are unevenly distributed among 
decision levels. 
During a study with a mUltiple level 
focus, the investigator typically has infor-
mation about units at one level, and is 
interested in what, if anything, can be 
inferred from this information about units at 
another leveL The process requires that 
collected data be either aggregated or 
disaggregated. Either operation requires 
assumption of a rule governing the procedure. 
In the social sciences, recognition of 
the existence of inherent problems in 
aggregating or disaggregating data dates back 
at least to Robinson (1950) (and somewhat 
earlier in economics). Alker (1969) gen-





MODEL I MODEL II 
Government action Government action largely determined 
as rational by institutional standard operating 
choice procedures and goals 
National actor Organizational actors 
The usual canons Factual problems & fractionated power 
of rational Parochial priorities & perceptions 
choice Standard operating procedures 
Uncertainty avoidance 
Central coordination accounts 
Decisions of government leaders 
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MODEL III 
Government action as the result of 
bargaining among concerned indivi-
duals in positions of power 
Players in positions 
Players in positions 
Parochial priorities & perceptions 
Goals & interests 
Stakes & stands 
Deadlines & faces of issues 
Power 
Action-channels 
Rules of the game 
eralized Robinson's conclusion and identified 
seven fallacies of ecological inference, 
summa r i zed in Fig u r e 7. I tis us u all y 
possible to resolve the objects of analysis 
into three levels: individuals, groups of 
individuals, or an overall level, like the 
social system. In analyses where different: 
levelS are recognized, it is not logically 
true that: 1) what is true overall is true 
within a particular group (universal fal-
l a c y); 2 ) w hat i s true 0 v era 11 i s t rue 
between groups (individualistic fallacy); 3) 
what is true of a particular group is true 
overall (selective fallacy); 4) what is true 
in a particular group is true in another 
group (contextual fallacy); 5) what is true 
in a particular group is true between groups 
(cross-sectional fallacy); 6) what is true 
between groups is true wi th in a group (h is-
torical fallacy); 7) what is true between 
groups is true overall (ecological fallacy). 
The possibility of ecological fallacy in 
planning is quite high not only because it is 
of interest to express the relationships 
between phenomena of different levels, but 
also because the only available data are 
often collected at a level different from the 
planning focus. As Hannan (1971, p. 475) 
points' out, "problems of aggregation and 
disaggregation arise largely as a consequence 
of missing data." Since ecological infer-
ences are not necessarily true (nor neces-
sarily false) but often unavoidable, it 
becomes necessary to offer an auxiliary 
premise to warrant the inference. This 
suggests that positions on ecological infer-
ence may be located along a continuum, 
defined by degree of willingness to assume 
similarity of properties across levels. On 
this continuum, the homology approach at one 
end supports unrestricted use of propositions 
across levels, and the inconsistency approach 
at the other end rejects such use of proposi-
tions (Hannan, 1970; 1971). 
Each planning effort, by choice or by 
default, locates somewhere along this con-
tinuum according to the approach taken how to 
express the micro-macro composition rela-
tions. The aggregation procedure can take 
the form of "natural" i ntermed iate forms 
(Ando, Fisher, and Simon, 1963) obt:ained 
from the application of a ipecified algo-
r ithm. Alternatively, it may search out 
the most likely relation between specified 
macro and micro variables. For decision 
mak ing, the mos t useful aggregat ion problem 
is interpreted as the most efficient sim-
p 1 icat ion, in terms of bes t allocat ion of 
resources available for the analysis, given 
the kind of decision to be made and the 
available implementation means (Nataf, 1968; 
Theil, 1972). 
All sorts of studies from scientific 
inquiry to fact gathering for political 
decision making can and usually need to be 
analyzed at various levels. For each deci-
sion, Boulding (1956) tells us that "Some-
where, however, between the specific that has 
no meaning and the general that has no 
content there must be, for each purpose, and 
at each level of abstraction, an optimum 
degree of generality." The problem is 
determining the degree of generality at 
which an analysis will provide the best 
results in terms of the goals of each 
portion of the planning. 
One of the most common problems in 
public works planning is that any proposal, 
be it a dam and reservoir or a curb and 
gutter, is Simultaneously considered from 
perspectives using various levels of analysis 
ranging from the top levels of government to 
people in the immediate vicinity. Different 
designs are likely to be preferred from the 
different viewpoints, and each level uses 
different concepts in reaching its decision 
and consequently in discuss ing the reasons 
for its decision with others. A planner may 
not have freedom of choice on a level of 
analysis and may have to work toward reaching 
a conclusion acceptable at all levels without 
creating conceptual confusion. When the 
total study requires analysis at more than 
one level, great care must be taken not to 
apply concepts discovered at one level 
indiscriminately to other levels. 
INDIVIDUALISTIC ~ 
0lVERSAL ~ /CONTEX1UAL~ ~CROSS-SECTIONAL~ 
RELATIONSHIP = RELATIONSHIP + RELATIONSHIP + RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN IN GROUP A IN GROUP NOT -A BE1"Vt£EN 
\X ~ SEl ./ "" / "" GROUPS ~ECTIVE ~ ........... CONT~ ........... HISlORICAL~~ J 
------------ ECOLOGICAL----------~ 
Figure 7. Types of ecological fallacies (adapted from Alker, 1969). 
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Recapitulation 
The discussion in this chapter has 
described how the concept of perspective can 
be used in defining a total planning system 
and how the appropr iate level for analyzing 
that system varies with perspective and 
needs to be explicitly chosen in harmony 
with the purposes of the planning effort. 
Perspect ives are inherent in human decis ion 
making where they take on values, scope of 
control, capability of action, and temporal 
d imens ions that collectively def ine the 
relevant planning system. Different actors 
wi th voices in the decision mak ing process 
developed different perspectives based on 
experience and capability with respect to 
these d imens ions, and the total relevant 
system would encompass all aspects relevant 
from any, perspective. A more practical 
definition of the relevant system, however, 
recognizes that the planning process cannot 
afford to devote extensive effort in areas of 
the tot a 1 s y stem t hat are 0 fin t ere s t to 
relatively few actors and that socialization 
processes among the actors work to reduce 
the scope of accepted concerns. 
The selected planning system can then 
be analyzed from the perspectives of the 
various parties who have active interest 
in the sorts of decisions at hand, in this 
case water management and use decisions. 
In practice this means concerned individuals 
and the levels of government from local to 
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national having jurisdiction in the matter. 
The primary levels concepts useful in this 
analysis are the relationships among parts 
and wholes and the concept of hierarchy. 
The reductionist approach would reduce the 
whole system to its smallest component units, 
but the theory of the existence of irre-
ducible social facts and the practical 
limitations in data availability and data 
processing make inquiry at a higher level, 
chosen to sat isfy the explanatory needs of 
the investigator, more satisfacory. Where 
multiple perspectives are involved, explana-
tory needs vary with perspective, and inquiry 
is necessary at a level to meet each need. 
This means two or three levels in practice. 
In concentrating on two or three selected 
levels, however, one should recognize the 
ever-present possibility of biasing the 
results because of ecological fallacy in that 
r elat ionsh ips found among groups at the 
levels chosen do not represent relationships 
among groups at other levels or the overall 
situation. 
The discussion in this chapter has shown 
that the problems of levels of analysis are 
among the most fundamental in conceptualizing 
a comprehensive river basin plan. A con-
ceptual framework based on the idea of a 
planning perspective, was defined and will be 
used in the next chapter to cons ider how 
relational problems may be overcome when 
planning from a single perspect ive, and in 
the following chapter the concept will be 
expanded to multiple objective planning. 
CHAPTER VII 
RELATIONAL PROBLEMS IN SINGLE PERSPECTIVE ANALYSES 
Introduction 
Relational problems seem less serious 
when a single planning perspective is in-
volved. Although deeis ion mak on total 
planning systems nearly always involves 
multiple levels, an analyst can take a 
single perspective by specification of 
selected interrelationships. The results of 
these select ions may lead to implaus ible 
or erroneous conclusions, but the levels 
phenomenon does not usually obstruct plan 
formulation. To put the situation dif-
ferently, when planning studies use multiple 
levels analysis, decisions must be made on 
wh ich levels to use and how to relate 
them. An indecisive analyst is thus in a 
pos ition simi lar to that of two analysts who 
disagree on what the best focus for study is. 
But the individual analyst is likely to have 
an easier time resolving (ignoring?) his 
difficulties. 
The relational problems to be explored 
in th is chapter may be generally character-
ized as emerging from the planner's need to 
structure the dimensions of his perspective 
to make good use of available information in 
finding answers to questions that arise in 
the planning study. A reasonable way to 
order the discussion of these problems is to 
arrange the four dimensions of planning 
perspective in the matrix form used in 
Chapter II (Figure 2) and discuss each cell. 
Problems Within the Temporal Dimension 
The Temporal Dimension 
, Planners generally think in terms of 
scenar ios cons is t ing of sequences of events 
extending to some future time horizon. The 
events, then, constitute the basic temporal 
\.Inits in analysis, and the temporal horizon 
IS erves as the boundary beyond wh ich the 
ident ificat ion of later poss ible events is 
either unnecessary Or else so uncertain that 
the ef fort is not worthwh ile. Internally, 
the p lann ing per iod may be though t of as a 
temporal whole composed of events--the 
temporal parts. 
The philosophical issues in the in-
d i v idua t ion of events are too complex 
for full discussion here,l and it will be 
sufficient for our purposes to follow a 
generally pragmatic line and show how what 
counts as an event is heavi ly dependent on 
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the purposes of the people concerned. 
This functional orientation is evident in the 
discussion by James and Lee (1971, p. 9-10) 
of four planning horizons in engineering 
economy studies:2 
The economic life ends when the 
incremental benefits from continued 
use no longer exceed the i ncre-
mental cost of continued operation. 
The £~Y~i£~l_lif~ ends when a 
facility can no ronger physically 
perform its intended function. The 
period of analysis is the length of 
time over which project conse-
quences occurring are included in a 
ticular study. The construction 
is reached when the con 
s facilities are no longer 
expected to satisfy future demands. 
If projects are compared on the basis of 
expected net benef it, the fate of a project 
may depend on how far into the future the 
analyst is willing to go in estimating 
the flow of benefits and is particularly 
likely to do so if a low discount rate is 
used (Herfindahl and Kneese, 1974, p. 189-
222; National Water Commission, 1973; Krutil-
la and Fisher, 1975; Howe, 1971). 
In principle, there seems to be no 
limit to the number of time subdivisions 
that can be made, so that one can char-
acterize processes of very short duration and 
very long duration on the same scale. The 
fact that th is can be done in pr inciple, 
however, does not overcome. the pract ica 1 
difficulty of assigning value to the smallest 
units and to the largest units on the same 
scale. People concerned with activities or 
events that occur within the smaller temporal 
lA good discussion of the problems 
here is found in Beardsley (1975); also 
Davidson in Rescher et al., eds., (1969). 
2A related statement is found in the 
Water Resources Council's statement of 
Principles and Standards (1973:24784). The 
per iod of analys is will be the lesser of 1) 
the per iod of time over wh ich the plan can 
reasonably be expected to serve a useful 
purpose considering probably technological 
trends affecting various alternatives; on 2) 
the per lod of time when further discount ing 
of beneficial and adverse effects will have 
no appreciable effects on design. 
intervals have difficulty grasping the 
pract ical impor t of events tha t are not 
s ignifcant except over longer intervals. 
Conversely, when one is concerned with longer 
intervals, events of shorter duration tend to 
fade to insignificance. This difference 
perhaps in part accounts for the differences 
in planning perspect ive between those think-
ing of short-term economic gain and those 
thinking of long-term ecologic loss. It is a 
basic fact, as Hayek has argued, "that it is 
impossible for any man to survey more than a 
limited field, to be aware of the urr..ency of 
more than a limi ted number of needs I (1944, 
p. 59). 
It is also useful to distinguish among 
four patterns of distribution within the 
interval (Resch and Urquhart, 1971, p. 
159-161): 1) activi tes occur over 
the interval a but cannot be said to 
occur in any subinterval. 2) Homogeneous 
activities can be said to take place over any 
or all subintervals in the same sense that 
they can be said to take place in the inter-
val as a whole. Constructing an irrigation 
canal is a holostic activi for one dealing 
in annual time units while ting fields 
is a homogeneous activity. 3) Majoritative 
activities go on dur most, but not neces-
sarily all, parts 0 the time interval. 
Reading this report is likely to be a 
majoritative activity for a day or two. 4) 
Finally, occasional activities go on at some 
times in the interval but not necessarily 
most of the time. Gaging water quality or 
stream flow are examples. The classification 
for a given activity, however, depends on the 
length of the time interval. Keeping these 
different temporal patterns in mind can be 
helpful in constructing efficient management 
systems. 
The Values Dimension 
For at least the past century, one 
of the dominant philosophies of value in 
the United States has been utilitarianism. 
Th is dominance is apparent in the use of 
benef it-cos t analys is as a me thod of social 
policy evaluation. One of the fundamental 
claims of utilitarianism (and to the non-
utilitarian, one of its fundamental de-
f iciencies) is that ultimately there is only 
one values (or, at least one highest value), 
although there is some disagreement among 
utilitarians on what to call it. 3 Among 
the candidates are "pleasure," "utility," 
"happiness," and "the general welfare." 
Other value terms -say, "liberty • ." "justice," 
"beauty," are to be valued bec~ql?,e (and only 
because) of their contributiont9the general 
welfare. The one ultimate value is the only 
criterion of choice needed. Alternative 
courses of action can, t oretically, 
30 n th is and other current issues in 
utilitarianism, see the excellent review by 
Brock (1973). 
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be measured by this single dimension, and 
the one ranked highest (assuming there 
are no ties) is the one which ought to be 
chosen. Economic efficiency has provided the 
first explicit and long time ostensible 
standard of federal t evaluation (James 
and Rogers, 1976). use economic effi-
ciency as traditionally applied can conflict 
with other values, like equality (Okun, 1975) 
or environmental quality (Commoner, 1971), 
important cons iderat ions are left out when 
efficiency is the sole evaluative criterion. 
It is useful to distinguish among the 
ways values can conflict (Rescher, 1969b). 
Probably the most common case of conflicting 
values (labeled "accidental" in Figure 2) is 
where mutually exclus Ive cour ses of act ion 
contribute to the fulfillment of two or more 
values to differing These conflicts 
are called accidental se they ar ise in 
the context of compet states of affairs 
rather than in the con ent of the values 
themselves; a different, as yet unidentified, 
alternative might satisfactorily achieve the 
values at issue without conflict. 
In contrast, other values necessarily 
conflict. Some values in fact seem to occur 
in polar pairs. Familiar examples include 
liberty and authority, individualism and 
collectivism, partic tion and expertise. 
In every case where one is relevant the other 
membe~ of the pair is also. An improvement in 
one requires diminution in the other. 
Finally, there are conflicts among 
criteria of value achievement. For example, 
people may agree on the need for clean water 
but disagree over how clean is "clean." 
Apparent conflicts of this sort are often 
actually based on one of the other types of 
conflicts mentioned. However, two agents 
sometimes more or less independently adopt 
standards for the same va lue and later find 
they need to come to some sort of agreement 
on cr iter i a of ach ievement. The adop t ion of 
the Pr inciples and Standards for federal 
water planning is an example. The need for 
common standards becomes greater as the 
number of agents involved increases. 
The objection that economic efficiency 
does not capture important considerations in 
water resources managment has led to the 
explicit recognition of environmental quality 
as an added value. Lesser attention has been 
given to regional development and social 
well-being (Water Resources Council, 1973). 
All these values cannot be reduced to <J 
single value without 0 straightforwDrd 
reduction method. Because the concept of 
decision implies convergence on a single 
alternative, the admission of multiple values 
requires aggregation across values. 
Systematic attention to aggrel'ating 
values for multiobjective decision making is 
fairly recent, but a growing number of tech-
niques and applications are being reported. 
Useful recent surveys of this work include 
MacCrimmon (1973) pnd, with emphasis on 
water resources applications, Cohon and Marks 
(1975). MacCrimmon groups 19 aggregating 
techniques into four major categories with 
three subdivisions in each.4 His four 
major categor ies indicate the variety of 
approaches possible for aggregating multiple 
values, and therefore, the difficulty of 
ident ifying the "best" for given cases. 
The first category is the weighting 
method. It requires that a scale be con-
s truc ted for each va lue of interes t, so that 
each alternative may be quantified with 
respect to each value. A numerical weight is 
assigned to each value score, reflecting the 
relative importance of the value, and pro-
ducts of values and weights are summed to 
give each alternative a single score. The 
alternative with the highest total score is 
then chosen. 5 
MacCrimmon's second major category is 
the sequential elimination method. It also 
begins with a set of attributes expressing 
the values in terms of which alternatives 
are to be .characterized. The attributes are 
scaled in such a way that they form a set of 
constraints. Any alternative that does not 
comply with the set of constraints is then 
eliminated. Generally, the set of con-
straints can be specified so that at least 
one acceptable alternative is found. 
The third category of multiobjective 
techniques is mathematical programming. The 
attributes of interest are the variables, and 
the alternatives are impliCitly identified 
by the set of constraints imposed upon the 
values of the variables. These constraints 
may be both technological and--as in the case 
of goal programming--preference. An algo-
rithm generates a set of perferred points 
from the set of feasible solutions (I.e .• the 
set of solutions satisfying the constraints) 
and systematically evaluates them in terms of 
a specif ied object ive funct ion in order to 
converge on an optimum. 
The final group of techniques is the 
$patial proximity method. Some applications 
of this method are simply instances of the 
previous methods where emphasis is placed on 
geometric representations. Each value is 
represented by a dimension in multidimen-
4Cohon and Marks use three major 
tategor ies to di vide 12 approaches. But 
their interests are slightly different from 
those here, i.e .• they wish to evaluate 
techniques with mathematical representations 
in terms of computational efficiency and 
comprehensibility of the display of alterna-
t ives. 
5The PROPDEMM technique described in 
Chapter IV falls roughly into this cate-
gory, with the complication that multiple 
values are distributed over several decision 
makers. Thus, the weighting procedure not 
only weights values (via "Group Salience"), 
but groups as well (via "Group Power"). 
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sional space, the decision maker is asked to 
identify the ideal point in that space, and 
alternatives that are ranked according to 
their distance from the ideal. 
The Scope/Jurisdiction Dimension 
Generally, a policy is cons idered less 
relevant if it does not affect the welfare of 
individuals in the decision making unit. 
Political units in fact behave somewhat like 
egoists. If efficiency is the primary value, 
one would want to adjust the boundar ies of 
the decision unit to the boundaries of policy 
effects. 
If the boundaries of the political 
body are not roughly congruent with 
the boundar ies over wh ich the 
external benefits or costs prevail, 
decisions will be biased and 
inefficient. If the affected area 
is too small, important benefits or 
costs will be ignored. If the area 
is too large, excessive cen-
tralization and the associated 
inefficiencies will result. 
(Schultze, 1968, p. 127128.) 
Unlike individual egoists, political units 
cannot operate on the basis of simple welfare 
maximization; the distribution of costs and 
benefits is crucial. 
One of the long-standing controversies 
in political theory is the determination 
of the best size of the policy for the 
performance of its responsibilities. These 
responsibilities fall under the general 
goal of promoting the general welfare. 
Of course such an abstract value as the 
general welfare does not prOVide much guid 
ance in decid what the boundar ies of the 
political unit ought to be and if taken to 
encompass all welfare effects would lead to a 
political boundary that would include the 
whole world. Appropriate smaller units ilre 
difficult to identify without defining the 
particular activities that are appropriate 
for governments to undertake. 
The Action Dimension 
The primary source of conflict in 
the actions dimension is associated I<>'ith 
difficulties in ascertaining the technical 
feasibility of action alternatives and 
consequent different perceptions of probable 
effectiveness. When performance cannot 
be predicted to the general satisfact ion of 
the various decision makers, each is likely 
to prefer the action with which he is most 
familiar. Often this choice is grounded in 
part on faith that the fami]iilr cnD be 
made to work more than on evidence from pust 
performance. Dam builders and the enforcers 
~f zoning laws both believe they can succeed 
working in the framework they know best. The 
way out of this sort of conflict is found in 
developing causal relationships for 
prediction, and that topic is examined in the 
balance of th chapter. The impl icat ion is 
that problems associated with ~mperfect 
causal relationships predominate In single 
perspect ive analyses and problems associated 
vi i th c lashes in the other three d imens ions 
predominate in multiple perspective analyses. 
Causal relationships become a problem 
when deterministic efforts to represent them 
do not portray what the decision makers 
presented with the plan have found to happen 
in similar situations in their experience. 
The problem becomes particularly severe 
should subsequent experience after action is 
taken on the planning information conform 
more closely to the expectations of the 
doubtful decision maker than of the planner. 
The faulty planning: project ions can 
result from inadequacies in a deterministic 
model used by the planners or in the fact 
that random events in real world systems mean 
that projections can only be made on a 
stochastic basis. Departure in a given 
s ituat ion may then s imply be because a rare 
random event (a major flood for example) 
happened to occur within a planning horizon 
in which it would not normally be expected. 
Such events become particularly difficult to 
deal with in planning for multiple level 
deci s ion mak ing because the var ious actors 
usually have quite different risk aversions 
and perceptions of possible outcomes. 
Further probing of the problem requires 
exploration of causal relationship~ in 
greater depth. Causal judgments have 
several uses in planning: 
(1) We make causal judgments 
to the occurrence of 
par cu ar events; (2) we seek 
causal knowledge because of its 
u sefulnes s; (3) know-
connec t ions 0 f ten 
gives us power to control events; 
(4) causal attributions involving 
agents are important in the at-
tribution of moral responsibility, 
legal liabilI!:.y, and so on; (5) 
caus81 concepts are often used in 
special technical senses in physi-
cal theory (Kim, 1973, p. 572). 
The first practical problem is how to 
determine that a causal relation exists 
between two objects. 6 Current approaches 
often take Hume's famous statement as a point 
of departure: 
We may define a cause to be an 
object followed by another, and 
6Useful recent collect ions of art icles 
on causation, with introductory surveys are 
Brand (1976) and Sosa (1975). 
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where all the objects, simi lar to 
the first, are followed by objects 
similar to the second. Or in other 
words, where, if the first object 
had not been, the second never had 
existed. (Hume, 1902:VII, 72, 
emphasis omitted.) 
The standard modern version of causation 
is that one event C is the cause of another 
event E if E occurred after C, and C and E 
are instances of (the antecedent and con 
sequent of) a general law. In other words, 
given the natural law and the initial condi-
tion C, event E follows deductively (Nagel, 
1961, p. 73-75; Hempel, 1966, p. 49 58). 
This explanation is generally thought to be 
adequate for at least some range of phen-
omena. Disagreement centers on how broad 
this range is, and what sort of analysis may 
be provided for c2usal relations beyond 
it. 
Causal relationships are sough.t and 
used in two ways in planning. One IS the 
determination that something is the cause of 
some effect, and the other is the determina-
tion of the causal contribution of something 
to subsequent states of affairs, that is the 
consequences of some event. Few claims that 
one thing caused another thing are ever made 
unconditionally, but rather on the assump-
t ion that a number of other "background" 
conditions--the ever present paribus 
cause--also pertained. The ques on that 
then arises is why the one thing should be 
singled out as the cause when the truth of 
the ass e r t ion evi den t 1 y d e pen d son the 
presence of other conditions. Various 
attempts have been made to reformulate 
the notion of causation to address this 
question. One recent tion, by Mackie 
(1975), is that causal attribu-
tions with an INUS con tion, which he 
defines as "an insufficient but necessary 
part of a condition which is itself unneces-
sary but sufficient for the result." Having 
thus explicitly included relevant baCkground 
conditions; one must return to the question 
of how anyone part of the sufficient condi-
tions can be favored as cause, and 
answering the question poses additional 
problem of delimiting the boundary of 
the sufficient condition. It does not, after 
all, seem reasonable to include the entire 
state of the universe just prior to the 
result in the sufficient condition. 
Inc;] s e s w her ewe h 11 veil w~, 1 1 - cst ;1 b-
lished scientif Ic theory-' such that the Cilllse 
and effect in question can be construed as 
instances of a causal law- the s i tuat ion is 
not so difficult. The central concern is 
that the cause and effect in question are of 
t~e appropriate kind, as indicated in the 
cover ing law. I n other words, the laws on 
which we are able to rely provide gUidance in 
singling out the cause. Secondly, one should 
look for other relevant conditions known to 
be required if the causal relation is to hold 
but likely to be present in the context in 
which the law is being applied. In other 
words, background condi tions become salient 
to the degree th at they are known to be 
variable. 
The problem planners encounter in 
trying to predict the consequences of their 
actions is nO,table lack of scientific laws 
for projecting impacts other than those in 
the technical dimensions of Figure l. 
Consequently, a very large number of auxili-
ary conditions seem to be required in order 
to make explanations and predictions fit the 
covering law model. Alternatively, it has 
been observed that the !Q&i£~! form is 
satisfied easily enough, but at the expense 
of plausibility (Mandelbaum, 1960). It has 
been suggested by some (Mandelbaum, 1960; 
Winch, 1958; Louch, 1966) that events in-
practical affairs are identified according 
to different standards--Le., the interests 
of actors in part icular s ituat ions--than are 
events in scientific contexts, so that 
traditional causal interpretations are in-
appropriate, or at least cannot be 'applied 
until the events in question have been 
analyzed into components. The implication is 
that causal explanations proposed for actual 
situations are heavily dependent on the 
interests of actors doing the explaining; 
moreover, the act ions of actors depend on 
their interests. 7 The supporting assump-
t ions for causal explanat ions in pract ical 
affairs, then, are often closely tied to 
salient values and object ives. Since these 
may be different for different groups, and 
can change over time, the same generality and 
stability of causal laws in hard sciences 
does not appear to be attainable in policy 
sciences (Reynolds, 1976). 
Another way to put this problems is that 
when planners bring human actions into a 
discussion of causes and effects, they must 
take into account the possiblility that 
actions have some of the consequences they do 
because of their intrinsically social na-
ture. 8 If someone diverts an amount of 
water in the Colorado Basin, two likely 
consequences that fit our ordinary causal 
model are a decrease in downstream flow and 
an increase in downstream salinity. Another 
consequence might be a law suit filed by 
downstream water users wishing to collect for 
damages. The first two consequences may be 
7Although he does not have the final 
word in all cases, the agent's view of 
h is act ions is the favored interpretat ion. 
Presumably the agent views what he is doing 
according to the practical purposes to which 
he is attending. 
8Actions that are "internal" to a 
pract ice--that is, actions that cannot be 
performed except within a definite institu-
t ional setting--are paradigm cases of this 
social dependence. The rules governing 
the practice are then said to be constitutive 
of the action see Searle (1969, p. 33-42). 
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expected to follow regularly from a water 
diversion, but the third consequence is 
contingent upon the institutional setting in 
which water allocations are made. Thus, the 
criteria for identifying causes in practical 
affairs must include the institutions which 
make certain actions possible and partially 
determine the conditions under which an 
agent may be held to be the cause of certain 
effects (Hart and Honore, 1959). 
The second problem of causation that 
arises in planning activities is the notion 
of the consequence of an action. Our ordin-
ary conception of performing an action is 
that of mak ing someth Ing happen or br ing ing 
something about. We think of actions gener-
ating consequences in the future. Some of 
the consequences are beneficial, some are 
harmful, and others are neither benef ic ial 
nor harmful. Judgments as to whether a 
consequence is beneficial or harmful and the 
degree of benefit or harm vary with perspec-
tive and level of analysis. In addition, we 
are often interested in determining whether 
certain consequences are intentional or 
unintent ional. 
If the utilitarian's teleological 
evaluation of proposed actions is adopted--
that is, if the alternative is chosen that is 
expected to have the h est net benefits--
then there must be some way of estimating 
the relevant consequences of the alternatives 
before they occur. If we want to improve 
future predictions by monitoring the conse-
quences of past actions, we need a way of 
ident Hying the consequences of the act ions 
as they 'happen. 9 Our inHial inclination, 
then, is to claim that ideally we should 
compare the total consequences of each 
alternative. But Bergstrom (1966) has argued 
persuas ively that the consequences of an 
action, or any plausible interpretation of 
"consequences," are indeterminate. Pr ior 
(1968, p. 54) goes further and claims that 
"the notion of the total consequences of an 
action seems thus to suffer from an incurable 
incoherence which renders it useless for 
ethical theory or for any other sort of 
theory." 
The reason for Prior's objections 
is the difficulty of separating what happens 
after the performance of an action into 
the consequences of that act ion and conse-
quences of other happenings. Since the 
occurrence of an effect requires the presence 
of other conditions, one may think of the 
consequences of these conditions as what 
would have happened if the action in question 
had not been performed, but everythin/2'- else 
had been the same (Lewis, 1973). But 
th is is almost certain to place too much 
9Equivalently, we must be prepared 
to identify actions in terms of their con-
sequences. What is meant by performing 
that act ion is the bringing about of 
consequences (Lyons, 1965). 
weight on the action in question, for conse-
quences will be attributed to it that occur 
only because it and certain other conditions 
are present--for- example, the chemical 
effluent that is not harmful alone, but 
interacts with another harmless effluent to 
form a toxic chemical. 
the consequences of act ions are further 
rendered indeterminate by subsequent dec i-
s ions. Present actions have consequences 
extending into the future, forming the 
conditions in which future decisions are 
taken. But since each future decision also 
generates consequences, each decision point 
represents, as it were, a dilution of the 
consequences of previous decisions. In other 
words, we cannot determine the total conse-
q uences of present act ions because some of 
them depend on future decisions. 
Th is inde termi nacy of the conseq uences 
of an action creates problems in forecasting 
for mak ing planning choices. The commonly 
expressed desire of decision makers for 
certain prediction is not attainable because 
the planner can never be sure. But we are 
reasonably sure of what we are doing in some 
cases, and this indicates that we employ 
other standards of predict ion. These other 
standards may be summarized as explicit or 
implicit rules indicating possible conse-
quences that may be ignored and possible 
consequences that, for various reasons, 
should be included in our deliberations. 
This corresponds to D'Arcy's (1963) concept 
of focal act descr ip t ions: f ea Lures of act s 
that, if they apply in a given instance, 
cannot be omitted from the description of 
that act without deception. The application 
of these rules and norms make planning 
possible, but creates problems at the same 
time. 
By narrowing the range of considered 
consequences, it becomes possible to iden-
tify and compare actions in terms of a· 
manageable set of characteristics required 
for successful performance. In fact, we may 
observe that different actions are identified 
with varying degrees of certainty as to their 
consequences. One common way to identify 
actions, but maintain a choice dependent on 
consequences, is to conceive of the action as 
bringing about some (especially desired) 
state of affairs; in other words, identifica-
tion by goal. An action of this sort is 
called by whatever phrase is the appropriate 
replacement for "X" in "bringing about X." 
Not ice, however, that it is necessary to 
distinguish between the action and the goal, 
so that we shall be able to describe the 
action "bringing about X" as "bringing about 
X by Y-ing" (Austin, 1956-57; Anscombe, 1976; 
Meiland, 1970, p. 36-42). The distinction is 
necessary for the same reason, basically, 
that "total consequences" proved to be 
unworkable. There are cases where we fail 
to bring about what we intended to, but 
nevertheless we can say what it was that we 
were doing. When intent ion and performance 
do not match one does not then decide that he 
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must have deceived himself about what his 
intentions really were. 
At the other end of act ion ident if ica-
tion are those actions that are identified 
fairly independently of consequences~ or not 
conceptually tied to particular goals. 
The descriptions of such actions are, in 
other words, fairly neutral with respect 
to different practical purposes. 
One way to view a plan is as a specified 
set of actions leading to a goal. Therefore, 
the identification of actions accordinl'- to 
their contr ibution to goals is an essent ial 
part of planning. On the other hand, if 
actions cannot be identified independently of 
particular goals, it will be more difficult 
to coordinate the activities of different 
agents, particularly different agents pur 
suing different goals and having different 
training. 
A tension is thus created between the 
advantages of more certa in goal ach ievement 
from specializat ion and the increased d if-
ficulty of coordinating individuals with 
different specialized training. A further 
tens ion is created between the increased 
effectiveness of specialization, under a 
certain range of circumstances, and the 
possibility of reduced effectiveness when 
special procedures are applied in circum-
stances outside of this range (Alexander, 
1964). Finally, the need to restrict the 
range of consequences in order to ident ify 
act ions at all implies that virtually every 
action will have unintended consequences. 
Unintended consequences become a serious 
planning problem under conditions of rapid 
social change, for such circumstances are 
likely to change the conditions necessary for 
an action to have even its expected effects. 
Since society is unlikely to excuse (nega-
t ive) unintended consequences a second time, 
it is often necessary either to take a 
meliorative actions or refrain from actions, 
even though their consequences are not 
certain. 
The discussion in this chapter describes 
key problems in the temporal, values, 
scope-jurisdictional, and action dimensions 
of perspective for planning by a single 
analyst. The temporal problems center on how 
to divide planning time into subunits and fit 
processes into those units. The value 
problems are that the values perceived from 
different perspectives can conflict and so 
can the criteria used to determine whether 
desired values have been achieved. The 
principal scope-jurisdictional problem is 
that institutionalized boundaries of respon-
sibility vary from those encompassi a 
desirable planning system. The act on 
prbblems relate to the inadeauacies of 
available tools for forecast ing the impacts 
of ac t ions under cons idera t ion. A more 
detailed probing of these inadequacies then 
showed certain fundamental inadequacies in 
the way planners handle necessary and suf-
ficient conditions in applying causal rela-
tionships to be as if not more important than 
inadequacies in the relationships available 
to planners in projecting the consequences of 
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contemplated actions for decision makers. 
The common consequence is that the sum of the 
benefits achieved from a group of implemented 
plans is often far less than the sum of the 
benefits causally attributed to each of them 
individually because of the interactions 
among them. Planning models need to be 
refined to deal with this problem more 
explicitly. 
CHAPTER VI I I 
RELATIONAL PROBLEMS IN MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE ANALYSES 
Introduction 
; Chapter VI I was used to explore the 
re lat ional problems in single perspect Ive 
planning. The effort identified the problems 
in aggregating available data units to 
obtain relevant information and in disaggreg-
ating the total planning system to an appro-
priate level for predicting the consequences 
of action alternatives as major planning 
issues. Deeper exploration, however, showed 
that the ideal of putting descr iptive data 
together in a way that would permit the use 
of physical laws to predict the consequences 
of action alternatives is not in harmony with 
the realities of how causes lead to effects. 
The consequences of a contemplated course of 
future action or of a monitored historical 
choice cannot in actuality be separated from 
what would have happened without that action. 
Consequence~ for which an action provides 
both necessary and sufficient conditions do 
not continue over a long time frame but 
rather are in fact soon altered in nature by 
consequences stemming from other actions or 
decisions. Dynamically interacting real 
world conditions make it impossible to 
attribute long consequence time streams to a 
single initial course of action. 
Wh a t the n i s the p 1 ann e r t 0 do? I s 
he to recommend against all long-term actions 
for social betterment because theoretical 
limitations in the effects one can attribute 
to a cause make it impossible to prove 
action justified? Such a policy can be 
followed only at tremendous loss to social 
welfare because none of the interact ing 
actions would be taken. The solution to the 
dilemma must rather be found in defining a 
test for project justification short of 
reqUlrlng proven causal benefits to exceed 
costs. Benefits associated with some lesser 
degree of partial causality must be accepted. 
The not ion of acceptance leads to 
the problems in multiple perspective plann 
since acceptance is ach ieved through recon-
ciling conclusions reached by diverse 
decision makers on the basis of the perspec-
tives that they have developed in coping with 
their particular situations. The relational 
issues in reaching these conclusions combine 
those already discussed as pertaining to 
reaching the component single perspective 
conclusions, the likelihood that contrary 
to reductionist philosophy the process of 
social decision making contains elements that 
cannot be broken down into individual deci-
sion making units, and the problems of 
duplicating realistic social decision making 
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ocesses for reconciling individual dif-
erences in a planning framework. The 
planner must reconcile differences in p1an 
formulat ion in a way that the public served 
is willing to accept as conforming to a 
reasonable collective preference. This 
chapter addresses these issues by dealing 
with the relational problems encountered in 
the multiple perspective context. 
Values Used in Multiple 
Perspective Planning 
Individuals form their values without 
too much concern as to whether the procedure 
used was proper or whether the results 
are really in their own best interest. 
Collective values thus include two kinds of 
criteria in addition to values obtained for 
society by reconciling differences in in-
dividual preference. 
Consequently, the values relevant to 
multiperspective planning can be classified 
into three groups. The first is composed 
of substantive criteria, like efficiency and 
en"i ronmental quality, that are applied to 
probable decision outcomes themselves. 
Second, procedural criteria guide the process 
by which decisions are reached. For example, 
procedural criteria are specified for use by 
water resources agencies in estimat costs 
and benefits. The third group is the source 
of legitimacy or or in of the evaluative 
criteria in use. For agencies, the usual 
sources of legitimacy are legislation and 
executive orders, and thus failure to cite, 
or, worse yet, to abide by the relevant 
legislative or executive authorizations can 
be sufficient to bring action to a halt. 
Legislation and orders are also justified by 
recogn ized purposes, so fai lure to ach ieve 
goals can br ing changes. Finally, agencies 
are sensitive to public support and opposi-
t ion, so that agency perceptions of the 
public mood affects the commitment with which 
an agency implements its programs. 
The evaluative base for government 
involvement in water resources has p.:radua tty 
expanded (James and Rogers, 1976). Conse-
quently, social values that previously did 
not enter into the analyses of benefits may 
now be used to just ify government sponsored 
water resources activities. In general this 
broadened evaluative base has stimulated 
water resources development, but recent 
experience with environmental quality stan-
dards has shown that the inclusion of add i-
tional objectives can also dampen project 
activities. It has been fairly easy to 
des ign mult iple purpose projects partly 
because the usual means for pursuing these 
purposes are similar--for example, water 
impoundments for water supply, hydroelec-
tricity, agriculture, flood control, and 
recreation. More importantly, serious 
problems have not arisen in evaluating these 
projects because each purpose is interpreted 
with reference to the overall objective of 
economic efficiency. In contrast, addition 
of a second objective of environmental 
quality has caused major design problems. l 
The lack of a common frame of reference 
for compar ing the object ives of economi c 
efficiency and environmental quality makes 
the adopt ion of one or another of the many 
possible frames of reference a political 
issue, characterized by dispute and revision 
of earlier decisions (Connolly, 1974; 
Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963). Where there 
is divergence in op inions concerning which 
values to pursue, the criteria used to 
determine what to do are procedural. Two 
vague standards have general support: 
policymaking should be rational and demo-
cratic. The meaning and implications of 
these standards have received wide attention 
in political science. 
The ordering of values for social 
decision making is very difficult to achieve 
because incomparable values are distributed 
in a variety of ways over diverse indivi-
duals. The impossibility of making inter-
personal comparisons of utility, assumed by 
economists, leads to quite pessimistic 
conclusions. Arrow's famous theorem (1963), 
for example, proved that any locus of control 
composed of more than two individuals and 
facing more than three alternatives will not 
be able to construct a rule for aggregating 
i nd iv idual preferences into we II-ordered 
values and that is general and nondicta-
toria!. 
One aspect of the problem, outs ide the 
scope of Arrow I s discussion, is the aggrega-
tive tendencies of certain values as opposed 
to the disaggregative tendencies of their 
pursuit. Some interests are more effectively 
pursued by smaller and other interests 
require larger units.. The reason for this 
difference is related to the concept of 
economies and diseconomies of scale. Given a 
technology, one may expect a U-shaped Curve 
relating average cost to total production, 
where the downward-s lop ing port ion reflects 
increasing economies of scale and the up-
ward-slop ing port ion indicates increas ing 
diseconomies of scale (Leftwich, 1973). The 
ITh .... costs of environmental quality 
~an be measured by conventional means but 
the benef its aJ'e more difficult to measure. 
Some efforts hdve been made to bring some 
aspects of environlli."~al quality into the 
doma in of economics by the l 011cep t of ameni ty 
rights (Mishan, 1969, p. 36-42). 
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low point Qn the curve Determines the optimal SIze at unlt for pursuIng that purpose gIven 
the existing technology. 
In planning, particular values are 
generally pursued by characteristic means 
(Le., technology). Thus the values, given 
the available stock of knowledge and re-
sources, are associated with optimal scopes 
of decision and control; and given a scope of 
decision and control, there is an associated 
optima level of pursuit for part lcular 
values. For example, water is generally 
less costly to pump from a single well in 
municipalities and from wells serving in-
dividual owners in rural areas. These 
differences affect pursuit of health values. 
Temporal Issues in Multiple 
Perspective Planning 
Since the identification of events 
depends on planning perspective, different 
planning groups attacking the "same" planning 
problem from different perspectives will use 
different events to describe the same time 
period. In order to achieve commensurability 
for comprehensive analysis, one may need, for 
example, to reconcile the diverse temporal 
perspectives of irrigators (who think in 
terms of planting, harvest, and possibly 
future· subdivision), administrators (who 
think in terms of budget and work schedules), 
and legislators (who think in terms of 
elect ions and legislat ive dockets). When a 
project reaches its construction phase, it 
requires definition of the temporal relations 
among events. Wi th the adopt ion of a s tan-
dard temporal reference, it becomes easier to 
conceive of kinds of actions rather than of 
particular actions. That is, we can think of 
the temporal requirement of an action inde-
pendent of any particular performance of 
it. 
The interaction among agents with 
different time horizons (e.g. the politician 
seek ing payoff before the next elect ion v. 
the environmentalist concerned with long run 
ecological stability) in the planning system 
thus presents two kinds of problems (U.N. 
Economic Commission for Europe, 1970, p. 
15-17). First, differences in values being 
pur sued must be reconci led. Second, there 
must be sufficient communication to avoid 
inadvertent disruptive actions. The latter 
is made more difficult by the fact that 
future actions are based on uncertain as-
sumptions that can be ver if ied only wi th the 
passage of time. In an interdependent 
system, a source of uncertainty for one agent 
is the actions of other agents. 
Over time, values change and tech-
nological advances are made, old alternatives 
need to be reevaluated as do those that have 
2The use of "optimal" here refers 
only to least average cost of production. 
newly become possible (Baier and Rescher, 
1969). The history of federal involvement 
in water projects can be seen as a process of 
broadening the values to be enhanced by water 
resources management (James and Rogers, 
1976). This trend corresponds with the 
not ion that values tend to be pursued h ier-
archically, so that as one value is attained 
the next value becomes salient (Maslow, 1972; 
Rokeach, 1973).3 
Va lue changes can occur rap'idly. A 
dam failure rapialy Increases the Importance 
of safety in the eyes of people in the 
immediate vacinity. The increase in concern 
for environmental quality has been somewhat 
more gradual. The decline in relative 
importance of irrigated agriculture to the 
western economy has been much more gradual. 
Value changes with time often bring 
concomitant changes in the structure of loci 
of control. The emergence of well-organized 
articulation of Indian interests in hereto-
fore unused water rights, for example, adds a 
new twist to water allocation decisions 
(National Water Commission, 1973, Ch.14). 
The heightened prominance of environmental 
i nteres ts is expressed in the growth in 
membership and power of environmental inter-
est groups, and in the creation of special 
government agencies at the state and national 
leve Is (Council of State Governments, 1975). 
In general, the inclusion of new 
groups in the decision process increases 
the time required to make decisions, parti-
cularly when these groups have special 
institutionalized methods for the promotion 
and protection of their interests. Bardach 
and Pugliaresi (1977, p. 23) for example, 
claim that "there can be little doubt that a 
major effect of the EIS (environmental impact 
statement) requirement has been to give 
environmental groups a legal and political 
instrument to cancel, delay, or modify 
development projects that they oppose." This 
impact of new interest groups in water policy 
decisions has also been noted by Ingram 
(1972). 
It should also be kept in mind that 
values vary with locality. Environmental 
quality is a national interest, but this does 
not mean that the salience of environmental 
interests are uniform either within or among 
localities. Furthermore, the values and 
their salience for all groups change with 
time. 
Problems of incommensurability would be 
more serious if events were the only temporal 
measure. Planners minimize this problem by 
using time un i ts that are independent of 
events and with which all groups are fami-
1 iar. 
3This is not to imply that government 
agencies follow the same pattern of develop-
ment that Maslow described for individuals. 
/ 
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If the identification of events is part-
ly a funct ion of pract ical purposes, those 
pursuing different purposes will generate 
different temporal frames, creating problems 
of commensurabili ty for comprehens ive anal-
ysis. Project approvals, for example, must 
fit into the institutional temporal perspec-
tives of legislative sessions, budget cycles, 
election years, and court dockets. Construc-
tion requires a complicated sequencing of the 
various construction activities, subject to 
both man-made (e.g. strikes) and natural 
(e.g. severe weather) interruptions. 
Jurisdictional Issues in Multiple 
Perspective Planning 
Jurisdictional assignments are made for 
management purposes and bounded by territory 
or function. The jurisdictional authority 
thus assigned is continually faced with 
problems caused by interact ions with act ivi-
ties and decisions going on outside that 
boundary and by limitations in its capability 
to manage within the defined jurisdictional 
boundary. Furthermore, some duplication and 
overlap, or redundancy (Landau, 1969), is 
required to facilitate interaction. Any 
locus, then, will be faced with coordination 
to avoid accidental conflicts of action. 
In some cases, agents independently pursuing 
different objectives may accidently create 
for themselves unnecessary problems which 
could be avoided by the adoption of some 
common rule. The convention of driving on 
the right side of the street is an example. 
In cases where multiple agents are 
independently pursuing their goals, the co-
ordinative rules generally direct that 
agents refrain from certain actions. In 
other cases, an agent incapable of inde-
pendently achieving some goal must cooperate 
with others. Cooperation to achieve specific 
goals requires closer coordination than is 
necessary to prevent interference among 
independent activities. The guiding rules 
are likely to restrict activities not related 
to the common goal. Since different agents 
have different incentives to cooperate (and 
different priorities on the other activities 
they will have to restrict), it is often 
difficult to attain effective cooperation 
through voluntary means (Olson, 1965). 
The difficulty in securing cooperation 
is compounded by virtue of numbers alone. 
Even in conditions that seem most con-
ducive--a cooperative attitude and basic 
agreement on goals--success is difficult to 
attain (Devons, 1971; Pressman and Wildavsky, 
1973). Multiple loci of decision and control 
imply differences in values and, therefore, 
incentives to cooperate. 
Scope of Control Issues in Multiple 
Perspective Planning 
If scope of control for a value were 
determined by maximizing efficiency in 
pursuit of that value (in a homogeneous 
envi ronment), the plann ing s ys tern would be 
structured as a collection of special-purpose 
agencies whose jurisdiction (Le., scope of 
control) changed only with changes in tech-
nology. Some values (those for which optimal 
production units are of small size) would be 
pursued by many agencies of fairly small 
scope, some values would require only a few 
agencies, and some values might be best 
pursued by a single agency. On the other 
hand, if a given structure of scopes of 
control were to determine what values were 
pursued, probably no single value would be 
efficiently produced. 
Actual situations are controlled partly 
by values and partly by scope of control. 
Values tend to be pursued at one or another 
existing level of government. In cases where 
all existing levels are seen to be inap-
propriate, incentive is created to form a new 
level, of a scope more adequate to deal with 
the problem (Ostrom, 1973; Bish, 1971). The 
frequency of such cases is evidenced by the 
pre li ferat ion of interstate commi ss ions, 
interagency commi ttees, counci Is of govern-
ment, and special purpos~ diitricts. Never-
thEless, these new levels are not created 
frem "scratch," but are composed of units 
already presept, and thus may not really have 
ideal scope. The Colorado River Compact, for 
exa:nple, is composed of seven states covering 
an area much larger than the basin. One can 
imagine a much different pattern of use for 
basin water if drainage divides had been used 
to determine state boundaries. Denver and 
Los Angeles, for example, would probably not 
receive the major part of their water supply 
from the Colorado River, as they do now. 
Relational Problems in Coordination 
One approach to the difficulty of 
secur ing cooperat ion to ach ieve mutually 
advant eous objectives among multiple 
jurisdi ions is to ask what would be done by 
an omniscient, benevolent dictator. Real 
world water management policy falls short of 
what such a dictator could accomplish because 
1) real world policy makers are not omni-
scient in that they often operate from 
incorrect or insufficient information and 2) 
real world policy makers are not able to 
dictate but rather are constrained by such 
relational problems as having to work with 
only a portion of the relevant system, the 
1 imi ted perspect ive of key individuals, and 
limited coordination among the loci of 
decision making. Relational efficiency can 
b, df'fined 8S the net increase in the value 
the f. l:ece ;"es from water reSOUl:ces that 
is actuo Ly being achieved by planning 
divided by the net increase that would be 
ach ieved by thf' d ictatC'r. Total relat ional 
effici can Le divided into two components 
associ with the L.0 fActors listed above: 
1) information efficielcY1nd 2) coordina-
t ion efficiency. The second factor is of 
primary interest here. 
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Without planning, water resource policy 
is established by interactions among in-
dividuals and groups acting .from limited 
i nformat ion in the market place and the 
political arena. Economists have long 
recognized that market transactions have 
external effects that cause some third 
parties to profit and others to be harmed by 
exchanges between buyers and sellers. The 
same sorts of externalitie result from 
political transactions. These icial and 
adverse external ef fects can be ident if ied, 
quantified, and described. Hopefully, 
planners should be able to use this informa-
tion to identify priorities for their efforts 
to improve relational efficiency. 
The externalities occur as decision 
making entities at all levels act in the 
market place or in political bargaining. in 
ways that affect others who do not part ici-
pate in the action. The effect may be 
technological in that it generates phys ical 
changes that helps or harms others or it may 
be pecuniary in that it changes prices and 
thus causes buyers to lose money to the 
profit of sellers who gain money. 
The presence and impol: tance of these 
externali ties has been treated at length by 
economists in the literature and has been 
used repeatedly as a principal argument for 
government water planning. The fact is, 
however, that externalities have not been 
systematically evaluated when government does 
the planning (some kinds have instead been 
systematically ignored) and u.sed to produce 
better plans. Since most externalities 
appear desirable from some perspectives and 
undesirable from others, many of the most 
impottant relational problems affecting 
coordination efficiency are in fact rooted in 
a failure of many water resources planners to 
give adequate attention to the problem. 
The need in multiple level analys is is thus 
to determine what planners can do to 1) be 
more systematic in the measurement of ex-
ternal costs and benefits and in the identi-
f ication of who loses and who ins and 2) 
use this information in the planning 
process to improve relational efficiency. 
The activities most likely to require 
government action are those dealing with 
public goods and externali ties. In the case 
of water resources planning, "the provision 
of most water services involves special 
problems of a systemic character which are 
not amenable to simple solution by provision 
in a competitive market economy" (Ostrom, 
1968, p. 125). 
Optimal levels of provision of public 
ji!,oods (or avoidance of public bads) are 
determined by the net benefits. The logical 
political boundary for planning provision of 
a given public good would be the service 
area of the most promising facility to 
produce the good. The most rational unit for 
most water resources plannin/l: appears to be 
the watershed, but th is is not necessar fly 
the best unit for the provision of other 
government services. The fact that relevant 
political boundaries differ for different 
public goods has suggested to some that 
multiple jurisdiction in a political system 
could be more efficient in the provision of 
public services (Ostrom, 1973; Bish, 1971). 
One justification for federalism can be made 
9h these grounds, but interactive and co-
ordinating working relations among these 
~u1tiple jurisdictions is difficult to 
ach ieve. 
It has been observed that the increasing 
~omplexity and interrelatedness of modern 
society has made it difficult for local 
governments to fulf ill their responsibili-
ties. Many social problems do not seem 
amenable to local treatment but require the 
centralization of authority at a higher 
level. On the other hand, local governments 
are thought to be more responsive to the 
needs of the people than ona1 governments 
and can more easily promote citizen parti-
cipation in the political process. The need 
to accommodate local variations thus provides 
arguments for decentralization. 
The pragmatic problem with respect 
to planning units is how to do the best job 
with the political units we have. The 
study of interorganizationa1 relations has as 
a primary task the identification of the 
conditions that inhibit, and are conducive 
to, cooperation among various organizations. 
Finally, wherever product ion can be 
increased at lower unit costs, economies can 
be realized. Obviously, this consideration 
cannot be separated from the objectives that 
are to be met by the out uts, and thus 
unclear objectives make the ion of 
economies of scale more difficult. In the 
case of multiple objectives, an increase in 
scale may be economical for some and not for 
others. Inefficiencies also arise when 
benefits or burdens of the activities under-
taken by one jurisdiction spillover into 
6ther jurisdictions. Such cases mean that 
all the costs or benefits of production are 
not being cons idered by the producing unit. 
The ideal solution is to adjust boundaries 
until all those who benefit or bear a cost 
are within the producing unit; but with 
mul t iple object ives, there may be no ideal 
boundary adjustment. 
" Economi s ts have f or years de ba t ed 
the po s sib 1i t y and p r act i cali t y 0 f de fin i ng 
a social welfare function in order to deter-
mine the social benefits and costs of alter-
native courses of action. They have con 
s idered ways in wh ich winners could compen-
~ate losers (financially) and elaborate 
mathellwlical systems for estimating a reason-
able compensation. 
Some of the issues and proposals for 
resolving them that have been raised are: 
1. Construct a social welfare function 
from information on individual values and 
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preferences recogniz both additive com-
ponents and new elements introduced by 
socialization within the decision process. 
Such an effort would uire development of 
practical composition ru The state of 
the art is such that "a composition rule 
may be int~oduced when a some level (of 
analysis), or for some range of problems, the 
assumption of independence is inadequa.te." 
Some axioms may have to be added, some 
deleted, and collective criteria may have to 
replace individual criteria at some aggregate 
level of analysis (Staaf, 1973, p. 21). 
2. Develop a theory of value on the 
bas is of a system of eth ics that places 
other than monetary values on human lives 
and natural resources (Staaf, 1973, p. 
12-13) 
3. Form interest groups to represent 
the quiet majority, the disadvantaged and 
inarticulate unorganized groups, to overcome 
the unequal distribution of influence and 
power. Overt behavior of organized groups 
and theiraec1ared preferences must not be 
used as the only relevant indicators of what 
is desirable (Staaf, 1973, p. 14). 
4. Develop a theoretical framework for 
defining social rationality. Social benefits 
need to be defined with reference to human 
needs and well-being, objectively determined 
and politically accepted, instead of be ing 
taken as given (Staaf, 1973, p. 16). 
5. Generate a social welfare funct ion 
that explicitly expresses the values of the 
community (Bergson, 1964). Empirical studies 
of values are needed so that the intangibles 
of life can be incorporated into welfare 
theory (Mishan, 1970). 
6. Deve lop an operat ional framework 
for imp1ementat ion. For e , Ma rr is 
(1974) has recommended "a commi ttee of wise 
men to impose a social welfare function 
(Le., draw up an extensive orderin!!. of 
society's objectives, preferences and prior-
it ies) and then to promulgate this in a 
system of prices" once the committee agrees 
on units of measurement of public gains and 
losses. The public gains would be produced 
by "social benefit corporations" with em-
phasis on responsibility to soc at large 
(Marris, 1974, p. 397-398). The problems of 
interpersonal comparisons would be overcome 
by binding decisions wade by committees. 
Such a social benefit corporation might be 
patterned after the Yug:oslavian system 
wherein the workers and public control the 
decision making hierarch (Marris, J97 l" p. 
397-398). However, Bacharadi (In U.N. 
Economic Commission for Europe, J 970, 5 
favors indicative planning: over an 
welfare function. 
One can see form the nature of 
issues raised that the approach one 
varies with highest level decisions 





pr iate approach for reconci ling water plan-
ning issues varies with choices between 
capitalistic and socialistic elements in 
government and with social choices between 
individual freedom and authoritarianism. 
Apart from these broader issues on the 
philosophy of ordering individual and social 
choice, resolution of choice conflicts has 
been handicapped by the failure of welfare 
economics and related disciplines to develop 
a theory that can provide an ideal agai:ost 
wh ich suggested methods of interpersonal 
comparison can be judged (Baumol, 1966). 
Compensat ion of losers by gainers does 
not hold up to theoretical criticism because 
it assumes that the marginal utility of money 
is the same for all. Externality reflects 
interdependencies as one's utility is af-
fected by what someone else does. 
Cost-benefit analysis by government 
planne,rs has problems because "government is, 
typically, at least partially ignorant of the 
dimensions of the benefits, and very likely 
also of the costs. In many cases, decision-
makers are not even able to specify the 
nature of the benefits and costs involved in 
a given program" (Crocker, 1971, p. 18). 
Furthermore, "because the gainers and losers 
from any government action in general will 
not be identical, the government must deter-
mine the magnitUde of net gains and losses 
among various gro~ps and individuals, and 
then somehow balance the desirability of the 
distribution effects against the pure econo-
mic efficiency affects revealed through 
straight forward benefit-cost analysis" 
(Crocker, 1971, p. 19). Even where govern-
ment is informed and can estimate magnitudes, 
it may not be feasible or realistic for 
planners to estimate dollar values (prices) 
for benefits and costs. 
More generally "there is no universal 
technology relating individual adaptations to 
collective results, neither a benef icient 
teleology nor, a pernicious one" (Marris, 
1974, p. 55). Conflicts between levels 
(agencies) could also be resolved by recipro-
cal explanation, persuasion, and constructive 
and understanding search for consensus or use 
of incentives (U.N. Economic Commission for 
Europe, 1970, p. 5). 
Illustrated Planning Response to External 
EconomIes and Diseconomles 
Externalities occur when social costs or 
benefits differ from private costs or bene-
fits. A commonly used example is in water 
poilU n- wherp a factory manager responds to 
his COSL_ 01 production (raw material, labor, 
overhead, advertising, etc.) more readily 
than he does to the costs others must bear in 
cl~aning up the water. If this cost is born 
by society, the soci ,,1 cost of production by 
the factory exceeds prlv~te cost. If the 
water is not cleaned up, then social cost 
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exceeds private cost due to the loss of 
recreation, harm to the natural environment, 
etc. The price society pays for the pro-
ducts the factory produces thus equals either 
the purchase pr ice plus the tax dollars for 
pollution control or the purchase price plus 
the loss in utility to recreationists and to 
the environment. In addition to these market 
responses, firms or governments of greater 
size and power possess greater bargaining 
power and can sh if t part of the ir cos ts to 
society as a whole or onto firms or govern-
ments of less power. 
Since the destructive and construct ive 
side-effects of production and consumption 
are not reckoned into the choices made 
by decision makers interacting in the market 
place, they must be measured (Staaf, 1973, p. 
12-13) for evaluation in planning. Th,is 
requires criteria of measurement and needs to 
be done in recognition that economic ra-
tionality does not imply social rationality 
and that the individual maximizat ion of 
profit and satisfaction does not imply the 
maximization of social benefit. A large 
gross nat ional product does not guarantee a 
healthy, satisfied nation (Staaf, 1973, p. 
13; Samuelson, 1973, p. 195). 
Because, in large part, the difficulties 
multiple level planning systems have in 
dealing explicitly with such issues, the 
strategy of the government to handle the 
externalities problem of water quality 
control over the past two decades has relied 
on detailed central regulation and construc-
t ion subs id ies for such waste treatment 
plants, proved excessively costly, and not 
worked well (Kneese, 1975, p. 1, 7-8). In 
practice, "Regulatory agencies often become 
the captives of the industries they are 
charged, with overseeing" (Kneese, 1975, p. 
7). Kneese concludes that new incentives and 
institutions are needed to spur individual 
decision makers, in their own self-interest, 
toward socially des irable act ions. He also 
finds that subsidies for the construction of 
capital facilities are inefficient in dealing 
with social problems; as well as costly and 
political (Kneese, 1975, p. 8). Greater 
efficiency could be achieved by region-wide 
agencies that place stiff taxes that offer 
polluters incentives to clean up the environ-
ment (Kneese, 1975, p. 2). "The market works 
efficiently when costs can be imputed to and 
levied on those who create them" (Walker, 
1969, p. 73). 
Illustrated Planning Response to Internal 
Diseconomies and Economies 
Internal economies are represented by 
increasing returns to scale where the in-
crease in output more than exceeds the 
increase in input. For example, if the size 
of a warehouse room is enlar~ed from 5' x 5' 
to 10' x 10', the volume increases ~.~gQ.i 
times. Mos t power p 1<10 ts, wa te r t rei! t mE'nt 
measures, and reservoirs for water suppl.y 
follow t his p r inc i p leu n til the [ <l c i 1 i t y 
increases to a size where diminishing mar-
ginal returns to scale began to predominate. 
Specialization of labor and overcoming 
indivisibilities can also result in in-
creasing returns to scale. 
The important relational problems 
with respect to returns to scale is that the 
technology of the production process governs 
the return to scale of the plant. In con-
trast, organizational laws govern the size of 
t:he firm (the management unit). Decreasing 
returns to scale can result when management 
~is no 1 r efficient in responding to 
hierarch or bureaucratic information and 
suffers communication breakdowns. As the 
firm grows too large, too many lines of 
communication develop, breakdowns occur, and 
the firm can no longer integrate its own 
activities in its own interest. Since water 
resources planning involves many complexities 
not found in industrial management and the 
same laws limiting organizational effective-
ness apply, water planners must select some 
limi ted number of control factors. One of 
the major relat ional problems is that plan-
ners operat from different perspectives 
choose different ones. Differences result 
which cannot be resolved without gett into 
a situation too complicated for a compre 
pensive planning organization to resolve. 
Composition of Social Criteria 
Composition laws govern extension of 
relationships derived from micro units to 
macro level applications. Laws that apply to 
the individual firm are extended to apply to 
the industry and the economy as a whole. 
Total flood damages are estimated as the sum 
of the damages suffered by affected in-
dividuals. Composition laws, however, may 
cease to apply at certain levels of aggrega-
tion. Flood losses become more than additive 
when the cost of repair increases or getting 
qualified help becomes impossible because 
suppliers of services cannot satisfy 
the demand (Yancey et a1., 1976). Inputs 
,that possess qualitative differences which 
give rise to increasing or decreasing returns 
to scale cannot be made homogeneous by 
placing a homogeneous monetary value measure-
ment on them. Only if the variables are 
card inally homogeneous can one get cons tant 
feturns to scale. 
The major problem in applying available 
composition laws to derive social criteria 
is that the theorems and axioms have been 
based on an assumed independence of the 
individual units. As one of the best known 
examples, the pure competition model used 
to define economic efficiency from market 
expression of individual consumer preferences 
and hence the foundation for benefit-cost 
analysis assumes that the consumer 
ences are independent of one another. 
Furthermore, no laws nor relationships have 
been defined for the case of interdependence 
where individual peferences are not linearly 
additive. 
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The problem that interdependency poses 
for logical derivation of social criteria by 
making the values of individuals not linearly 
additive is analogous to the problem found in 
the last chapter of logical prediction of 
effects where causal relat ionships are not 
linearly additive. In both cases, the way 
for planni methodology to improve is to 
develop 1) tter understanding of the 
dynamic, interactive relationships and 2) 
rules for dealing with partial value ful-
fillment and partial causality in decision 
making. 
The principal measure of value in 
economic markets is price. Price, however, is 
only one among many political, psychological, 
and other variables that affect resource 
flows. Chamberlain (1965, p. 362) even 
claims that bargaining relationships are more 
important and furthermore that "There is no 
ground for predicting the behavior of any 
economic unit, any more than physics can 
predict the behavior of any atom. It is only 
probability based on large numbers, that 
permi ts us to ize as to act ions and 
reactions under given conditions" (Chamber-
lain 1965, p. 356). Even then, the general-
i zed micro relat ionships must be unders tood 
within the context of given macro relation-
ships (Chamberlain, 1965, p. 364). 
In important areas of resource conserva 
tion, prices signal false information. The 
waste-aSSimilating capacities of air and 
water, as common property resources, do not 
command a price in the marketplace. Thus 
their overuse is encouraged. Collect ively 
held common property goods will be too soon 
exhausted unless they are given a value and 
treated, not as free goods, but rather as 
scarce goods to be economized and conserved. 
Incentives imposed by government such as 
effluent charges or tax breaks are one way to 
get total price to reflect the true cost of 
externalities and to get individual decision 
makers to act in socially optimal ways. 
Effluent charges are essentally rents 
charged for the lease of rights to dispose of 
wastes in public owned environmental 
resources. They are a nonmarket solution to 
externalities in that government must exter-
nally, to market processes, determine the 
effluent charges and coordinate them into an 
overall system effective in combat ing 
interrelated environmental problems (Crocker, 
1971, p. 87-88). Several problems compli-
cate government efforts to deal with ex-
ternalities. To in with the technical 
issues, the external e fects of air pollution 
are very difficult to measure. Water pollu-
tion measurement is easier but still leaves 
the question of assigning responsibility "all 
the men who have put straw on the camel, or 
just the last man before its back is broken?" 
(Goldman, 1972, p. 16). 
Assignment of administrative respon-
sibility does not automatically solve these 
technical problems. Government intervention 
is no panacea for the failures of the private 
market system. Central re~ulation cannot 
handle the complexity of externalities, and 
the basic failures of the price system must 
be corrected not buried under concrete and 
steel (construction subsidies) (Kneese, 1975, 
p. 4-9). Part of the problem is that it is 
very difficult to define public interest 
(Crocker, 1911, p. 113) and determine whether 
externalities (Friedmann calls them "neigh-
borhood effects") warrant government inter-
vention. 
Ne ighborhood effects impede volun-
tary exchan~,e because it is diffi-
cuI t to ide n t if Y the e f f e c t s on 
third parties and to measure their 
magnitude; but this difficulty is 
present in government act ivi ty as 
we 11.. Conseq uent ly, when govern-
ment engages in activities to 
overcome neighborhood effects, it 
will in part introduce an addition-
al set of neighborhood effects by 
failing to charge or to compensate 
individuals properly. Whether the 
original or the new neighborhood 
effects are the more serious can 
only be judged by the facts of the 
individual case, and even then, 
only very approximately (Friedmann, 
1962, p. 124). 
Basic microeconomic and value theory 
have been based on individual tastes and 
preferences and their aggregation based 
on an assumption of independence. A new 
theory for aggregating social choice is 
needed if social wants and needs are to be 
ach ieved. Perhaps such a theory could use 
Arrow's Value Theory to go from individual 
tastes to social preferences. Perhaps, it 
would more effectively be based on socio-
political and psychological considerations 
and factors (Staaf, 1973, p. 13). Perhaps, 
the answer lies in providing each participant 
the resources and incent ives to use inter-
personal and interagency compar isons of 
utility in resolving conflicts by reciprocal 
explanation, persuasion, and a constructive 
understanding search for consensus (U.N. 
Economic Commission for Europe, 1970, p. 5). 
The main difficulty to be overcome is the 
indeterminancy encountered wherever one 
attempts to aggregate independent parts into 
interdependent wholes or disaggregate inter-
dependent t.i/holes into independent parts. 
I f society is to ach ieve its goals in a 
world of externalities, planners must provide 
decision makers information on the extent of 
these effects and on how to equitably adjust 
for imbalances. However, democratic ideals 
require r"jection of imperative or imposed 
p::','''' '..,,,, (a benign dictator or group of 
dictalu. Between the extremes of firm 
control to prevent externalities from happen-
ing and letting them freely occur lies some 
acceptable midd'0 ~round. 
Temporal IS!)tJes ;n S('C ial Choice 
One cause of perplexing relational 
problems is the persistence of political 
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systems and the results of their actions 
beyond the lifetimes of their citizens. For 
long range planning in a democratic society, 
where citizen participation and consent are 
so important, the difficulty of ;ustifving 
obligations imposed on future ?-eneiation~ is 
greater than opt imizing for present members 
of society. One writer (Bock,1970) suggests 
that long-range governmental planning can 
restrict not only the options for the present 
generation, with possible deleterious effects 
on individuals motivated by a possible 
"brighter future," but can also restrict the 
opportunity for the exercise of choice by 
future generations. Resolution of the issue 
involves determination of the responsibility 
of the present generation for the future 
given that present actions can affect th~ 
self-determination of future generations and 
that present values and technOlogy may be 
quite different than those of the fut~re. 
In a somewhat different form, the issue 
concerns the product ion of temporal exter-
nalities, which su~gest that the adoption 
of a given temporal horizon has implications 
in terms of both efficiency and equity (Page, 
1977). One advantage of the extended life-
span of government organizations is that 
projects which require long periods in which 
to realize benefits can be more readily 
undertaken than would be the case without 
such organizations. If organizations are 
more likely than individuals to undertake 
long-range programs, then at least some of 
these programs will reflect a difference in 
temporal preference between organizations and 
individuals. . 
The preferences of both vroups and 
individuals change over time .. This fact 
makes ad hoc agreements involving many agents 
very expensive and vulnerable to dissolution 
in the case of unexpected implementat ion 
delay. A case study by Pressman and Wildav-
sky (1973) documents the slow disintegration 
of cooperation in one federal pro~ram, in 
spite of broad agreement and generous funding 
at the outset. They recommend that, in view 
of this agility of voluntary agreements, 
programs kept as simple and direct as 
possible. 
In high conflict sitwations such as 
that existing in allocating Colorado River 
water, the cost of decisions through volun-
tary agreement may be very large. The effort 
required ~o ach ieve agreement is such that 
participants are seldom willing to reonen 
discussion, partly because of the unpleasant 
ness of the process and the amount it de-
tracts from other activities and partly 
because of a fear that they wi 11 fare less 
well next time. No one is willing to reopen 
negotiations each time new facts or chan~ing 
conditions suggest the standing compromise as 
nonoptima1. As the departure rroIl! optimality 
increases over time, however, stro['~'er 
regulat ions and the threat of grei'1ter sanc-
tions are required to keep practice in line 
with policy. Over time one might expect the 
jurisdictions that entered into the voluntary 
agreement to perceive continued enforcement 
against the best interest of their con-
stituents to be more undesirable than re-
opening negotiations. 
The institutionalization of cycles 
contributes also in other ways to the 
temporal dimensions of perspectives at 
all levels of decision making. For example, 
obvious short-term cycles are found in 
the legislative process and the judicial 
process. The ju-d icial process tends to 
emphas ize the sequence in reach ing a deter-
mination. The legislative process is more 
influenced by duration. The basic contrast 
resulting from this difference in emphasis is 
the tendency for the judicial process to 
become drawn out in an effort to reach a 
definitive solution to an issue, as opposed 
to the tendency of the legislative process to 
periodically redecide the issue, with more or 
less continual policy adjustment. 
The combination of changing preferences 
and the duration of institutional processes 
are important considerations in choice of 
political tactics. Legislative proposals put 
to a vote near the end of a sess ion are 
usually thought to have a better change of 
passage than those introduced early, because 
there is less time for examination and 
debate. At the other end, litigation has 
proven to be an ef fect ive envi ronmentalis t 
tactic for opposing development projects 
because, even if the court battle is lost, 
the project can be delayed long enough that 
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popular support diminishes and rising costs 
lower the benefit cost ratio. 
Just as legislative railroading can 
produce inferior legislation, the use of the 
jud idal system to defeat projects can lead 
to results that are not in the public inter-
est. Most legislatures have undertaken 
measures to improve the quality of legisla-
t ion. It may be similarly beneficial to 
cons ider reforms in the jud ic ial process 
whereby judgments of project acceptibility 
may be made more rapidly. 
Recapitulation 
The additional problems discussed in 
this chapter as associated with expanding 
from a single to a multiple perspective in 
aggregate expand on the principal conclusion 
of the last chapter, namely that the set of 
available planning tools are based on an 
assumption of additivity of basic units 
whereas a dynamically interactive real world 
is not that way. It is not realistic to plan 
from concepts of individual values a?gre-
gating linearly into social values, of 
actions efficiently achieving values, of 
decision makers being fully in control of 
situations and able to implement their plans, 
or of jurisdictional authority matching 
management needs. In every such situation, 
what one instead finds is situations of 
interacting perspectives and partial contri-
bution. The major thrust needed for more 
effective planning is development of accept-
able methodology for a real nonlinear world. 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The general inference that can be made 
from the research reported herein is that 
water resources planners generally have a 
poor understanding of the relational and 
levels of analysis problems in policy making. 
lhis lack of insight into the basic nature of 
,these problems is imposing a high cost on 
~ociety, particularly because many conflicts 
that occur might othorwise be circumvented or 
prevented. The literature that deals I-lith 
relational and lev£ Is problems is largely 
unknown to practicirg vlater resources plan-
ners, and the literature has not developed to 
a point where established principles about 
improved methods for dealing with these 
problems can be practically implemented in 
large scale planning. Critical knowledge 
gaps need to be filled. This means that 
further exploratory or basic research must be 
conducted before practical successes can be 
expected. l The specific conclusions pre-
sented in this chapter refer to basic 
problems that should be resolved before 
practical solutions are possible. 
Conclusion 1: Not much research that 
has had practical significance has been 
done, either analytically or institutionally, 
to resolve relat ional and levels of analyl is 
problems in large-scale planning. If the 
question were asked: "What kinds of h,.rd 
knowledge are appropr late and ava Hable to 
understand and evaluate how the socio-
cultural, economic, and political activities 
of farmers in the Ulntah Basin relate to the 
same kinds of activities of businessmen in 
Southern California?" only very little such 
knowledge can be identified. But that is 
probably the kind of knowledpe that is 
necessary in basin-wide planning. Similarly, 
if it is asked what institutions and insti-
tutional procedures are appropriate to relate 
the activities of the two groups, pood 
answers would be difficult to find and 
substantiate. 
Recommendation 1: Basic and applied 
research-rB-r1eeded-to develop specific 
knowledge about analytical/conceptual 
i'!nd institutional procedures appropriate for 
dealing with relational and levels of an-
alysis problems in river basin planning. 
lOne mi~hl even say thut, somewhat 
inadverlently, an entire research area 
of basic as well as applied problems in 
policy making and planning lies virtually 
untouched. 
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Conclusion 2: The orientations and 
perspective--s0fpliJnners, or agenci!?s in-
volved in planning, have a lI'ajor impact on 
the manner in which relational and levels of 
analysis problems are resolved. The i!l'['or-
tance of the role of concepts and perceptions 
in planning behavior is not generall~ re 
cognized (to the extent that it car be 
observed). The range of activities involving 
definition of the problem, foal formulation 
and classification, specification of objec-
tives, and identification of alternative 
courses of action, depend on the conceDtions 
Bnd perceptions of those who do the planning. 
Uncritical acceptanc!? of basic biases and 
assumptions is the rule rather than the 
exception in many planning efforts. 
Pla~ninR procedures 
need ed to Insure that the 
role of basic conceptions and perceptions 
is explicitly recornized wit:' respect to 
their impacts on dealing with relational and 
levels of analysis problems. 
Conclusion 3: The syneqdstic effects 
that emerge as the result of the systemic 
interactions among different subsystems 
of a river basin have major impacts that 
need to be taken into account in bas in-¥!ide 
plannirg. As a planning analysis moves from 
subbasin to basin, it is clear that patterns 
of interaction emerge with results that 
cannot be explained simply by combining. the 
analyses of the subbasins. A new ana sis is 
necessary from the viewpoint of the in as 
a whole. For planning purposes, it is 
critical that the differences between analvz-
in!,! the system as a whole versus combin-in? 
the seDarate analyses of the subsvstetl's are 
made ciear. Thes·e differences rep"resent the 
synergistic effects that emerp.e from inte 
gratinr a larger system. M!?thods are needed 
to determine what these differences are, how 
they emerge, and what their effects are. 
Recommendation 3: Srecific' research 
support should-~provjdec! to investigate 
how sjne istic effects create relational 
and leve s of analysis problems in river 
basin. planning. The enort should [OCLIS on 
the way synerristic effects emer~~, their 
impacU:, and their implications with respect 
to plannin~ procedures. 
Conclus ion 4: ~:Llch of the i nforfll,lt i ('n 
and data that are colleCled for different 
parts of a r jver bas jp iHP not COfllP<1t i b I (~. 
thereby creating obstiJclcs th;lt hilD'L'pr 
efforts to cope with relational and levels of 
analysis problems. Relational and levels of 
analysis problems present special diffi-
culties that require a high degree of co-
ordination and integration of planning 
activities. Such coordination and integra-
t ion is hampered by the fact that different 
planners and agencies rely on data that 
varies according to location or may be 
i ncons istent in other ways. Although some 
efforts have been made to standardize data 
collect ion procedures, much more rema ins to 
be accomplished. For example, different 
levels of government need to put greater 
effort into exchanging information and 
standardizing collected data. 
Recommendation 4: An intergovernmental 
task force should examine how data management 
procedures can be improved so that incon-
s istencies among planning agencies in a 
region or river basin are minimized. 
Conclusion 5: The methods, techniques, 
and models in river basin planning are not 
generally suitable for analysis of multilevel 
problems because they do not represent the 
dynamic interactive elements in a real world 
setting. 
Recommendation 5: Multilevel problems 
in comprehensive river basin planning involve 
not only hydrologic phenomena, but also 
social, economic, and political variables. 
Although multilevel problems are rare in 
hydrologic applications and modeling of 
physical phenomena is becoming increasingly 
sophisticated, such is not the case with 
social, economic, and political variables and 
the related modeling efforts. Therefore, ex-
isting modeling methods, techniques! and 
concepts should be evaluated to determine 
their limi tations in .handling rela t ional and 
level of analysis type problems and how 
interactive elements can be added to do a 
better job. 
Conclusion 6: The planning activities 
and functions that have developed are 
frequently inappropriate or ineffective 
in comprehensive river basin planning. 
The dynamics of the planning system, as 
discussed in this report, are such that no 
ingle agency or governmental level is best 
suited for all planning activities. In a 
completely centralized setting, important 
considerations will inevitably be left out of 
the planning perspective. On the other hand, 
while special districts may provide the scope 
that is best adapted to a function, pro-
liferation of such districts increases 
the difficulty of achieving coordinated 
planning. 
Recommendation 6: Studies should be 
underta~o determine how planning func-
tions should be distributed, and what plan-
ning activities are appropriate for different 
organizations and agencies in regional and 
river basin planning, particularly as these 
concern relational and levels problems. 
Conclusion 7: 
are compounded by 
Planning difficulties 
the poor communication 
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processes that usually character ize inter-
actions among organizations responsible for 
various planning functions and activities. 
mOne useful applicat ion of the idea of a 
planning perspective developed here is that 
it shows numerous possibilities for percep-
tual differences that, if unrecognized, can 
lead to communication distortions. Many of 
the problems created by poor commun icat ion 
could be avoided if planners 1) were more 
careful in considering the potential impacts 
of their activities at different levels and 
on the performance of other funct ions and 2) 
less optimistic of being completely under-
stood. 
Recommendation 7: Communication pro-
cesses should be developed and des igned to 
improve the quality of planning interactions 
among organizations and agencies so they can 
be more effective in integrating and co-
ordinating the activities required in compre-
hensive river basin planninf,. 
Conclusion 8: Rules and ref,ulations 
that are established to deal with one situa-
tion are often inappropriately applied to 
other, different situations, or are incon-
sistent with one another when multilevel 
problems are involved. One of the most 
frequent complaints made by state and local 
officials concerns the difficulty in comply-
ing with the numerous, highly detailed 
federal regulations. The suitability of a 
uniform national regulation in a region 
depends on how well that region matches the 
national norm used to establish the regula-
t ion. To the degree western water quali ty 
problems differ from those in the east, 
national water quality regulations cause 
administrative problems. 
Recommendation 8: In developing rules 
and regulations, special attention should be 
given to levels issues, so that significant 
local variations in conditions will not be 
ignored and cause inconsistencies in the way 
various parties are affected. 
Conclusion 9: Calculation of costs 
and benefits is often done for only one 
planning level, thereby ignorinf, costs and 
benef its that would be recognized at other 
levels, creating inefficiency and inequitable 
dis t ri bu t ion. 
Recommendation 9: Traditional benefit-
cost calculation hRS takpn plocf' only ;It th;1t 
1 eve 1. a t w h i c h t h f' pro j e c tim p ,1 C l s IV l' r e 
es t ima ted. For example, sma 11 projects 
provided a benefit-c6st figure based only on 
local impacts. Large regional projects 
provided a benefit-cost figure based only on 
the aggregate regional impacts and ignor ing 
the subsystem economics. Therefore, tech-
niques and procedures should be developed for 
better benefit-cost estimation by area of 
impact or by perspective dimension. Such 
tools would provide more accurate information 
on the distribution of costs and benefits 
wh ich accrue as a resul t of river bas in 
projects that generate multilevel impacts. 
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APPENDIX A 
PROPDEMM II COMPUTER PROGRAM 
DOCUMENTATION 
Program PROPDEMM II is a revision· of 
PROPDEMM written in FORTRAN IV and is 
compatible with either an IBM system 860 configura-
tion or Burroughs 6700. The documented listing is set 
up to be used on a Burroughs 6700. 
Compilation time is approximately 28 seconds. 
Approximate storage required is 7650 words (48 
bit words). 
Execution time is approximately 7 seconds. 
Since the Burroughs 6700 is a virtual memory 
computer storage requirements are hard to estimate. 
However. array storage is approximately 4862 words. 
totsl program code of 2502 words. 11 program 
segments. and 155 disc segments. 
Printed lines of execution output is 1877 lines for 
the current execution of the programs the numbers of 
lines printed for the program listing and compilation is 
(500). 
The number of cards in the program deck is 500. 
The number of cards in the data deck is 77. 
The program deck is punched in EBCDIC code 
using an IBM 029 keypunch. A utility program 
available at the Utah State University Computer 
Center will convert EBCDIC or 029 keypunch code to 
BCD or 026 keypunch code, thus permitting compila-
tion and execution on a UNIVAC 1180 computer. 
The following deck setup is for a Burroughs. B6700 
computer. All words written in capital letters must be 
punched literally as they appear. To compile the 
PROPDEMM II program card deck, the following 
control cards must be used: 
Beginning in card column 11: 
2 USER necessary accounting information (this 
will vary from computer center to computer 
center. The user will need to contact the 
iA "2" represents an invalid character or a 1 and 2 
overpuncbed. 
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computer center in question for correct 
accounting information). 
2 PASSWORD "password" (this card may also vary 
depending on the computer center) where 
password may be any character combination 
known only to the user. 
2 COMPILE PROPDEMM FORTRAN LIBRARY 
where LIBRARY is an optional item. If the 
user desires to store the compiles PROP-
DEMM program deck permanently on a 
system program library disk, he need only 
punch the word LIBRARY in the card as 
shown. The advantage of such an action 
permits the user to execute the program as 
many times as desired without needing to 
recompile the program deck each time. If 
LIBRARY is not used. SYNTAX may be 
punched in its place. This indicates that the 
program will be compiled only and not 
executed. In either case, the program will be 
compiled only. 
2 DATA 
PROPDEMM program deck is placed here. 
2 END 
This completes the compilation procedure. 
To compile and execute PROPDEMM in one 
operation. arrange control cards as follows: 
2 USER accounting information 
2 PASSWORD "password" 
2 COMPILE PROPDEMM FORTRAN GO where 
GO mayor may not be punched, indicating 




2 DATA CARD/DECK 
PROPDEMM data cards. 
2 END 
The user should be aware that the decision maker 
and objective vectors are treated in the same manner 
as the other five groups in all computations. At the 
present development of PROPDEMM these vectors 
do affect the other groups and are affected by the 
other groups. 
No program-generated error messages will 
appear in PROPDEMM. 
PROPDEMM D DATA PREPARATION 
All data input to PROPDEMM II must be 
prepared in order as follows. Format specifications 
included are written in FORTRAN IV for use on a 
Burroughs 6700! computer. 
L SWITCH CARDS: Format (2011). Four values 
are entered on this card to represent the 
variables SWSEL. SWESG, SWOVVG, and 
SWID. All values are '1' or '0'. A '0' in any 






1 SWSEL switch prints selected vectors 
only when SWESG and/or SWOVVG 
are turned on. 
2 SWESG switch prints environme!' tal,
state vectors modified by groups. 
3 SWOVVG switch prints outcome valu 
vectors modified by groups. 
4 SWID switch prints issue differences. 
INDICATED SALIENCE LEVEL: Format 
(512). A single number is placed on this card as 
follows: 
column 
----r any integer value between 0 and 7. The 
remainder of the card is not used. 
GROUP DOGMATISM VECTOR: Format 
(7F1.0). Input as shown: 
column 
1-7 Seven dogmatism values, one for each 
group. single spaced. The group infor-
mation must be in the same order as 
the groups will be analyzed. The 
seventh group is the selected vector 
group which may be used as a 
hypothetical group. A positive integer 
must occupy each column. 
PUNISHMENT -REWARD POTENTIAL VEC-
TOR: Format (512). Five values are entered as 
shown: 
column 
---riO Any integer value between -3 and+3. If 
a negative value is entered then a (-) 
sign and the integer value occupy the 
two place field. If a positive integer is 
entered, then the integer alone will 
occupy the second place in the two 
5. 
place field. No (+) sign is necessary for 
positive integers. 
COST CONSCIOUSNESS/COST LEVEL 
VECTORS: Format (711, 1512). Values are 
punched on the card as follows: 
column 
~ Seven single digit integer values each 
associated with the cost consciousness 
of a group including both the decision 
maker's value and an objective value 
which may represent a hypothetical 
group. Range of possible values: 1-7. 
9-37 The cost levels of all 15 courses of 
action are punched as single digit 
numbers within a range of -3 to+3. 
When the value is positive, right justify 
the digit in the given field as no (+) sign 
is necessary. 
6. GROUP AFFECT VECTOR: Format (28F2.0/ 
21F2.0). The affect values require two data 
cards and are input thusly: 
~ 
1-14 Group 1 values 
15-28 Group 2 values 
29-42 Group 3 values 
43-56 Group 4 values 
(next card) 
1-14 Group 5 values 
15-28 Group 6 or decision maker 
29-42 Selected vector 
The values are entered in two digit fields using 
values from -3 to+ 3. Where using '0' as a 
positive integer right justify entry. The (.) sign 
will occupy the first digit position in negative 
entires. 
7. GROUP VALUES VECTORS: Format (3(5A4, 
1012, 5A4. 1012/) 5A4, 1012, 5A4, 1012). The 
group value vectors require four data cards and 
are prepared as follows: 
column 
---r:2if Group name 
21-40 Group values (10) 
41-61 Group name 
62-80 Group values (10) 
This format allows the use of seven groups. The 
first three data cards will input two groups per 
card and the fourth card will input the 
remaining group. The group values are entered 
in two digit fields using a -3 to+3 scale. Entries 
must be right justified with the (-) sign 
occupying the first digit position for negative 
entires. 
8. GROUP VALUE NAMES: Format (2(4(5A4)/). 
4(5A4». The value names require three data 
cards as shown below: 
column 
---r.::r- Abbreviation of value #11 name 
5-20 Value #11 name 
21-24 Abbreviation of value #12 name 
25-40 Value #12 name 
41-44 Abbreviation of value #13 name 
54-60 Value #13 name 
61-64Abbreviation of value #14 name 
65-SO Value #14 name 
This pattern is followed on the second data card 
for values 5,6,7, and 8. The third card follows 
the same format for the input of values 9 and 10. 
9. COURSE OF ACTION NAMES: Format (3 
(20Af/). 20A4). Four data cards are prepared 
thusly: 
column 
---r-2O Course of action name 
21-40 Course of action name 
41-60 Course of action name 
61-SOCourse of action name 
Each of the first three cards will input the 
names of four courses of action. The fourth card 
will input the names of three courses of action. 
It is not necessary to fill all of the spaces within 
a field. 
10. GROUP SALIENCE VECTORS: Format (70 I 
1). Salience vectors for all seven groups are 
entered on one data card. 
column 
--r:IO Group 1 salience vector 
U-20Group 2 salience vector 
21-30 Group 3 salience vector 
31-40 Group 4 salience vector 
41-50 Group 5 salience vector 
51-60 Decision maker salience vector 
61-70 Objective vector salience vector 
Salience is ranked on a 1-7 scale and input 
through single digit fields. 
11. GROUP POWER VECTORS: Format (751 1/30 
11). Two data cards are required to input the 
group power vectors. 
column 
-TT5 Group 1 power for courses of action #11 
through #115 
16-30 Group 2 power for courses of action #11 
through #115 
31-45 Group 3 power for courses of action #11 
through #115 
46-60 Group 4 power for courses of action #11 
through #115 
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46-60 Group 4 power for courses of action #11 
through #115 
61-75 Group 5 power for courses of action #11 
through #15 
(next card) 
1-15 Decision maker power for courses of 
action #1 through #15 
16-30 Objective vector power for courses of 
action #1 through #15 
Each group power vector is contained in a 15 
digit field representing the 15 courses of action. 
Groups must be entered in the order listed. A 
1-7 scale is used to rank group power. 
12. SALIENCE OF POSITIVE INFORMATION 
VECTOR: Format (6011). One data card is 
needed to input this vector. 
column 
lTD Group 1 positive information salience 
11-20 Group 2 positive information salience 
21-30 Group 3 positive information salience 
31-40 Group 4 positive information salience 
41-50 Group 5 positive information salience 
51-60 Decision maker positive information 
salience 
Each groups positive information salience is 
entered in a 10 digit field corresponding to the 
10 environmental values. Salience rankings are 
performed on a 1-7 scale and the 7th group-the 
objective vector is omitted from input. At the 
current time this data is not used in the 
PROPDEMM II program but must be input to 
fulfill format requirements. 
13. SALIENCE OF NEGATIVE INFORMATION 
VECTOR: Format (6011). All input require-
ments are the same as presented in SALIENCE 
OF POSITIVE INFORMATION vector above. 
vector above. 
14. POSITIVE INFORMATION VECTOR: Format 
(75 I 1/15 I 1). Two data cards are needed for 
this vector. 
column 
-"1-15 Group 1 access to positive information 
16-30 Group 2 access to positive information 
31-45 Group 3 access to positive information 
46-60 Group 4 access to positive information 
61-75 Group 5 access to positive information 
(next card) 
1-15 Decision maker access to positive 
information 
Each group is ranked for access to positive 
information for each source of action. This 
ranking is performed on a 1-7 scale with 1 
representing perfect information. The decision 
maker vector will always be equal to a series of 
"l's" in a fifteen digit field. At the current time 
this data is not used in the PROPDEMM II 
program but must be input to fulfill format 
requirements. 
15. NEGATIVE INFORMATION VECTOR: For-
mat (75 I 1/15 I 1). All input requirements are 
the same as presented in POSITIVE INFOR-
MATION VECTOR above. 
16. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT VALUE VEC-
TORS: Format (24(2(4A4, 1112, 11)/), 2(4A4, 
1112, 11)). Twenty-five data cards are used to 
input the EIVV. They are prepared as follows: 
follows: 
column 
--r:nr Name of environmental factor (up to 16 
characters) 
17-36 Ten integer impact values-right justi-
fied in a set of ten two-digit fields. A -3 
to+3 scale is used. 
37·38 Probability value 
39 Intensity of impact ranking between 
the five levels of each environmental 
factor. A scale of 1 to 5 is used with "I" 
representing the most intense. 
40-55 Name of environmental factor 
56·75 Impact values 
76·77 Probability 
78 Impact ranking 
Repeat as above on the next 24 cards. Column 
79·80 may be used for any useful data 
identifying information. 
17. OUTCOME VALUE VECTORS: Format (24 
(3312/), 3312). Twenty-five cards are required 
to input these vectors. So there are 5 possible 
outcomes per course of action, they should all be 
grouped in proper sequence. 
column 
---r:2O Ten integer values ranging from ·3 to 
+3 right justified in a set of ten 
two-digit fields. Positive values do not 
require an indicating sign, but negative 
values must be pr~c~ded by a minus (-) 
sign always. 
21-22 Probability value 
23-42 Ten impact values 
43-44 Probability value 
45-64 Ten impact values 
65-66 Probability values 
Repeat as above on next 24 cards. Columns 
67 -80 on each card may he punched with any 
information. 
A summary of required data to be punched 
follows: 
1st card: Program switches 








Cost factor vectors 
6th-7th cards: Group affect vectors 
8th· 11th cards: Group values vectors 
12th· 14th cards: Group values names 
15th-18th cards: Course of Action names 
19th card: Group salience vectors 
20th-21st cards: Group power vectors 
22nd card: Salience of positive information 
vector 
23rd card: Salience of negative information 
vector 
24th·25th cards: Positive information vectors 
26th-27th cards: Negative information vectors 
28th-52nd cards: Environmental impact value vec-
tors 
53rd-77th cards: Outcome value vectors 
PROPDEMM ERRATA LEGEND 
Subscripts: 
= impact values 
j = conditions 
k = groups 
s = environmental states 
I = courses of action 
m = outcomes 
r = reference group 







= environmental value modifica-
tion vector 
= impact values resulting from 
specific environmental condi-
tions. 
= the valu(!s on likes and dislikes 
of a specific group. 
= the degree of significance of a 
value to a group 
= environmental value modifica-
tion vector index 
OMVm,k,I.s 
OVVi,I,m,s 
= outcome value modification vec-
tor 
= the impact values resulting 
from specific course of action 
outcomes 
XOMV m k I s = outcome value modificationvec-
, " tor index 
GPi,k,l,m,s = the group position 












= the partial issue position 
= the nonsystematic issue posi-
tion 
7 
k (CLl.x x CCk) k=\ 
= the cost level of a course of 
action. 
= the cost consciousness of a 
group k as regards a course of 
action. 
= the selected salience number 
for group k. 
= the salience level number rep-
resenting the level of salience 
considered significant by group 
k. 
= the nonsystematic political fea-
sibility index. 
= the power group k possessess 
to block a course of action. 
= the openness to change index. 
= the degree of friendship or 
hostility between group rand k. 
= the dogmatism of group r-its 
political rigidity. 
= (NSIPr - NS1Pk), the issue 
difference between the groups. 
= the systematic issue p~sition. 
= the systematic political feasibil-
ity index. 
= the potential for change index. 




10 IESVV .. s - GRPVAL. kl k I,j, I. L EMV. k j, ,s 
i= 1 GRPSALj,k 
EMVj,k,s 
ESVVi,j,s 
= environmental value modifica-
tion vector. There is a EMV for 
each of the 10 conditions per 
environmental state for each of 
the 7 groups and 3 environmen-
tal states given the 10 values 
per condition. There will be 210 
EMV's; 3 ES x 10 ESVV's x 7 
groups. 
The SVV (selected value vec-
tor) and SSV (selected salience 
vector) are included as objec-
tive vectors as groups 7. Group 
6 is the decision maker. 
j =condition. there are 10 con-
ditions per environmental 
state (ES). 
i =impact value, there are 10 
impact values per condi-
tion. 
k = groups, there are 7 groups. 
s =environmental states, 
there are 3 ES's ESI = 
most probable. ESII 
most desirable. ESIII 
least desirable. 
= The impact values resulting 
from specific (j) environmental 
conditions j = 1...10 for each 
environmental state(s). The 
ESVV's are given on a -3 to 3 
scale. 
GRPVALi,k = the values or likes and dislikes 
of a specific group (k), k = 
1.. .7. regarding each of the 10 
values; e.g., water quality. 
economic growth, etc. The 
GRPV AL's are given on a -3 to 
3 scale. 
GRPSALi,k = the degree of significance of a 
value to a group-a measure of 
intensity of feelings regarding 
each of the 10 values. GRP-
SAIls are given on a 1 to 7 
scale. 
expected desired 
Thus as GRPSAL and ESVV + GRPVAL the EMV 
and the more desirable the 
environmental condition. 
2. XEMVj,k,s = 
IESVV (S,J,K)BRPVAL (I,K) I 
GRPSAL(,l) 
XEMVj,k,s = environmental value modifica-
tion vector index. There is an 
XEMV for each EMV. 
The smaller the index the more desired the 
environmental condition; i.e., the closer the fit 
between expected and desired values. 
10 lovvi rn 1 s - GPRVAL. kl 3. OMV = ~ , " I, 
rn,k,I,s i=1 
OMV m,k,l,s = outcome value modification 
vector. There is a OMV for 
each ofthe 5 outcomes per each 
of the 5 courses of action for 
each of the 7 groups and 3 
environmental states. There 
will be 525 OMV's; 5 OVV's x 5 
CA's x 3 ES's x 7 groups. 
OVVi,l,m,s 
The SVV and SSV are included 
as group 7 and the decision 
maker as group 6. 
the impact values resulting 
from specific (m) course of 
action outcomes m = 1. .. 5 for 
each course of action. The 
OVV's are given on a -3 to+3 
scale. 
Thus as GRPSAL t and expected - desired 
OVV _ GRPVAL 
the OMV • and the more desirable the course of 
action outcome. 
4. XOMV = I(OVV(S,L,M,K) - GRPVAL (K,I) I 
rn,k,l,s GRPSAL(K,I) 
XOMVm,k,I,s=Outcome value modification in-
dex. There is an XOMV for each 
OMV. 
OMVrn,k,l,s 
5. PXOMV rn,k,Ls PROB
OVV 
rn 
PXOMV m k I s=probability outcome value 
, " modification vector index. 
There is a PXOMV for each 
OMV. 
The smaller the index the more desired the 
course of action outcome. 
(3-1 (OVV(S,L,M,I)-(GRPVAL(K,l)1 x GRPSAL(K,I) 
10 
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POVV m,k,l,s = the position ~utcome value 
vector. There IS a POVV for 
each group for each course of 
action for each outcome for 
each environmental state. 5 
OVV's x 5 CA's x 3 ES x 7 
groups = 525 POVV's. POVV + 
if GP t or GRPSAL + . The 
larger the POVV the more 
favorable the outcome. 
5 
~ (pOVV k 1 x OVV I ) 
m=} ill, "S S, ,ill 
7. PIPI,k,s = 5 
PIPI,k,s = the POVV weighted with the 
probability of the outcomes for 
each course of action. PIP , as 
POVV t or PROB ,. The larger 
the PIP the more favorable the 
course of action. There is PIP 
for each course of action for 
each ES for each group. 5 CA's 
x 3 ES's x 7 groups = 105 
PIPS. 
The PIP is the partial issue 
position. 
PIP 7 
8. NSIP = --...!& in which XCLl,s = ~ (CLI s x CCk) I,k,s XCLI,s k=j , 
NSIPI,k,s = the nonsystematic issue posi-
tion. It is nonsystematic since 
political interactions with other 
groups is not considered at this 
point in the calculations. There 
is a NSIP for each group for 
each course of action for each 
ES; 5 CA's x 7 groups x 3 ES = 
105 NSIP's. As CC t and CL t 
NSIP •. 
CCk = the cost consciousness 
of group k and is measured on a 
scale of 1 to 7. A low CC of say 
1 or 2 means the group does not 
consider the CL of a CA 
relevant or significant. 
CLI s = the cost level of a CA 
and'is measured on a scale of 1 
to 7. 
*Note: this is a change-the scale used to be -3 to 
3 but for reasons of difficulties dividing by zero or 
trying to get NSIP's that were not negative numbers, 
the scale had to changed to 1 to 7. 
A low CL means the group 
feels that the cost of a CA is not 
high. 
Thus NSIP , as CC t or CL t 
the higher the CL and degree 
of CC the less support a group 




9. SSNk = 10 Z 
10. 
z 





= the selected salience number 
for group k. This number is the 
aggregate or "average" sa-
lience value for the GRPSAL 
vector. Instead of GRPSAL 
vector of saliences we now 
have one salience number the 
selected salience number. The 
SSN is computed using GRP-
SAL's and the SL. There are 7 
SSN's-one for each group. 
= the indicated salience level. 
The SL is that salience number 
representing the degree of 
salience considered significant. 
Saliences<ISL are not used in 
the "averaging" computation of 
the SSN. There is only one 
ISL. 
= the number of GRPSAL's > ISL 
NSPFl = (SSNk x PWR kl x NSIPI k s) I,k,s , ,s , , 
NSPFII,k,s 
PWRk,l,s 
= the nonsystematic political fea-
sibility index. It is nonsystem-
atic since external political 
interactions are not consid-
ered. It measures the support a 
group will give to a CA without 
external political interaction 
effects. NSPFI' if NSIP t 
PWR t , and SSN t . The 
political feasibility of a CA' as 
NSPFI t. There is an NSPFI 
for each group for each CA for 
each ES. 7 groups x 3 E ss x 5 
CA's = 105 NSPFI's. 
= the power a group possesses to 
block a course of action. It is 
given on a scale of 1 to 7. A 
PWR of 7 means the group can 
block a CA. 
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~_-,-r?:.c' -:- X r f, , ( AFF k) (SSN xPWR IS) II + iDr,kl SSN k x PWRk,l,s 
Dogk 
= the openness to change index. 
It represents the measure of 
influence of each group k on a 
reference group r to determine 
the OC of the reference group 
r. As the Dogr , , PWRr t , SSNrt , ID t, AFFt , SSNr ' 
PWRk', the OCr •. There is an 
OC for each grop for each CA 
for each ES. 7 groups x 5 CA's 
x 3 ES's = 105 OC's. 
r = the reference group. 
= the degree of friendship or 
hostility between r and any 
group k. 
*Note, for math reasons the 
scale has been changed from -3 
to 3 to 1 to 7. 1 = strong 
negative affect or much hostil-
ity, 7 = strong friendship. The 
more friendly the groups the 
more OC the reference group. 
= the issue difference between 
the r group and k group. IDr k 
to prevent division by zero, and 
the r group and k group. IDy 
= l(NSIP r - NSIPk)l; since 1D 
can be zero on negative we 
divide AFF r ~ by(l + IDr k)to 
prevent div(slOn by zero,' and 
we need the absolute value to 
prevent OC from being a 
negative number. The less the 
ID the greater OC. 
= the dogmatism of r. This is 
given on a 1 to 7 scale. 7 = 
very rigid politically or very 
dogmatic. The more dogmatic r 
is the less OCr is. 
= the systematic issue position. 
It is systematic because it 
takes into consideration the 
political interactions of one 
group on another (the OCr,k)' 
There is a SIP for each group 
for each course of action for 
each environmental state. 7 
groups x 5 CA's x 3 ES = 105 
SIP's. 
SPFlk,l,s 
SIP , as OC t and NSIP t , it 
measures the support a group 
will give a course of action 
given that they are interacting 
politically. 
= the systematic political feasi-
bility index. It is systematic 
because external political in-
teractions are considered 
(SIP). It measures the support 
a group will give a CA given 
that they interact. There is a 
SPFI for each group for each 
CA for each ES; 7 groups x 5 
CA's x 3 ES's = 105 SPFI's. 
~ [SSNr x PWRr,l,s J 
14. PClk,l,s k=1 SIPk,l,s + SSNk + DOCk 
PClr,l,s = the potential for change index. 
The PCI represents the extent 
to which a group can be 
influenced to change in the 
98 
15. XCVDk 
direction wanted by the deci-
sion maker. PCI + if DOGkt 
SIPk. SSNk+and the PWRrt, 
SSNr " Remember that group 
6 is our decision maker. There 
is a PCI for each group for each 
CA for each ES. 7 groups x 5 
CNs x 3 ES's = 105 PCl's. 
7 [~ CRPSAL. X (3-ICRPVAL\. k-GRPVAL k ~) . 1 I~r ) I, ,! ~ \~=~----------~------------~-k=1 10 
= t.he group value difference in-
dex. It measures the differ-
ences in value positions of the 
various group. The larger the 
index the more similar the 
values of the reference group r 
and any other group. As 
GRPVAL - GRPVALk. the 
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A complete listing is available in Kimball (1979) 
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ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT VALUE VECTORS (Cont.) 
Environmental Factors ECON RUM WATR REC PVT INUU MUNI COMM AG W ENV 
lOOK BBL/day 2 -2 2 0 0 2 1 -2 -1 -1 P=.33 Rank=4 
50K BBL/day 2 -2 2 0 0 2 0 -2 -1 -1 P".10 Rank=5 
Indian ~ater Claim 
580K Af/Y Indian -2 2 -3 -2 0 -3 -3 2 -3 2 P=.20 Rank=5 
387K Af/Y Indian -2 2 -3 -2 0 -3 -3 2 -2 2 P=.45 Rank=3 
256K Af/Y Indian -2 2 -2 -1 0 -2 -2 1 -2 2 P=.30 Rank=2 
193K Af/Y Indian -3 3 -1 1 0 -2 1 1 -2 1 P=.15 Rank=l 
No Indian Water -3 3 3 2 0 3 3 1 3 -1 P". 1 Rank=4 
Per Capita Income 
$4000 Per Cap -2 2 -2 -2 0 0 -2 -1 -2 0 P=. 5 Rank=5 
$4500 Per Cap -1 1 -1 -1 0 0 -1 1 -1 0 P=.10 Rank=4 
$5000 Per Cap 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 P=.40 Rank=3 
$5500 Per Cap 2 -1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 -1 P".35 Rank=2 
$6000 Per Cap 3 -2 2 3 2 1 2 -1 1 -2 P=.37 Rank=l 
Export Water 
197K Af Export -2 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -2 -3 -3 P=.41 Rank=5 
149K Af Export -1 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -2 -2 -3 P=.30 Rank=4 
102K Af Export 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -1 -2 -2 P=.43 Rank=3 
50K Af Export 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 P=.25 Rank"2 
No Exports 3 -1 2 2 0 1 2 0 3 2 P=.15 Rank=l 
Federal Acreage 
10.6 Mill Fed Ac -1 1 1 2 -3 -2 -2 0 2 3 P=.lO Rank=5 
10.1 Mill Fed Ac 0 0 1 2 -3 -1 -2 0 2 2 P=.lO Rank=4 
9.6 Mill Fed Ac 0 0 0 1 -2 0 -1 0 1 1 p=.38 Rank=3 
9.1 Mill Fed Ac 0 0 0 1 -2 0 0 0 0 0 P=.15 Rank=2 
8.7 Mill Fed Ac 1 -1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 P=.10 Rank=l 
COST FACTORS 
COST LEVELS 
CA 1 CA2 CA3 CA4 CA 5 
Environmental State 1 3 3 3 3 3 
Environmental State 2 3 3 3 3 3 
Environmental State 3 3 3 3 3 3 
GRP 1 GRP 2 GRP 3 GRP 4 GRP 5 GRP 6 GRP 7 
Cost Consciousness 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 
GROUP AFFECT 
Group 1 O. -2. O. 1. 3. 2. 1. 
Group 2 -1. O. 2. O. -2. 2. -1. 
Group 3 -2. 3. O. 2. -1. -1. 1. 
Group 4 O. O. 1. O. O. o. O. 
Group 5 3. -2. -2. 1. O. 2. 1. 
Group 6 3. 3. -2. 1. 1- O. 3. 
Group 7 1. 1. 1. O. 1. 2. O. 
DOGMATISM VALUES 
GRP 1 GRP 2 GRP 3 GRP 4 GRP 5 GRP 6 SEL V 
5. 3. 4. 2. 3. 4. 3. 
PUNISHMENT-REWARD VALUE VECTORS 
GRP 1 GRP 2 GRP 3 GRP 4 GRP 5 
-1 2 -2 2 3 
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GROUP VALUE VECTORS 
Interest Grou~ Im~act Values 
ECON RURA NATU REC PVT INDU 
Agriculture 1 3 1 2 3 -3 
Energy Development 3 1 3 1 0 3 
Indians 2 3 2 3 2 0 
Developed Rec. 0 3 -1 3 -1 -2 
Control Development 2 3 0 2 -2 1 
Decision Maker 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Objective Vector 2 3 1 2 0 0 
GROUP SALIENCE 
Interest GrouE ImEac t Val ues 
ECON RURA NATU REC PVT INDU 
Agriculture 5 6 4 3 6 
Energy Development 6 5 7 3 3 
Indians 5 4 5 6 6 
Developed Rec. 3 3 4 6 5 
Control Development 7 6 6 4 5 
Decision Maker 5 5 6 3 5 
Objective Vector 5 5 5 4 5 
NAMES OF THE 10 IMPACT VALUES: 
Economic Growth 
Rural Atmosphere 
Natural Resource Dev. 
Rec Opportunity 














MUNI COMM AG W ENV 
0 2 3 1 
1 -2 -2 -1 
1 2 3 2 
0 2 2 -2 
3 3 1 2 
1 0 2 -1 
1 2 2 1 
MUNI COMM AG W ENV 
4 6 7 5 
5 6 6 6 
6 5 6 5 
4 5 4 6 
6 7 6 5 
5 6 6 5 
5 6 6 5 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT VALUE VECTORS 
Environmental Factors ECON RURA WATR REC PVT INDU MUNI COMM AG W ENV 
Population 
43795 People 3 -1 3 1 0 2 3 -3 -3 -2 P=.17 Rank=4 
41804 People 3 -2 3 1 0 2 3 -3 -2 -2 P=.32 Rank=2 
39814 People 3 -2 3 0 0 1- 2 -2 -2 -1 P=.47 Rank=l 
37824 People 3 -2 3 0 0 1 1 -2 -2 -1 P=.29 Rank=3 
35833 People 2 -3 2 0 0 1 1 -2 -2 0 P=.15 Rank=5 
Precipi.tation 
19.2 Inches 2 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 1 0 P=.30 Rank=l 
18.3 Inches 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 P=.45 Rank=2 
17.4 Inches 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 P=.30 Rank=3 
16.5 Inches 
-1 0 -1 -1 0 -1 -1 -2 -2 -1 P=.25 Rank=4 
15.6 Inches 
-2 0 -1 -2 0 -2 -1 -3 -3 -2 P=.15 Rank=5 
M-I Water Supply 
74456 M-I Ac Ft 3 -2 3 -2 -1 3 3 -2 -3 -2 P=.15 Rank=5 
t-' 71072 M-I Ac Ft 2 -2 3 -2 -1 3 3 -2 -3 -2 P=.35 Rank=4 
0 67688 M-I Ac Ft 2 -1 2 -2 0 2 2 -1 -3 -1 P=.38 Rank=3 0\ 
64304 M-I Ac Ft 1 -1 2 -1 0 2 2 -1 -2 0 P=.30 Rank=2 
60920 M- I Ac Ft 0 -1 1 -1 0 2 2 0 -2 0 P-.20 Rank=l 
Irrigated Acreage 
287500 Irr Ac 2 3 -3 2 3 1 0 3 3 1 P=.22 Rank=3 
275000 Irr Ac 1 3 -2 2 3 1 0 2 3 1 P=.30 Rank=l 
262500 Irr Ac 0 2 -2 1 2 0 0 1 2 0 P=.46 Rank=2 
250000 Irr Ac 0 2 -1 1 2 0 0 0 2 -1 P=.17 Rank=4 
237500 Irr Ac 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 -1 1 -1 P=. 5 Rank=5 
Value of Mineral Products 
$111 Mill Minr1s 3 -3 3 0 0 3 1 -3 -3 -2 P=.15 Rank=4 
$106 Mill Minr1s 3 -3 3 0 0 3 1 -3 -2 -2 P=.35 Rank=3 $101 Mill Minr1s 2 -2 3 0 0 2 0 -2 -2 -2 P=.38 Rank=l $ 96 Mill Minr1s 2 -2 3 0 0 2 0 -2 -1 -2 P=.20 Rank=2 $ 91 Mill Minr1s 1 -1 3 0 0 1 0 -1 -1 -1 P=.40 Rank=5 
Oil Shale Production 
350K BBL/day 3 -3 3 -2 0 3 2 -3 -3 -2 P=.26 Rank=l 
300K BBL/day 3 -3 3 -2 0 3 2 -3 -2 -2 P=.40 Rank=2 
200K BBL/day 2 -2 3 -1 0 2 1 -3 -2 -2 P=.35 Rank=3 
OPENNESS TO CHANGE INDICES 
~ FORMULA IS: DC (S)(AFF(K.O)!(l+ID)) * «SSN(O) * GRPPWR (O))!(SSN(K) * GRPPWR (K))!Dog (K) 
Level 1 
Course of Action Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Selected Vector 
UB 1 0.7 -0.2 1.0 0.1 0.8 0.9 0.8 
UB 2 1.2 -0.2 -1.1 0.2 1.5 1.0 0.9 
UB 3 1.0 0.2 1.3 0.2 0.4 1.1 1.0 
UB 4 1.0 -1.0 0.5 0.1 0.7 1.4 0.9 
UB 5 1.2 -1.3 0.4 0.0 0.4 1.4 0.9 
Level 2 
Course of Action Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Selected Vector 
UT 1 1.4 0.7 0.3 1.8 -0.3 0.6 1.4 
ur 2 1.5 0.6 0.3 1.7 -0.3 0.6 1.4 
UT 3 0.8 0.1 0.3 1.7 -0.4 1.3 1.2 
ur 4 0.4 -0.0 -0.2 1.2 0.5 2.3 1.7 
UT 5 0.9 0.6 0.0 1.4 0.3 0.4 0.7 
Level 3 
Course of Action Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Selected Vector 
CRB 1 1.6 1.2 0.1 1.0 0.1 0.3 2.2 
CRB 2 0.6 -0.0 0.5 0.4 0.3 1.0 1.2 
CRB 3 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.8 1.3 1.0 
CRB 4 0.7 0.1 -0.0 0.5 0.7 1.3 1.0 
CRB 5 0.7 1.6 0.0 1.6 -0.8 0.3 2.0 
POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE INDEX 
FORMULA IS: PCI (S) (SSN(O) * GRPPWR (O))!(SIP(K) + Dog (K)) 
Level 1 
Course of Action Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Selected Vector 
UB 1 8.8 9.5 9.3 13.2 8.6 7.1 8.2 
UB 2 8.4 12.8 11.9 13.2 8.6 8.0 8.7 
UB 3 11.4 9.9 11.4 16.7 9.9 8.4 10.3 
UB 4 9.4 13.6 10.8 13.8 9.0 8.8 9.6 
UB 5 9.7 13.7 10.6 15.3 9.2 8.9 9.5 
Level 2 
Course of Action Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Selec ted Vector 
UT 1 5.2 5.6 4.4 6.9 5.9 4.9 5.2 
UT 2 5.2 5.7 4.4 7.0 5.9 4.9 5.2 
UT 3 7.5 4.8 6.7 9.3 8.0 5.9 7.0 
UT 4 5.6 7.7 6.7 8.5 7.0 6.0 6.5 
vr 5 3.6 4.9 3.2 4.8 3.9 4.2 3.5 
Level 3 
Course of Action Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Selected Vector 
CRB 1 4.0 4.4 3.6 6.0 4.4 3.7 3.7 
CRB 2 2.6 2.9 2.6 3.8 2.8 2.3 2.3 
CRB 3 2.4 3.2 2.6 3.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 
CRB 4 2.5 3.3 2.7 3.5 2.4 2.5 2.5 
CRB 5 4.6 4.0 3.3 5.9 5.4 3.7 3.7 
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NON-SYSTEMIC POLITICAL FEASIBILITY INDEX 
~ THE LARGER THE INDEX VALUES, THE MORE FAVORABLE THE COURSE OF ACTION 
FORMULAE ARE: SSN = (S) SSAL/(TSAL-SSAL) + TSAL/10, (SEE TEXT) 
NSPFI = SSN * GRPPWR * NSIP 
Level 1 
CA III CA 112 CA 1/3 CA 114 CA 115 
GROUP SSN NSIP PWR NSIP PWR NSIP PWR NSIP PWR NSIP PWR (NSPFI) (NSPFI) (NSPFI) (NSPFI) (NSPFI) 
Agriculture 5.4 1.40 3 2.91 4 0.73 2 2.71 4 1.96 3 
(22.7) (63.0) ( 7.9) (58.6) (31.6) 
Energy Development 5.7 2.99 3 1.32 3 3.32 5 2.31 3 2.16 3 
(51.1) (22.6) (94.5) (39.5) (36.9) 
Indians 5.6 2.35 1 3.01 1 1.73 1 3.61 1 3.45 1 
(13.2) (16.9) ( 9.7) (20.3) (19.4 ) 
Developed Rec. 4.6 1.82 3 3.00 3 1.45 3 2.85 5 1.61 5 
(24.9) (41.0) (19.9) (65.0) (36.8) 
Control Development 6.3 2.36 3 2.96 4 2.33 5 3.06 6 2.37 6 
(44.2) (74.0) (72.9) (114.7) (89.0) 
Decision Maker 5.4 3.61 5 3.44 6 3.37 6 4.26 4 3.47 4 
(97.5) ( 111.6) (109.5) (92 .1) (75.0) 
Objective Vector 5.5 2.69 5 3.89 5 2.40 5 3.82 5 3.25 5 
(74.0) (106.8) (66.0) (105.1) (89.3) 
Total NSPFI (156.1) (217.5) (204.9) (298.2) (214.0) 
Level 2 
CA III CA 112 CA 113 CA 114 CA 115 
GROUP SSN NSIP PWR NSIP PWR NSIP PWR NSIP PWR NSIP PWR (NSPFI) (NSPFI) (NSPFI) (NSPFI) (NSPFI) 
Agriculture 5.4 2.13 1 2.05 1 0.03 1 3.26 4 2.46 1 
(11. 5) (11.1) ( 0.3) (70.4) (13.3) 
Energy Development 5.7 2.58 2 2.50 2 3.82 5 1.32 4 0.87 1 
(29.4) (28.5) (108.8) (30.1) ( 5.0) 
Indians 5.6 2.66 4 2.64 4 1.00 3 2.91 3 2.17 3 
(59.9) (59.4) (16.9) (49.1) (36.7) 
Developed Rec 4.6 2.32 1 2.20 1 0.89 1 3.41 1 2.49 1 
(10.6) (10.0) ( 4.1) (15.6) (11.4) 
Control Development 6.3 2.16 2 2.06 2 0.75 2 2.75 2 3.09 1 
(27.0) (25.7) ( 9.4) (34.4) (19.3) 
Decision Maker 5.4 3.76 2 3.64 2 2.72 2 3.28 2 2.10 1 
(40.7) (39.4) (29.4) (35.5) (11.4) 
Objective Vector 5.5 3.01 2 2.94 2 1.61 2 3.63 2 3.35 2 
(33.1) (32.3) (17.7) (40.1) . (36.8) 
Total NSPFI (138.4) (134.8) (139.3) (199.6) ( 69.6) 
Level 3 
CAIIl CA 112 CA 113 CA /14 CA 115 
GROUP SSN NSIP PWR NSIP PWR NSIP PWR NSIP PWR NSIP PWR (NSPFI) (NSPFI) (NSPFI) (NSPFI) (NSPFI) 
Agricu1 ture 5.4 1.84 1 1. 74 1 2.66 1 2.34 1 0.89 1 
(10.0) ( 9.4) (14.4) (12.7) ( 4.8) 
Energy Development 5.7 2.65 1 2.57 1 1. 56 1 1.21 1 3.56 1 
(15.0) (14.6) ( 8.9) ( 6.9) (20.2) 
Indians 5.6 2.58 3 2.44 1 2.71 1 2.39 1 1. 96 4 
(43.6) (13.7) (15.2) (13.4) (44.2) 
Developed Rec 4.6 1.81 1 1.89 1 2.71 1 2.78 1 1.40 1 
( 8.3) ( 8.6) (12.4) (12.6) ( 6.4) 
Control Development 6.3 1.90 2 2.13 1 3.25 1 3.33 1 1.64 1 
(23.7) (13.3) (20.3) (20.8) (10.3) 
Decision Maker 5.4 3.83 2 3.79 1 3.11 1 2.73 1 3.75 2 
(41. 5) (20.5) (16.8) (14.7) (40.5) 
Objective Vector 5.5 3.11 1 3.03 1 3.89 1 3.61 1 2.34 1 
(17 .1) (16.6) (21.4) (19.8) (12.9) 
Total NSPFI (100.5) ( 59.7) ( 71.1) (66.3) ( 85.9) 
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COST INDICES AND NON-SYSTEMIC ISSUE POSITIONS 
THE NSIP AND XCL ARE INVERSELY RELATED 
FORMULAE ARE: XCL = (S) (CL*CC) 
NSIP = PIP/XCL 
Level 1 SELECTED 
Course of GROUP 1 GROUP 2 GROUP 3 GROUP 4 GROUP 5 GROUP 6 VECTOR 
Action XCL PIP (NSIP) PIP (NSIP) PIP (NSIP) PIP (NSIP) PIP (NSIP) PIP (NSIP) PIP (NSIP) 
UB 1 54 75.4 (1. 40) 161.6 (2.99) 126.8 (2.35) 98.4 (1. 82) 127.2 (2.36) 194.8 (3.61) 145.4 (2.69) 
UB 2 54 157.4 (2.91) 71.4 (1. 32) 162.4 (3.01) 161.8 (3.00) 159.8 (2.96) 185.8 (3.44) 209.8 (3.89) 
UB 3 54 39.4 (0.73) 179.2 (3.32) 93.2 (1.73J 78.4 (1. 45) 126.0 (2.33) 182.2 (3.37) 129.6 (2.40) 
UB 4 54 146.4 (2.71) 124.8 (2.31) 195.0 (3.61) 154.0 (2.85) 165.2 (3.06) 229.8 (4.26) 206.4 (3.82) 
UB 5 54 106.0 (1. 96) 116.8 (2.16 ) 186.2 (3.45) 87.2 (1.61) 128.2 (2.37) 187.2 (3.47) 175.4 (3.25) 
Level 2 SELECTED 
Course of GROUP 1 GROUP 2 GROUP 4 GROUP 4 GROUP 5 GROUP 6 VECTOR 
Action XCL PIP (NSIP) PIP (NSIP) PIP (NSIP) PIP (NSIP) PIP (NSIP) PIP (NSIP) PIP (NSIP) 
UT 1 54 114.8 (2.13) 139.4 (2.58) 143.8 (2.66) 1Z5.2 (2.32) 116.8 (1.90) 207.0 (3.83) 162.8 (3.11) 
UT 2 54 110.8 (2.05) l35.2 (2.50) 14Z.6 (2.64) 118.8 (2.20) 111.2 (Z .13) Z04.8 (3.79) 163.4 (3.03) 
UT 3 54 1.4 (0.03) 206.4 (3.82) 54.0 (1.00) 48.Z (0.89) 40.4 (3.25) 168.Z (3.11) Z09.8 (3.89) 
UT 4 54 175.8 (3.26) 41.4 (1. 3Z) 157.2 (2.91) 184.4 (3.41) 148.6 (3.33) 147.2 (2.73) 194.8 (3.61) 
UT 5 54 132.8 (2.46) 47.0 (0.87) 117.4 (2.17) 134.6 (2.49) 167.0 (1. 64) 202.4 (3.75) 126.4 (2.34) 
Level 3 SELECTED 
Course of GROUP 1 GROUP 2 GROUP 3 GROUP 4 GROUP 5 GROUP 6 VECTOR 
Action XCL PIP (NSIP) PIP (NSIP) PIP (NSIP) PIP (NSIP) PIP (NSIP) PIP (NSIP) PIP (NSIP) 
CBR 1 54 99.6 (1.84) 142.4 (2.64) 139.4 (2.58) 98.0 (1. 81) 102.4 (1.90) 207.0 (3.83) 167.8 (3.11) 
CBR 2 54 94.2 (1. 74) 138.6 (Z .57) 131.8 (Z.44) 102.0 (1. 89) 115.0 (2.13) 204.8 (3.79) 163.4 (3.03) 
CBR 3 54 143.6 (2.66) 84.2 (1.56) 146.2 (2.71) 146.4 (2.71) 175.4 (3.25) 168.2 (3.11) 209.8 (3.89) 
CBR 4 54 126.4 (2.34) 65.6 (1. 21) 129.0 (2.39) 147.6 (Z.73) 179.6 (3.33) 147.Z (3.73) 194.8 (3.61) 
CBR 5 54 48.2 (0.89) 192.0 (3.56) 106.0 (1. 96) 75.8 (1. 40) 88.6 (1.64) 202.4 (3.75) 126.4 (2.34) 
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~ ENVIRONMENTAL VALUE MODIFICATION VECTOR INDICES 
THE SMALLER THE INDEX VALUE, THE CLOSER THE FIT BETWEEN 
EXISTING CONDITIONS AND A SET OF GROUP VALUES 
FORMULAE ARE: XEMV = ABS(EIVV-GRPVAL)/GRPSAL 
Level 1 
Environmental PROB GROUP 1 GROUP 2 GROUP 3 GROUP 4 GROUP 5 GROUP 6 Selected Condo Vector 
XEMV XEMV XEMV XEMV XEMV XEMV 
39814 People 47 6.0 1.6 5.2 7.6 4.4 2.9 4.2 
18.3 Inches 45 3.3 2.5 3.7 4.1 2.8 1.9 2.5 
57688 M-I Ac Ft 38 6.2 2.6 5.0 7.3 4.6 3.2 4.3 
262500 Irr Ac 46 2.7 4.3 2.8 2.5 3.4 2.0 2.4 
$ 91 Mill Minrls 40 4.6 2.1 4.5 5.6 4.2 2.4 3.7 
300K BBL/day 40 7.6 2.2 6.5 8.8 5.7 4.5 5.6 
387K Af/Y Indian 45 5.3 6.0 5.4 5.2 4.9 6.0 5.0 
$5000 Per Cap 40 2.8 2.7 2.8 3.9 2.6 1.7 1.6 
102K Af Export 43 4.2 2.0 4.7 3.9 4.0 2.8 3.4 
9.6 Mill Fed Ac 38 3.6 4.0 3.9 3.7 2.5 2.9 2.7 
Level 2 
Environmental PROB GROUP 1 GROUP 2 GROUP 3 GROUP 4 GROUP 5 GROUP 6 Selected Condo Vector 
XEMV XEMV XEMV XEMV XEMV XEMV 
39814 People 47 6.0 1.6 5.2 7.6 4.4 2.9 4.2 
19.2 Inches 30 3.3 2.7 3.3 4.3 2.4 2.0 2.0 
60920 M-I Ac Ft 20 5.1 2.9 4.9 5.9 3.9 3.3 3.7 
275000 Irr Ac 30 1.6 5.3 1.9 3.1 2.7 2.9 1.9 
$101 Mill Minrls 38 5.7 1.5 5.3 3.1 2.7 2.9 1.9 
350K BBL/day 26 7.7 2.3 6.7 9.0 5.9 4.7 5.8 
193K Af/Y Indian 15 3.5 3.8 3.9 3.5 3.3 3.7 2.8 
$6000 Per Cap 37 4.7 3.3 3.5 6.1 3.9 2.6 3.7 
No Exports 15 3.7 3.2 2.5 6.0 2.5 2.3 2.3 
8.7 Mill Fed Ac 10 3.8 3.5 4.2 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.0 
Level 3 
Environmental PROB GROUP 1 GROUP 2 GROUP 3 GROUP 4 GROUP 5 GROUP 6 Selected Condo Vector 
XEMV XEMV XEMV XEMV XEMV XEMV 
15833 People 15 5.2 2.1 4.6 7.3 4:2 2.7 3.6 
15.6 Inches 15 6.2 4.2 7.0 5.2 6.1 5.4 5.8 
74456 M-I Ac Ft 15 7.8 2.5 5.6 8.6 5.2 4.7 5.8 
237500 Irr Ac 5 3.2 3.7 3.4 3.2 3.6 2.0 3.0 
$ 91 Mill Minrls 40 4.6 2.1 4.5 5.6 4.2 2.4 3.7 
50K BBL/day 10 5.1 1.9 4.8 6.5 4.4 2.6 3.8 
$4000 Per Cap 5 5.9 4.3 5.5 5.2 4.9 4.5 4.6 
197K Af Export 41 5.5 3.2 6.2 5.3 5.4 4.4 5.0 
10.6 Mill Fed Ac 10 3.3 5.6 3.9 3.9 3.3 4.1 3.3 
:::l 
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